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Abstract 
Ferguson, Shon M. M.Sc. University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, October 2004. 
The Economics of Vertical Coordination in the Organic Wheat Supply Chain. 
Supervisor: Dr. J.E. Hobbs 
 
 The organic wheat supply chain in Canada operates in a relatively new sector for 
which there is very little public information to aid in price discovery.  Organic wheat 
producers must use available information in order to decide when to sell their wheat and 
whom to sell to.  The relatively low degree of market information, especially for 
producers, suggests a problem of information asymmetry, which may have ramifications 
for efficiency and the distribution of rents in the organic wheat supply chain. 
The literature on Transaction Cost Economics, Agency Theory and the 
Economics of Information is used in the thesis to theorize differences between methods 
of selling organic wheat that vary in terms of vertical coordination.  The analysis 
involves a comparison of selling to large and small grain companies, selling through 
Producer-Owned Firms (POFs) and selling directly to processors.  The theory predicts 
that producers gain from using a POF because of savings in transaction costs and higher 
prices.  These theorized differences in transaction costs and price are due to increased 
sharing of information between the producer and the marketing agent, enhanced 
producer control over the marketer, and incentive for the marketer to provide producers 
with a high price.  These benefits can also be realized by selling directly to a processor, 
but only if the producer can effectively and efficiently perform his or her own marketing 
iii 
functions.  Average cost, price and profit margins are used as a metric for comparing 
each of the four governance structures. 
A survey of organic wheat producers in Saskatchewan was undertaken in order 
to collect data on organic Hard Red Spring Wheat (HRSW) transactions.  The results 
indicate that governance structure has a statistically significant effect on organic HRSW 
prices and on producer transaction costs.  The analysis concludes that the producer 
receives the greatest profit margin from selling through the vertically coordinated POF, 
while a marketer receives the greatest profit margin if it operates as a large grain 
company and purchases HRSW on the spot market.  The results also suggest that organic 
producers that “eliminate the middleman” and sell directly to processors cannot market 
as efficiently and effectively compared with producers that use a POF.  The results of 
this thesis emphasize that increased coordination between producer and marketer 
through a POF can be advantageous for the producer, but not necessarily for the 
marketer, due to the difference in the distribution of rents.   
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction
 
1.0 Introduction 
The organic grain industry in Canada has quickly evolved from a cottage industry 
towards an industrialized system that exports internationally.  The trend towards 
increased consumption of organic food products has catalyzed organic production 
around the world, creating a world market for organic grains.  Supply chains for organic 
grains have evolved in a number of different forms, involving different economic agents 
and with different implications for efficiency.  Supply chain efficiency is important at 
every level, including primary production, marketing, processing, through to the 
consumer.  This thesis presents an analysis of the efficiency and the distribution of rents 
of alternative supply chain configurations in the Canadian organic wheat industry. 
 The organic wheat supply chain consists of several functions, including 
production, transportation, storage, cleaning, finding a buyer, price determination, 
controlling the logistics of all of these functions, etc.  This wide array of functions is 
divided up among firms in the supply chain.  In general, producers perform primary 
production functions.  Marketers act as a middleman between the producer and the 
processor or foreign buyer, and perform much of the transportation, cleaning, marketing 
and logistics functions before the grain arrives at a processor for further processing.  
This common division of a grain supply chain exhibits low levels of vertical 
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coordination between the producer and marketer entities; the transaction between these 
firms are performed on the spot market, and producers and marketers have little or no 
involvement in each other’s activities.  This system is closely related to the conventional 
grain supply chain, where many of the organic grain buyers were doing business long 
before the organic sector emerged. 
Deviations from typical low vertical coordination also exist in the organic wheat 
supply chain between producer and marketer firms.  Some producers choose to eliminate 
the marketing firm middleman entirely.  In this case they transact directly with 
processors and other foreign buyers instead of selling to an organic grain marketing 
firm.  The producer performs the functions and incurs the expenses that are otherwise 
covered by the marketer, with the goal of achieving a higher price.  Such direct 
marketing efforts by producers represent a type of vertical integration of the producer 
and marketer levels of the supply chain.   
Some producers have chosen to market cooperatively as a group, with a 
marketing firm working on commission as their agent.  While the producer and marketer 
entities are not entirely integrated in the group marketer approach, there is increased 
coordination between the producer members and their marketer.  Producers may also 
choose to sell individually to brokers that work on a commission.  In the group marketer 
and commission agent approaches, producers must perform more of the necessary 
supply chain functions, with the agent providing fewer functions apart from finding a 
buyer for the producers’ grain. 
 It is assumed that the goal of producers and other firms in a supply chain is to 
maximize profit.  For marketers, this objective is achieved by simultaneously finding a 
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buyer offering the highest price at the lowest cost possible.  Cost efficiency is thus an 
important part of the marketing decision.  While production costs would not differ 
considerably among producers’ available marketing options, Transaction Cost Theory 
(TCE) tells us that transaction costs, which are the costs of performing transactions in 
the market, can differ between alternative governance structures and institutional 
arrangements.  In TCE, governance structure can be defined as the set of rules that 
govern transactions between parties.  Some rules in transactions are defined by the law 
(e.g.: contract law), while other rules are defined by social convention.  The rules of a 
transaction culminate into a contract, which can be created verbally or in writing.  The 
contract sets out the rights and obligations of the buyer and seller.  Different governance 
structures are therefore characterized by contracts that differ in the extent, complexity, 
duration, etc. of the rights and obligations.  Institutions are defined by North (1989) as 
rules, enforcement characteristics of rules and norms of behaviour.  Institutions can 
manifest themselves through public or private organizations that affect transactions, and 
undertake functions such as transmitting information on market price and quantity, 
measuring quality, and enforcing contracts.  The efficiency of transaction organizations 
has been examined in the poultry and pork industries (Boger 2001, Martinez et. al. 
1998), where researchers have found that the drive towards transaction cost efficiency 
and increased product quality explains the increased vertical coordination in those 
sectors. 
There is evidence that governance structures and their associated transaction costs 
are important to firms when making marketing choices.  Several studies have concluded 
that transaction costs have a significant effect on the choice of vertical coordination by 
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producers.  Hobbs (1996) found that transaction costs significantly influence the 
proportion of cattle sold by producers through auctions in the UK.  Boger (2001) 
examined vertical coordination between Polish hog producers and buyers at a time when 
high quality markets were emerging, and found that transaction characteristics have a 
significant effect on the producers’ choice of marketing channel. 
 While TCE posits that the governance structure that emerges is one that 
minimizes costs, including transaction costs, this rule ignores price differences that 
result from using different governance structures.  Price differences can occur between 
different governance structures because they add different amounts of value to a product 
or because the governance structure facilitates finding higher prices.  Both prices and 
costs under the different governance structures must therefore be compared to measure 
the optimal, profit maximizing governance structure.  At present there have been no 
studies that attempt to determine the optimal governance structure for the organic wheat 
supply chain. 
1.1 Need for the Study 
Organic hard red spring wheat (HRSW) is one of the largest organic crops grown 
in Saskatchewan (AAFC 2004).  Given the expected significance of governance 
structure in the efficiency of many agri-food supply chains and the continuing growth of 
the organic grain sector, it is timely to evaluate the relative prices and cost efficiency of 
governance structure alternatives in the organic wheat supply chain in Western Canada.  
An evaluation of this kind may assist firms in the supply chain to increase their profits or 
improve overall cost efficiency.  Any improvement in cost efficiency is beneficial to the 
organic wheat supply chain, as it improves competitiveness with other countries’ organic 
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wheat supply chains and with substitute products such as conventional wheat.  To 
achieve this, a method of comparing alternative governance structures that considers 
both price and cost is needed. 
1.2 Purpose and Objectives 
 The main purpose of this thesis is to measure the relative performance of the 
existing supply chain governance structures that are used to transact organic HRSW 
between producers and buyers in Saskatchewan. 
There are several specific objectives of the study.  The study endeavours to 
provide a better understanding of the functioning of the organic wheat supply chain.  
The study also seeks to provide a theory and method that can be used to measure the 
relative performance of alternative governance structures.  In particular, the study aims 
to provide an explanation for why prices and costs may differ between governance 
structures.  This explanation is complemented by providing an assessment of price 
variability and producers’ concerns regarding price information asymmetry. 
1.3 Hypothesis 
 The null hypothesis put forth in this thesis is that there are no significant 
differences in price or cost between the various governance structures that producers use 
to transact organic HRSW to downstream firms.  Each alternative governance structure 
is tested for significant difference from a defined base governance structure.  In the 
thesis, the base governance structure is the transaction with grain companies that are 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) handling agents.  The alternative governance structures 
are transactions through Producer-Owned Firms, transactions direct to processors or 
other downstream firms, and transactions through grain companies that are not CWB 
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handling agents.  The rejection of the hypothesis means that a particular governance 
structure is significantly different from the base governance structure. 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
 This thesis is composed of nine chapters.  A background on the organic wheat 
supply chain is provided in Chapter 2.  A review of the relevant literature is included in 
Chapter 3.  A description of the theoretical framework that is used to analyze the 
problem is given in Chapter 4, which includes a model that can quantitatively compare 
the prices, costs and profits of alternative governance structures.  The methodology of 
the thesis is described in Chapter 5.  The results of the hypothesis test are presented in 
Chapter 6.  A methodology and results for measuring the nature of a HRSW price 
distribution and producers’ opinions on information asymmetry is presented in Chapter 7 
and Chapter 8 respectively.  Conclusions follow in Chapter 9. 
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2 Chapter 2: Industry Characteristics and Background 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 A brief background of the organic wheat industry and the organic wheat supply 
chain is provided in this chapter.  The chapter begins by providing a general description 
of the size and growth of the industry, followed by a description of the alternative supply 
chain configurations.  The involvement of organizations in the supply chain is then 
described, including the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), price discovery organizations 
such as commodity exchanges and quality assurance organizations such as certification 
bodies.  Vertical coordination in the organic wheat supply chain is then discussed, 
including the drivers of existing vertical coordination arrangements and their outcomes1.  
The history of vertical coordination in organic and conventional grain sectors concludes 
the chapter. 
2.1 Industry Characteristics 
Organic wheat production in Western Canada is small compared to conventional 
wheat production, but it is a fast growing segment of the wheat industry. Organic wheat 
acreage in Western Canada increased by 126 percent from 1998 to 2001 (AAFC 2002). 
                                                 
1 A driver is defined in this context as an exogenous effect that causes increased vertical coordination to 
occur. 
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There are several components of the organic wheat supply chain, including 
primary producers, grain cleaners, grain companies, brokers, export buyers, and 
processors.  There were approximately 3134 certified organic producers in Canada in 
2003, of which 1049 are located in Saskatchewan, the most of any province (AAFC 
2004).  The number of certified organic grain producers continues to grow.  In that same 
year, there were 456 certified processors and handlers in Canada, of which 94 were 
located in Saskatchewan.  Saskatchewan had the largest acreage of organic crop 
production in Canada, totalling 386,000 acres with an estimated farmgate value of $92 
million.  Most certified organic producers in Saskatchewan are involved in growing 
grains or oilseeds.  Saskatchewan producers grew 145,000 acres of organic wheat and 
durum in 2003.  Given that Saskatchewan has a large share of Canadian grain production 
and producers, it is appropriate that this thesis examine the supply chain of 
Saskatchewan’s largest organic crop, which is organic Hard Red Spring Wheat. 
There are further upstream and downstream components of the supply chain, such 
as upstream seed providers and downstream distributors and retailers of wheat products.  
An analysis of these other components of the supply chain is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, which focuses on the primary production to processor stages of the supply chain. 
2.2 Organizations in the Organic Wheat Sector 
 There are several organizations in Western Canada that have an influence on the 
organic wheat supply chain.  While there are several governmental organizations that 
affect the grains industry, there are a few that are especially influential for organic 
wheat, including the Canadian Wheat Board and organizations that certify firms as 
organic.  It is also interesting to note that there is an absence of organizations that 
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provide price information to firms in the organic wheat supply chain.  This section 
describes these organizations. 
2.2.1 The Canadian Wheat Board 
The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is legislated to market all wheat and barley 
that is destined for export or domestic human consumption in the prairie region of 
Canada (CWB 2004).  While the CWB has the power to market organic wheat or any 
other wheat that is graded by the CGC, it does not market organic wheat. 
 The CWB pools the revenues that it receives for conventional wheat so that the 
proceeds of each sale are put in a single account, which is distributed back to the 
producers so that each producer receives the same price for a given quality of wheat.  
Pooling is carried out on an annual basis, beginning August 1 and ending July 31.  It is 
against the law for producers in the “CWB designated area” (including Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, Alberta, and North-east British Columbia) to sell their wheat and barley 
outside of the CWB, unless the producer has sold their wheat to the CWB at the pooled 
price and then bought it back at the market price on that day. The process of selling at 
the pooled price and buying back at the market price that day is called a Producer Direct 
Sale (PDS).  If the market price on the given day is greater than the pool price, then the 
difference is paid to the CWB.  If the market price is less than the pool price, then the 
difference is paid to the producer.  The difference between these prices can be very 
large, depending on the time of the sale.  The pooled price from the CWB includes an 
initial payment issued at the time of the PDS, plus any other interim payments later in 
the crop year, and a final payment after the pool account is closed for the particular year. 
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Even though the CWB does not market organic wheat, the rules still apply so that 
organic producers cannot sell their wheat until they have performed the PDS.  Organic 
producers are not allowed to sell outside of the pool because it is believed that the 
organic producers would compete with the CWB’s own sales effort for conventional 
wheat, and could cause prices to decrease for producers in the pool.  Moreover, 
producers that sold outside of the pool without performing a PDS would sell most often 
when the cash price of wheat is the highest, thus exacerbating the effect of competition 
on prices in the pool.  Organic wheat is also capable of compromising the integrity of the 
conventional wheat pool accounts, since organic wheat that is not sold to an organic 
buyer may end up being sold in the conventional market, thus competing with the CWB 
and lowering pooled returns. 
Producers incur transaction costs from CWB transactions.  In transactions with 
companies that are not handling agents of the CWB, the PDS from the CWB typically 
costs producers $1.50 per tonne, which can be considered as a transaction cost2.  In 
addition, the CWB initial, interim and final payments that organic producers receive 
already include marketing charges accrued to the particular pool account, despite the fact 
that the CWB has not performed any marketing tasks for organic producers. 
A PDS is not necessarily a concern for the producers when organic wheat is sold 
to a company that is a handling agent of the CWB.  The PDS process is internalized by 
the handling agent in these types of transactions(CWB 2004).  When wheat is sold 
                                                 
2 The CWB charges an additional $0.50 per tonne for producer direct sales where the producer is not 
required to pay the CWB’s cash price immediately, but can wait until a later date, such as when they 
receive payment from their directly sold organic wheat. 
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through a CWB handling agent, the producer receives initial payment from the CWB 
and then the producer must negotiate for the organic premium with the CWB handling 
agent.  Interim and final payments from the CWB are sent to the producer later in the 
crop year. 
2.2.2 Price Discovery Organizations 
Price discovery for organic wheat is very different from price discovery for 
conventional wheat.  For conventional wheat, the CWB, the government and other 
private firms conduct extensive surveillance of the supply and demand situation in all 
world markets that have a bearing on the present and future Canadian wheat price.  
Public and private organizations use surveys to collect statistics on areas planted, yield, 
stocks, etc.  These organizations disseminate and distribute this information for 
producers’ use.  There is one Canadian commodity exchange (the Winnipeg Commodity 
Exchange) with a futures contract for feed wheat, and there are three U.S. commodity 
exchanges with futures contracts for wheat of various qualities (the Chicago Board of  
Trade, Kansas Commodity Exchange and Minneapolis Grain Exchange).  Futures 
contracts provide price data that can be interpreted directly by producers or through 
government or private firms to yield price discovery information.  Exchanges also utilize 
cash closing committees that are responsible for reporting a daily cash price.  Radio, 
television and newspaper communicate wheat price data on a daily basis to the public. 
There is much less market information available to the organic wheat industry as 
there does not exist any organization that gathers and interprets organic wheat price data, 
nor is there a futures contract for organic wheat.  While there are several wheat 
transactions made every week, there is no process to share this information that could 
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inform individuals on the market clearing price.  Price information is thus private unless 
transacting individuals choose to make it known to others.  Moreover, there is no way to 
verify the truth of individual’s statements on prices paid and received.  This results in 
significantly less market information and lower quality marketing information in the 
organic wheat supply chain regarding the prices of different sellers and expected prices 
in the future.  Unlike downstream marketers and processors, most organic producers 
suffer to a greater extent because they do not have economies of scale related to price, 
supply and demand data collection and interpretation.  Producers do not know all of the 
offer prices on a given day, and they have very little means to forecast organic grain 
prices in order to decide if they should sell now or wait for a higher price.  As a result of 
these organizational limitations to price discovery, producers, intermediaries, and end-
users discuss prices on a regular basis through person-to-person communication. 
2.2.3 Certification Organizations 
 Organic producers, organic grain buyers, and other firms that buy and sell 
organic products must be certified before they can label their output as organic.  The 
organic characteristic is a credence attribute, which means that it is an attribute that 
cannot be physically verified either before or after consumption (McCluskey 2000).  The 
credence characteristic of organic foods necessitates certification in order for the organic 
attribute to be effectively signalled to buyers and ultimately to consumers.   
Certification requires documentation by participating firms in order to provide 
sufficient proof that the original product was grown in accordance with organic 
production practices and that no contamination has occurred from non-organic sources.  
Producers must prove that they grow and handle their grains following the guidelines 
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established by organizations that establish standards for producing and handling organic 
grains.  Other firms that handle the organic grains must prove that they handle the grains 
in their facilities using the required procedures.  Firms in the organic wheat supply chain 
incur costs to acquire third party certifications by paying a certification body to provide 
the service. 
2.3 The Transaction Process 
Low degrees of vertical coordination characterize the organic wheat supply chain 
in Western Canada.  The transactional relationships between producers and buyers of 
organic wheat are mainly market specification contracts, using the terminology of 
Mighell and Jones (1963).  In market specification contracts, producers grow their wheat 
and then communicate their available quantities and qualities to potential buyers, or they 
contract prior to seeding or harvest.  Producers and buyers must communicate 
individually with each other through telephone, fax, internet or in person.  If demand 
exceeds supply a producer may be in a situation where buyers tender bids to the 
producers, but if supply exceeds demand the producer may become a price taker at the 
mercy of buyers.  Contracts arranged prior to harvest are almost identical in form to 
those made after harvest, except that the buyer generally requires the land location of the 
contracted wheat field and estimated production in order to make sure that the producer 
does not shirk on his or her contractual obligations. 
2.4 Supply Chain Configurations 
In general, producers sell organic wheat directly to a processor or foreign importer, 
or producers sell to a middleman marketer that in turn sells to a processor or foreign 
importer.  Horizontal transactions can also take place between marketers.  Marketers 
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include grain companies, brokers and Producer-Owned Firms (POFs).  Some grain 
companies are handling agents of the CWB, while others are not.  Figure 2.1 illustrates 
the possible supply chain sequences for organic wheat.  The supply chain levels that are 
within the scope of the thesis are illustrated in dark font in the figure. 
2.5 Functions of Firms at Each Level of the Supply Chain 
 A simple way to describe the various firms that are components of the organic 
wheat supply chain is to describe their functions within the chain.  Table 2.1 provides a 
summary of the division of functions for producers and specific types of marketer firms.  
In Table 2.1, an “I” indicates that the intermediary/marketer performs the function and a 
“P” indicates that the producer performs the function.  Some functions are not performed 
and are designated by “n/a”.  This section begins with a description of the general 
functions of producers and marketers and then discusses the differences in functions 
among the different types of marketers. 
2.5.1 Producer Functions 
 Producers perform the function of primary production of wheat.  Producers can 
also perform functions that add value to their wheat, including cleaning, storage, 
transportation and processing.  Producers also perform functions related to marketing 
their wheat, such as searching for a buyer that offers an acceptable price for the wheat, 
negotiating the details of the transaction, completing the associated paperwork for the 
transaction, and monitoring the buyer’s action with respect to timing of payment and 
amount of payment.  The number of marketing functions that are required of producers 
is determined by their choice of buyer, or “governance structure”.  By using the term 
“governance structure”, it is implied that different buyer choices entail different rules 
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that govern the nature of the transaction, including the rights and obligations of each 
party. 
 
Producer 
Processor 
(Domestic 
or Foreign) 
Or Foreign 
Importer 
Grain 
Company 
Commission 
Broker 
Producer-
Owned 
Firm 
Further Downstream 
Processing and 
Consumption 
Inputs 
(Seed, fuel, 
equipment, 
land) 
Certification 
Bodies 
 
Figure 2.1 - Organic Wheat Supply Chain 
 27
Table 2.1 - Division of functions between producer and marketer levels for 
governance structures (P = performed by producer, I = performed by marketer) 
Function Governance Structure 
Increasing Vertical Coordination 
-------------------------------------------------------------> 
Marketer Type: Grain Companies Brokers None 
 
 
CWB 
Agent 
Not CWB 
Agent 
Brokers POF 
Broker 
Direct to 
Processor 
Transformation 
Functions: 
     
   Production P P P P P 
   Storage between  
   production and delivery  
   to downstream buyer 
P / I P / I P P P 
   Transport from farm I I P P P / I 
   Cleaning and     
   transport from cleaner I I P P P / I 
   Transport to    
   processor/buyer I I P P P / I 
Transaction Functions:      
   CWB PDS (wheat only) I P/I P / I P / I P 
   Searching for  
   marketers’ prices P P P n/a n/a 
   Searching for  
   processor prices I I I I P 
   Marketer reputation  
   search P P P n/a n/a 
   Downstream buyer   
   reputation search I I I I P 
   Quality testing I P / I P P P 
   Sample delivery to   
   marketer P P P P n/a 
   Sample delivery to    
   processor I I I I P 
   Filling out paperwork P / I P / I P / I P / I P 
   Monitoring producer I I I I n/a 
   Monitoring marketer P P P P n/a 
   Enforcing marketer 
   payment P P n/a n/a n/a 
   Enforcing downstream     
   buyer payment I P / I P / I P / I P 
n/a = not an applicable cost 
Source: Author’s estimates, personal communications with grain companies 
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2.5.2 Marketer Functions 
Marketers are defined in this thesis as firms that perform the functions that are 
necessary to transact between producers and downstream buyers such as processors and 
foreign buyers.  The functions of the specific types of marketers are outlined in Table 
2.1. 
It is generally the case that marketers perform or coordinate the value-adding 
functions of cleaning, blending and transportation to the buyer’s location.  These value-
adding functions entail a cost, referred to in this thesis as “transformation costs”. 
Marketer firms also perform functions in order to transact with both the upstream 
producer and the downstream processor/buyer.  These transaction functions are 
numerous, and include negotiating with the upstream producer, monitoring the upstream 
producer, searching for a downstream buyer, negotiating with the downstream buyer, 
completing necessary accounting and certification paperwork with the producer and 
buyer, and enforcing buyer payment.  These transaction functions entail a cost and are 
referred to as “transaction costs”. 
There are several types of marketers, including grain companies that are handling 
agents of the CWB (hereafter referred to as CWB agents), grain companies that are not 
handling agents of the CWB (hereafter referred to as non-agents), brokers and POFs.  
These marketers differ in the value-adding functions and transaction functions that they 
perform.  The defining characteristics of the different marketer types is provided in the 
next section. 
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Grain Companies 
 Grain companies generally own an elevator at one or more locations.  Organic 
wheat is purchased by the grain company and is delivered to the elevator, where it may 
be cleaned, stored, and possibly blended in order for it to meet the specifications of their 
customer.  The organic wheat is then loaded into a truck or an inter-modal container for 
transport to the buyer.  Grain companies generally pay for all transportation charges 
from the farm to the downstream buyer.  Grain companies also perform several 
transaction functions, including PDS and certification paperwork, finding buyers, quality 
testing, sample delivery to the buyer, monitoring producer actions (in contracts), and 
enforcing buyer payment.   
A fundamental difference between grain companies, brokers and POFs is that 
grain companies take ownership of the grain.  Grain companies’ margins are therefore 
not transparent to producers and buyers in the case of organic grains.  The characteristics 
of grain companies that are CWB handling agents and are not CWB handling agents is 
provided in the next two sections. 
CWB Handling Agent Grain Companies 
Some grain companies are designated handling agents of the Canadian Wheat 
Board (CWB), which means that they can issue CWB initial payments to producers 
when producers deliver their organic wheat.  CWB agents also have the privilege of 
being able to buy organic grain on the CWB account.  These companies repay the CWB 
the conventional portion of the price on the given day that they actually sell the organic 
wheat, which acts as a type of hedge against price fluctuations in the conventional wheat 
market (that probably also affects the organic wheat price).  The ability of CWB agents 
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to purchase organic wheat on the CWB account also acts as a loan that allows the CWB 
agent to purchase organic wheat from producers before the downstream buyer has paid.  
These companies pay the organic producer the conventional price, plus an organic 
premium.  The organic premium is a cost that cannot be borrowed from the CWB and 
for which there exists no hedging mechanism.   
It is generally the case that CWB agent grain companies sometimes buy producers’ 
grain and hold the grain for a period of time before selling.  This behaviour is different 
than other organic wheat buyers, and indicates that CWB agent grain companies may be 
speculating in the market, or they may be attempting to secure enough grain to make 
their commitments.  If a CWB agent buys organic wheat from a producer and pays the 
producer an organic premium in advance of knowing the downstream price, it must 
discount the organic premium to account for the risk that the organic premium will 
decrease. 
CWB agents that buy organic wheat are generally large grain companies with one 
or more elevator locations.  Storage, blending and loading often occurs at the elevator 
locations.  Cleaning may occur in the elevator or it may be performed by a fee-for-
service grain cleaning firm.  CWB agents buy the majority of the organic wheat in 
Saskatchewan, and likely have economies of scale with respect to their functions.  
Similar to other marketers, CWB agents use containers and bulk truck loads to transport 
organic grains.  Organic wheat transaction quantities are not large enough for companies 
to use bulk boat shipments, as would occur in conventional wheat sales.  CWB agents 
may receive discounts on trucking, rail, or marine transportation because of their size.  
Smaller grain companies, brokers and POFs may also receive discounts, but these would 
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be more idiosyncratic, depending on factors such as backhauls or other timing 
considerations. 
Non-CWB Handling Agent Grain Companies 
Grain companies that are not CWB handling agents may have a central physical 
location where cleaning, storage, blending and loading occurs.   If they do not have these 
facilities, they may arrange for cleaning with a fee-for-service company and coordinate 
transportation directly from the producer’s yard to the cleaning facility, and on to the 
customer.   
Non-agents must arrange for the PDS to be performed with the CWB before the 
grain can be purchased by that grain company.  The CWB is no longer involved once the 
PDS is completed, and a grain company that agrees to buy this wheat cannot buy it on 
the CWB account, but rather must pay the full amount directly to the producer.  The 
inability of these companies to buy through the CWB means that they must finance the 
purchase on their own, through either a loan or by performing a “back-to-back” sale.  A 
“back-to-back” sale is characterized by completing the transaction with the upstream 
producer at approximately the same time as the subsequent transaction with the 
downstream processor or buyer.  In this situation, the downstream buyer pays the grain 
company and the grain company pays the producer shortly thereafter.  Non-agents 
perform most of the same transaction functions as CWB agents, but they may not pay 
for quality testing, as some non-agents cannot justify the expense of owning testing 
equipment.  Non-agents may not enforce downstream payment as strongly as CWB 
agents, since they are not as influential as larger CWB agent grain companies. 
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Brokers  
In general, organic grain brokers can be defined as firms that act as agents to the 
upstream producers by negotiating sales in return for a fee or commission.  Brokers 
generally do not take ownership of the wheat.  The marketing margin of a broker is 
typically transparent to the producer.   
Brokers do not perform as many value-adding functions as grain companies.  
Organic wheat sold by brokers may be stored and cleaned by the producer or by a fee-
for-service company.  Blending does not likely occur because the shipment would not 
enter an elevator facility.  As in the grain company case, the broker makes arrangements 
for the organic wheat to be transported to the buyer by truck or intermodal container.  
The cost of transportation may be paid by the producer or by the broker. 
Brokers perform many transaction functions, but not as many as grain companies.  
Brokers’ transaction functions include finding buyers, sample delivery to the buyer, 
filling out paperwork, monitoring producer actions (in contracts), and enforcing buyer 
payment.  PDS paperwork and quality testing are transaction functions that are not 
usually performed by brokers, with producers undertaking these functions instead.  The 
producer does not receive payment until the broker has received payment from the buyer 
and deducts the commission. 
Producer Owned Firms 
Generally, POFs are similar to commission brokers, but they market the products 
of the producer owners over an extended period of time.  The POF employs an agent to 
act on behalf of the members/owners.  POFs are organized as either cooperatives or 
corporations.  The marketing agent typically receives a percent commission as an 
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incentive to maximize prices to producers.  The POF members do not receive payment 
until the POF has received payment from the buyer and deducts the commission and any 
applicable transformation costs. 
Not all POFs are located on the same point on the continuum of vertical 
coordination.  One POF in Saskatchewan (Marysburg Organic Producers) operates like a 
relational contract.  Producers own shares in the corporation and employ a marketing 
agent.  The obligations of the principal and agent are specified and self-enforced, which 
are characteristics of vertical financial integration.  However, the agreement to cooperate 
is based more on goodwill than on a superior-subordinate relationship between the 
producer and marketer respectively, which are characteristics of a relational contract.  
The other POF in Saskatchewan (Farmer Direct) is cooperatively organized and displays 
the characteristics of strict vertical integration. 
2.6 Vertical Coordination 
This thesis focuses on vertical coordination between producers and marketers.  
Vertical coordination is defined by Mighell and Jones (1963) as: 
“…all the ways of harmonizing the successive vertical stages of production 
and marketing.  The market-price system, vertical integration, contracting, 
cooperation singly or in combination are some of the alternative means of 
coordination” (p.1). 
Organic producers’ choice of buyer type can be measured in terms of the level of 
vertical coordination.  As table 2.1 indicates, changing from a grain company 
governance structure to selling directly to processors entails increasing degrees of 
vertical coordination.  Transactions through grain companies involve very little 
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coordination between the producer and the marketer other than arranging the sale and 
delivering.  Transactions through brokers involve more vertical coordination between 
the producer and the broker agent, involving the coordination of the agent’s actions with 
the producer.  Even more coordination is necessary with a POF, since the arrangement 
lasts much longer.  Transactions directly between producers and processors or foreign 
buyers represent vertical integration between the producer and marketer stages of the 
supply chain, as the producer must perform all of the value-adding and transaction tasks 
that a grain company would typically undertake.  These choices are thus on a spectrum 
of vertical coordination. 
2.6.1 History of Vertical Coordination in the Wheat Supply Chain 
The principles of vertical coordination between producers and downstream firms 
in grain supply chains have been important for decades.  Grain producers in the Prairie 
provinces first sought to gain control of the grain companies during the early 1900s.  
Producers wanted more control of grain companies so that the companies would work as 
agents on farmers’ behalf instead of against the farmers.  This movement was catalyzed 
by reports of grain companies taking advantage of producers by deducting excessive 
dockage and improperly weighing their loads (Fowke 1957).   The companies were also 
accused of collusion in setting the purchase price.  The goal of producers to have grain 
companies working for the producer manifested itself in the establishment of farmer-
owned grain companies.  Through the twentieth century, and until recently, these 
cooperatives became large and prosperous, while at the same time keeping their 
marketing margins low, to the benefit of their producer members. 
 35
 Closer forms of vertical coordination have also occurred in the organic grain 
sector.  The Girvin Cooperative was the first cooperative organic grain marketer and 
processor in Saskatchewan, emerging in the 1980s.  The organization was abandoned in 
the early 1990s due to a lack of membership commitment.   
Shortly after the demise of the Girvin Cooperative in 1993, a group of organic 
producers decided to organize a group marketing scheme, which started with six 
producers.  One of the six producers volunteered to perform the function of marketing 
the group’s grain.  The organization grew to include approximately 40 shareholders.  
This group is known as Marysburg Organic Producers Inc, and continues to operate in 
Saskatoon, SK.  An organic grain producer cooperative has recently formed, under the 
name Farmer Direct Cooperative Ltd.  This organization has approximately 80 members, 
and it also markets organic grains from its Regina location (Farmer Direct 2004).  
Marysburg Organic Producers Inc. and Farmer Direct are the only two known POFs that 
sell organic grains in Saskatchewan.  Although Marysburg Organic Producers is 
incorporated and Farmer Direct is organized as a cooperative, both organizations work 
on a percentage commission separately for each producer.  No revenue pooling occurs 
within these organizations. 
2.6.2 Drivers of Vertical Coordination 
Hobbs and Young (2000) explain the trend towards increased vertical coordination 
by examining its technological, regulatory, and socio-economic drivers.  Liability and 
traceability are examples of regulatory drivers.  Perishability, product differentiation, 
and biotechnology are examples of technological drivers.  Changes in consumer 
lifestyles and preferences are examples of socio-economic drivers. 
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Much of the increased coordination in grain markets has come in the form of 
increased contracting between producers and grain buyers, although this phenomenon is 
partially attributed to biotechnology in conventional grain supply chains.  Organic 
supply chains are not affected by the biotechnology driver because genetically modified 
organisms are prohibited in organic production.  However, organic wheat has its own set 
of influential drivers.  Traceability drivers have already affected vertical coordination in 
organic wheat through the Identity Preservation (IP) and quality assurance systems 
required for organic certification.  Consumer preferences for more direct interaction with 
agriculture (the “buy local” phenomenon) drive direct selling from producers to 
consumers.   
The lack of organizations to aid in price discovery, and producers’ subsequent 
belief that controlling their marketer’s actions can aid the perceived problem of 
asymmetric price information, may be the most significant driver of vertical 
coordination in the organic grain supply chain.  Some producers see vertical integration 
with the marketer as a method of gaining better information and therefore receive higher 
prices compared to marketing through other means. 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
A background of the organic wheat supply chain and its organizations was 
provided by this chapter.  The organic wheat supply chain formally begins as certified 
organic primary producers purchase inputs and grow organic wheat.  Producers sell their 
organic wheat to marketers who sell the organic wheat to processors or foreign 
importers.  Organic wheat is transformed along the supply chain into a product that is 
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purchased by consumers.  This thesis examines the various ways that producers sell their 
organic wheat to downstream firms.   
There are five different types of organic wheat supply chains that producers can 
use.  Producers can sell to marketers such as CWB agent grain companies, non-CWB 
agent grain companies, brokers, or POFs.  Producers can bypass these agents and sell 
directly to millers or other downstream buyers.  The different types of firms that 
producers transact with differ by the degree of vertical coordination that is required 
between the parties in the transaction.  Transactions with grain companies entail the least 
vertical coordination, while POF and broker transactions entail higher amounts of 
vertical coordination.  Eliminating the middleman entirely and selling directly to 
processors is a form of vertical integration of the production and marketing levels.  The 
producers’ choice of firm type therefore affects the vertical coordination in their 
transaction. 
Organizations to assist in price discovery do not exist in the organic wheat supply 
chain.  The CWB acts to ensure that organic wheat sales do not negatively affect the 
pool accounts by requiring that organic wheat be sold to the CWB at the pool price and 
bought back at the price that given day, known as a PDS.  Certification bodies provide 
the service of third party organic certification, which is necessary to assure buyers that 
the wheat contains the organic attribute. 
This chapter has provided a background on the relevance of vertical coordination 
in describing the organic wheat supply chain.  A review of literature that relates to the 
analysis of vertical coordination is provided in the next chapter. 
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3 Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
3.0 Introduction 
There are several areas of literature that provide the theory that is required to 
understand the effect of governance structure on prices and costs.  Literature from 
several disciplines of economic theory is relevant to this thesis, including Transaction 
Cost Economics, Agency Theory, Competency Theory and the Economics of 
Information.  Literature that uses welfare models to measure the effect of transaction 
cost changes is also relevant.  The concepts from these areas of economic literature that 
are relevant to the theoretical framework, theoretical model and methodology chapters 
of this thesis are discussed in this chapter. 
3.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
The seminal literature on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is central to the 
theoretical framework of this thesis.  The genesis of TCE was provided by Coase (1937) 
in his seminal paper “The Nature of the Firm.”   The central thesis of Coase’s paper was 
that the fundamental purpose of a firm is to organize transactions, and that firms and 
markets are the alternative means of conducting transactions.  Firms can choose to 
transact a good through the market mechanism or internalize the transaction within the 
firm.  Coase posited that there is a cost to using the market mechanism for making 
vertical transactions between firms in a supply chain.   Moreover, Coase suggested that 
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the number of successive stages of production that are contained within a firm was a 
decision variable that depended on the relative costs of using the market versus 
internalizing the transaction within the firm.  A firm internalizes successive stages of 
production within a firm until the marginal benefit of transacting through the market is 
greater than the marginal benefit of internalizing the transaction.  In this thesis, 
transactions with different types of buyers differ in the successive stages of production 
that are contained within the producer firm.  Transactions with grain companies use the 
market, while selling through a broker, POF or directly to processor internalize more 
aspects of the transaction. 
Williamson (1979) further developed Coase’s concept and in doing so created 
modern TCE theory.  Williamson postulated that the “governance structures” that 
determine the rules of transactions are not a given, but are decision variables that are 
chosen by comparing their relative costs.  In this thesis, the five types of buyers of 
organic wheat are considered to be alternative “governance structures”. 
Williamson also posited that firms choose the governance structure that minimizes 
cost.  The principle of cost minimization is incorporated into this thesis, as the 
methodology compares transaction costs amongst alternative governance structures. 
Williamson’s work also described the basic behavioural assumptions of TCE and 
the fundamental properties of transactions.  The first main assumption of TCE is that 
parties in a transaction exhibit bounded rationality.  In general, bounded rationality 
implies that individuals attempt to act rationally, but are unable to do so because they do 
not have complete information.  The assumption of bounded rationality means that 
parties in a transaction will agree to a contract that is in their best interests, but they do 
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not have perfect information regarding the other party or what transpires in the future 
with respect to the contract.   
The second assumption of TCE is that parties in a transaction may act 
opportunistically, which is defined by Williamson as “self-interest seeking with guile” 
(p.7).  The opportunism assumption means that a party to a transaction may act in a way 
that exploits the other party to their own advantage.  Combining the behaviours of 
bounded rationality and opportunism, parties to a transaction will not wilfully enter into 
a contract where their partner exploits them, but they may enter into a situation where 
they are exploited because they have no means of predicting future exploitation at the 
time that the contract is made.  The theoretical framework of this thesis uses the 
behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Williamson proposed that transactions can be characterized by their endowments 
of uncertainty, asset specificity and frequency.  The degree of uncertainty in transactions 
is the party’s perception of the likeliness that a transaction will occur as expected, for 
example, in terms of price, time of payment, quality and quantity.  The degree of asset 
specificity in transactions is determined by the degree to which one party has invested 
resources specific to the transaction that have little or no value in an alternative use.  
Williamson dubbed the term “fundamental transformation” as the change that occurs 
after specific assets become part of a contract and are then vulnerable to appropriation 
due to the bilateral trading relationship that is created.  The presence of uncertainty and 
asset specificity may result in opportunistic behaviour.   Parties are driven to reduce the 
risk of being exploited by incurring transaction costs.  Increasing frequency of 
transactions results in less risk of opportunistic behaviour because individuals learn to 
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avoid exploitative situations and reputation effects reduce the payoff from opportunism.  
Frequent transactions with the same party involve relational contracting.  That is, both 
parties have a mutual interest in maintaining the relationship and it is in both parties’ 
interests to not exploit the other.  This thesis analyzes the characteristics of organic 
wheat transactions in order to arrive at a priori beliefs on the differences in transaction 
costs between governance structures. 
Williamson (1985) posited that there are four major types of asset specificity: site 
specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity and dedicated assets.  Site 
specificity occurs when an immobile asset must be located in a certain location in order 
to be of use in a particular transaction.  Physical asset specificity occurs when an 
physical asset has a use limited to the particular transaction.  Human asset specificity 
occurs when skills that are gained have a use limited to the particular transaction.  
Dedicated assets occur when assets are expanded on behalf of a particular buyer.  The 
additional assets may have limited use if the particular buyer reduces its purchases at a 
later time. 
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) contributed to TCE by further explaining the 
effect of asset specificity on transactions.  Klein et. al. developed the idea that specific 
assets in a transaction have a salvage value, which is the value of the asset if sold to 
another party.  A party to a transaction could exploit the transaction-specific assets of the 
other party by worsening the terms of the contract by an amount such that the asset 
returns a value that is equal only to its salvage value.  The exploited party has no choice 
but to accept the new terms of the contract because it cannot become better off by selling 
the asset.  The difference between the original value and the salvage value of the specific 
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asset is the amount of “quasi-rents” that the opportunistically-behaving firm can 
appropriate.  Klein et al.’s insights on asset specificity are applied to the case of organic 
wheat in this thesis. 
Literature on the relevance of transaction cost concepts to contemporary supply 
chain management is found in Hobbs (1996).  Hobbs explains the conceptual relevance 
of TCE in contemporary supply chain issues, and discusses the types of costs that arise 
in transactions.  Transactions costs can be divided into information (or search) costs, 
negotiation costs and monitoring (or enforcement) costs.  Information costs include 
searching for information about products, prices, inputs and the characteristics of buyers 
or sellers.  Negotiation costs include the effort required in specifying the terms of the 
contract.  Monitoring and enforcement costs arise after an exchange has been negotiated, 
and involve monitoring the behaviour of the transaction partner and enforcing the pre-
agreed terms of the contract.  Hobbs (1996) also discusses methodological issues 
regarding the testing of hypotheses using TCE theory.  This thesis uses these definitions 
of transaction cost types to identify producers’ transaction costs. 
3.2 Agency Theory and Vertical Integration 
Agency Theory can be defined as the economic analysis of cooperation in 
situations where externalities, uncertainty, limited observability, or asymmetric 
information exclude the pure market organization3 (Bamberg and Spremann 1987).  The 
problem of information asymmetry occurs because the agent often knows more about 
their own activities than the principal.  The goal of the principal is to gain information or 
                                                 
3 The “pure market organization” can be defined as the spot market where the price system works 
smoothly (Mahoney 1992) and no vertical coordination exists. 
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develop a system of incentives to ensure that the agent’s actions are in the principal’s 
interests. 
Agency theory complements the transaction cost approach to the theoretical 
framework.  It provides explanations of inefficiencies stemming from incentive 
problems when using more coordinated contracting and vertical integration.  Sykuta and 
Cook (1995) posit that contracting efficiencies exist for producer-oriented firms (POFs) 
compared to investor-owned firms (IOFs) because the principal-agent relationship 
entails less incentive to withhold information and more trust when producers contract 
with a firm that they own and control.  This principle is applied in this thesis to the case 
of POFs in the organic wheat supply chain. 
Williamson (1971) states that the advantages of a vertically integrated firm can be 
divided into three components: incentives, controls, and “inherent strategic advantages.”  
Incentive advantages include the ability of a vertically integrated firm to internalize and 
eliminate opportunism that may otherwise occur in market transactions.  The firm can 
provide strong incentives for all parts of the firm to work as an agent to the owner-
principal.  Control advantages of vertical integration include the ability to perform more 
precise own-performance evaluations and control rewards and penalties within the 
organization.  Other potential control benefits of vertical integration include easier 
conflict resolution, resulting in lower negotiation and enforcement costs for both parties 
and economies of market information exchange.  An inherent strategic advantage of 
vertical integration between the production and marketing stages is that economies of 
information exchange can occur.  Quality, price, and quantity information is allowed to 
flow more freely within the firm than between transaction partners.  In this thesis, 
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Williamson’s ideas on the advantages of vertical integration are applied to the organic 
wheat supply chain, particularly POF and direct to processor transactions. 
3.3 Prediction of Organizational Choice 
Mahoney (1992) adds to the literature on the choice of organization by providing a 
thorough literature review of the reasons for and against vertical integration, as well as 
providing a framework for predicting organizational form.  Mahoney’s framework is 
used in order to predict the governance structures that should emerge in the organic 
wheat supply chain.  Predictions can be made from the perspective of both the organic 
producer and the organic marketing firm.   
Mahoney states that the choice of organizational form may be determined from 
asset specificity and measurement uncertainty.  The resulting framework applies insights 
from two theoretical perspectives – TCE and agency theory – and offers an integrative 
organizational efficiency approach to the prediction of governance structure choice.  
Measurement uncertainty consists of the uncertainty of observing output as a means to 
reward an agent’s performance (the degree of “nonseparability”) and the uncertainty of 
observing input as a means to reward an agent’s performance (the degree of “task 
programmability”). 
Mahoney’s framework for predicting governance structure choice can be 
summarized in eight different circumstances, which are shown in Table 3.1.  When the 
output of the agent is easily measured (low nonseparability) and asset specificity is low 
(cases 1 and 5), the ease of input measurement (task programmability) is not important, 
and in either case the spot market should be chosen.  Any sort of vertical coordination is 
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not likely to be useful in these two cases because it provides no benefit compared to the 
spot market transaction. 
Table 3.1 – Predicting the Organizational Form of Vertical Control 
 Low Task Programmability High Task Programmability 
 Low 
Specificity 
High 
Specificity 
Low 
Specificity 
High 
Specificity 
Low Nonseparability 1: spot market 2: long-term contract 5: spot market 6: joint venture 
High Nonseparability 3: relational contract 
4: clan 
(hierarchy) 
7: inside 
contract 8: hierarchy 
Definitions: 
Low task programmability: Observing input (effort) is a poor measure for making rewards. 
High nonseparability: Observing output is a poor measure for making rewards. 
High specificity: Human, physical and/or site firm-specific investments are high. 
Spot market: The price system works smoothly. 
Long-term contract: Obligations of principals and agents are specified and enforced by third- 
 parties (courts). 
Relational contract: Obligations of principals and agents are specified and self-enforced.  Social 
conditioning is applicable. 
Inside contract: A hybrid arrangement between contract and hierarchy that is best described as a  
 ‘manager as monitor’ setup. 
Joint ventures: An equity agreement whereby a separate entity is created. 
Hierarchy: A superior-subordinate relationship; financial ownership (vertical integration). 
Clan: Organization that is based on a vital sense of human solidarity. 
Source: Mahoney (1992). 
 
When the output of the agent is easily measured (low nonseparability) and asset 
specificity is high (cases 2 and 6) a long term relationship is necessary for the parties to 
commit to investing in the specific assets.  Low nonseparability discourages vertical 
integration in these cases.  Given these characteristics, high task programmability would 
be accommodated by a joint venture, and low task programmability would be best suited 
to a long-term contract.   
When the output of the agent is hard to measure (high nonseparability) and asset 
specificity is low (cases 3 and 7) a long-term relationship is not required due to a lack of 
asset specificity.  If task programmability is low, a relational contract that provides 
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incentive for cooperation between the parties is required since output and behavioural 
controls are ineffective.  If task programmability is high then the “inside contract” is 
optimal.  In an inside contracting system, agents are paid based on their effort, and any 
team production within these contracts is monitored by a manager. 
When the output of the agent is difficult to measure (high nonseparability) and 
asset specificity is high (cases 4 and 8), contracting problems become severe.  Under 
high task programmability, this scenario lends itself to hierarchy (vertical integration).  
Under low task programmability, this is the worst-case scenario where asset specificity 
is high and the input and output measurements are ineffective.  A vertically integrated 
clan relationship is best under this case, where trust and human dignity are emphasized 
in order to alleviate opportunistic behaviour. 
3.4 Competency Theory 
Competency theory also complements the transaction cost approach, as it can 
explain vertical coordination inefficiencies that exhibit themselves through production 
costs.  The idea of competence theory, as described by Hodgson (1998), is that on the 
margins of a firm’s increasing scope, firms may not be as competent, and therefore, may 
not be as cost efficient as a firm that specializes in that given task.  In this thesis, the 
principle of decreasing competence as firm scope increases is also applied to the case of 
producers vertically integrating with marketers, particularly in the case of transacting 
directly with processors. 
3.5 Economics of Information 
Stigler (1961) explains the effect of price information search costs on the 
frequency dispersion of asking prices in a market.  Stigler’s analysis relaxes the 
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assumption of neoclassical economics that all individuals have perfect information, and 
claims that the bidding price dispersion is a function of the amount of “ignorance” in the 
market regarding the amount of search required.  The amount of search is a negative 
function of the cost per unit of search, and a positive function of the percentage of the 
seller’s expected revenue and the percentage of experienced producers in the market.  
The variance of supply and demand in the organic wheat market can affect the size of 
the price dispersion, with greater variance leading to greater price dispersion.  According 
to Stigler (1961), greater “geographical size” (p.219), which can be interpreted in the 
case of organic wheat as the difficulty of searching, can also lead to greater price 
dispersion, and can potentially affect the cost of search. 
Individuals choose the optimum amount of search by searching until the marginal 
cost of search equals its marginal return.  By turning Stigler’s argument around to 
discuss bidding prices instead of asking prices, a conceptual framework for the effect of 
search costs on price can be developed for organic wheat. 
3.6 Applications to Agri-Food Supply Chains 
Hobbs and Young (2000) apply TCE to agricultural commodities by discussing the 
transaction characteristics and costs that drive vertical coordination.  They state that 
uncertainty can be broken down into four components; quality, supply, price, and 
finding a buyer.  As uncertainty increases, it is expected that tighter forms of vertical 
coordination are used rather than using the spot market.  Hobbs and Young give 
examples of vertical coordination for several grain and livestock commodities.  
Increased vertical coordination has been occurring in chicken and pork industries for 
several years, but grain supply chains are beginning to adopt closer vertical 
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coordination.  Technological, regulatory and sociological developments have been major 
drivers of closer vertical coordination in agriculture commodity supply chains.  
Regulatory developments include concern over liability and the requirement of 
traceability in supply chains.  Technological developments that provide economies of 
size include relationship-specific investments in biotechnology.  Socio-economic 
developments involve changes in consumer preferences, requiring tighter vertical 
coordination with suppliers in order to provide the attributes demanded by consumers.  
Following Hobbs and Young’s paper, this thesis explores the drivers that have 
contributed to increased vertical coordination in the organic wheat supply chain. 
Wilson and Dahl (1999) discuss the issue of quality uncertainty in grain markets.  
Quality uncertainty in the grain supply chain can be defined as “consistency in quality 
either within a lot, across lots, or over time” (p.222).  Quality uncertainty can result in 
higher costs for buyers, processors and grain handlers by increasing search costs, 
inspection costs, defect rates, storage costs and processing costs.  Firms in the grain 
supply chain have chosen vertical coordination strategies, such as Identity Preservation 
(IP), in order to ensure the supply of consistently high quality grains.  Wilson and Dahl’s 
descriptions of uncertainty in grain markets is applied to the case of organic wheat in 
this thesis. 
Kennett et al. (1998) also discuss the issue of quality uncertainty and its effect on 
vertical coordination.  Current wheat grading systems do not always meet the quality 
needs of end-users.  Downstream wheat buying firms have therefore begun to use 
segregation and contracting in order to procure the desired specifications.  Kennett 
models the procurement of milling wheat, and illustrates that grading schema are 
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ineffective when the end-users standards are higher than the grade cut-offs.  The model 
also provides a measure of the willingness of a processor to pay for segregated wheat.   
Kennett et al. state two conditions that must be present in order for an initiative in 
supply chain management to be sustainable.  The first condition is that the economic 
rents created for the whole system must be greater than the economic rents generated 
from alternative systems.  The second condition is that each party’s share of the 
economic rent must exceed their costs.  In the case of wheat segregation, the processor 
must compensate the upstream firms in the segregated supply chain for their extra costs 
and have remaining surplus in order for segregation to occur.  Kennett et. al. examine 
the case of Warburtons Ltd. segregating milling wheat in Western Canada as an example 
of successful vertical coordination via segregation.  Warburtons Ltd. is a UK baker that 
requires a certain variety and quality of wheat in its product.  Kennett et al.’s two 
conditions for an initiative in supply chain management to be sustainable are 
incorporated into the criteria for governance structure comparison used in this thesis.  
3.7 Welfare Modelling 
As the measurement of the welfare effects of alternative governance structures is 
one objective of this thesis, relevant literature in this area is needed.  Muth (1964) 
provides a model of vertical markets that uses a supply and demand framework to 
illustrate the effect of supply and demand shifts on prices, quantities and welfare in 
vertical markets.  The Muth model consists of six equations describing a vertical market.  
The production function is a technology requiring two types of inputs and creating one 
type of output.  The supply chain is described by a production function, a processor 
demand equation, two input supply equations and two equations setting out the marginal 
 50
conditions for profit maximization. The system contains six endogenous variables and 
six equations, allowing for a unique solution if demand functions have non-positive 
slopes and supply functions have non-negative slopes.  The Muth model has been used 
to measure welfare effects in vertical markets in a vast array of agricultural economics 
literature.  While this thesis does not use the Muth model, it is proposed as a model that 
can be used to measure transaction costs in certain situations. 
Choosing the appropriate welfare model to find empirically the differences in 
price, cost and profit between governance structures is a very important part of this 
thesis.  The use of supply and demand functions as a means for empirically evaluating 
alternative governance structures is controversial in the literature.  Hobbs (1996) states 
that perceiving transaction costs as a measurable marginal cost may be “misguided” (p. 
25). Dorward (2001) avoids the use of supply and demand functions in constructing a 
welfare model of the effect of transaction costs on price and welfare.  These authors’ 
main argument against using transaction costs in a supply and demand framework is that 
their existence is subtle.  Transaction costs are not considered on the margin like 
production costs because data measuring transaction costs are not routinely collected by 
the standard accounting practices of firms.  Moreover, transaction costs are harder to 
quantify than production costs. 
Other studies have embraced the Muth model framework to examine the effects of 
transaction costs due to governance structure changes, and have included traditional 
welfare measurement (Martinez et. al. 1998, Kinnucan and Nelson 1993).  These authors 
also implicitly assumed that marginal transaction costs are a part of the marginal costs 
that are a component of the supply curve. 
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Dorward (2001) develops a methodology for modelling the economic effect of 
governance structure choice.  Dorward’s model takes account of the effect of the 
contractual choice, the transaction parties’ characteristics, the product characteristics, 
and the organizational environment on price, quantity and welfare.  The Dorward model 
posits that the optimal form of transaction governance maximizes the “transaction 
margin”, which is the difference between the total costs and total revenue net of pure 
transformation costs4.  Total costs consist of transaction costs, associated transformation 
costs5 and the risk of loss due to market conditions and seller behaviour.  Dorward’s 
approach allows for quantitative analysis of transaction costs.  While this thesis does not 
use the entire Dorward model, it implements the graphical illustration of alternative 
governance structures to display the results of the governance structure comparison. 
3.8 Applications of Welfare Modelling 
There are no applied models of vertical coordination in the literature that exactly 
match the objectives of this thesis, but some studies exist that are similar in nature.  A 
study by Lentz and Akridge (1997) has an objective that is most similar to this thesis.  
Lentz and Akridge evaluate the cost of alternative supply chains for the production of 
soybean peroxidase.  The study empirically evaluates the production cost of the status 
quo and alternative soybean peroxidase supply chains.  Lentz and Akridge do not use a 
supply and demand approach to analyzing differences between supply chains, but they 
                                                 
4 Pure transformation costs are transformation (production) costs that occur across all governance 
structures. 
5 Associated transformation costs are transformation (production) costs that are particular to the 
governance structure used. 
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calculate the price, revenue and profit under each procurement scheme.  This thesis 
closely follows the organization of the Lentz and Akridge paper. 
Martinez, Smith, and Zering (1998) employ a transaction cost approach to analyze 
the effect of increased quality in the U.S. pork industry.  The authors show the effects of 
decreased production and transaction costs from sorting and measuring efficiencies, 
coupled with a projected increase in demand, on the welfare of producers and consumers 
using a model similar to the Muth model.  Decreased production and transaction costs at 
the packer level due to higher quality hogs shifts the retail supply curve to the right, 
while increased quality shifts the retail demand curve to the right.  The expansion in 
demand and supply increases quantity, decreases retail price and increases consumer and 
producer surplus. 
The concept of vertical coordination causing a shift in the supply curve was tested 
by Kinnucan and Nelson (1993).  They found that the substantial decrease in the farm-
retail price spread in the U.S. egg industry is explained by increased vertical control, 
exhibiting itself through a downward shift in the supply curve.  Martinez et al. and 
Kinnucan and Nelson both provide applications of modelling vertical coordination that 
are relevant to the thesis as potential methods of modelling the effect of vertical 
coordination in the organic wheat supply chain. 
3.9 Applied Price Dispersion Analysis 
Since the Economics of Information literature proposes that a distribution of prices 
can develop in markets where search costs are positive, it is advantageous to explore the 
possibility of analysing price dispersion in the organic wheat supply chain.  Analyses of 
price dispersion are not common in the literature, but an article by Lach (2002) provides 
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a rigourous analysis of store-level monthly prices of four household products sold in 
Israel.  Lach studied the existence and characteristics of price dispersion for each good.  
Product heterogeneity was controlled for by employing a regression on prices, where the 
independent variables included the store effect, month effect, location effect and type-of-
store effect.  After calculating the regression, the variance of the residual terms indicated 
the degree of price dispersion.  Lach found that price dispersion existed for each good 
after controlling for product heterogeneity.  Moreover, Lach observed that intra-
distribution mobility is significant, meaning that a given store’s price moves to different 
parts of the price distribution over time.  Consumers therefore cannot learn about stores 
that offer consistently lower prices, and price dispersion persists over time. 
3.10 Chapter Summary 
A summary of the literature that is relevant to the objective of this thesis was 
provided in this chapter.  The common theme of the literature is to understand the effect 
of governance structure on prices and costs, and how to appropriately model these 
effects.  Seminal TCE literature provided by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1979) is 
central to the theoretical framework of the thesis.  The TCE theory is complemented by 
literature in the areas of Agency Theory, Competency Theory and a synthesis of Agency 
Theory and TCE theory by Mahoney (1992).  A description of transaction characteristics 
for agricultural commodities provides a guide for understanding organic wheat 
transactions.  The Economics of Information literature provides relevant theory to 
describe the nature of organic wheat prices.  Literature that analyzes price dispersion is 
also described. 
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Muth (1964) and Dorward (2001) provide two alternative models that can be 
applied to governance structure effects on price and cost.  The Muth model has been 
applied in the literature to model effects of vertical coordination, but the use of a supply 
and demand framework in governance structure comparison is less common.  The next 
chapter applies the literature to the theoretical framework. 
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4 Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
4.0 Introduction to the Theoretical Framework 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a set of theories to analyze the 
differences between governance structures that are used to transact organic wheat 
between producers and buyers.  This framework is used to construct a methodology to 
test for significant differences in prices and costs and to measure differences in profit 
between governance structures.. 
The theoretical framework chapter proceeds as follows.  The objective of firms in 
the organic wheat supply chain is first described and then the effects of governance 
structure are explained.  The effects of governance structure in transactions can be 
separated into effects on transaction costs, which follows TCE theory, and effects on 
price, which follows the Economics of Information theory.  After showing how 
governance structure affects transaction costs and price, the chapter continues by 
describing all factors that potentially affect producers’ average transaction costs and 
prices.  A discussion of governance structure comparison concludes the chapter, using a 
model adapted from Dorward (2001).
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4.1 The Approach to Governance Structure Comparison 
Organic wheat is grown by producers, and sold to a series of firms that eventually 
transform the wheat into a product that is purchased by consumers.  This succession of 
firms that produce, purchase, transform, and sell the organic wheat product is known as 
a supply chain.  The firms in the supply chain are assumed to maximize their utility, 
subject to constraints. 
4.1.1 The Producer’s Objective Function 
Organic wheat producers have a utility function that is subject to constraints.  
Organic wheat producers are assumed to maximize their utility, which is comprised of 
profits derived from producing and selling organic wheat, and from other non-monetary 
characteristics of transactions.  The utility of an individual organic producer in year t can 
be represented as 
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where tmktΠ is the profits derived from organic wheat in year t, and t mktnon−U  is a 
vector of non-market utilities that are associated with their choice of production and 
marketing practices in year t.  The profit function of an organic producer is defined as 
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where P represents the price for organic wheat and Q is the quantity of organic 
wheat sold in year t.  The term ∑
=
m
j
jVTC
1
 represents the variable transaction costs 
associated with each transaction, where VTCj is the variable transaction cost of the jth  
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transaction in year t.  Variable transaction costs are not accrued per unit of quantity, but 
rather per transaction.  Moreover, each transaction may be unique and have its own level 
of variable cost, necessitating a separate calculation for each transaction. The size of the 
transaction thus affects average transaction costs.  Variable transaction costs include 
search, negotiation, and monitoring costs that are required when transacting organic 
wheat, and are described in greater detail later in this chapter.  VPC represents variable 
production (transformation) costs, which comprise mainly the cost of producing organic 
wheat.   
Producers may also incur transportation and storage costs, depending on the 
conditions of their sales.  The terms FTC and FPC represent the amounts of fixed 
transaction and production (transformation) costs respectively.  Fixed transaction costs 
include those costs that are incurred regardless of the number of transactions performed, 
and include certification costs, marketing-related overhead items, and general marketing 
efforts that do not accrue to any one particular transaction.  Fixed transformation costs 
include capital costs and overhead that are incurred regardless of the quantity of organic 
wheat produced. 
Organic wheat producers maximize their profit by finding the highest price for 
their wheat and producing as much as possible while keeping costs low.  The producer 
profit function differs from the typical description of the profit function in that it 
explicitly includes fixed and variable transaction costs.   
The choice of governance structure does not affect all of the variables in the profit 
function.  Theory indicates that variable and fixed transaction costs are affected by 
governance structure (Williamson 1979) and prices can be affected by search costs 
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(Stigler 1961), which are affected by governance structure choice.  Pure transformation 
costs are assumed to be unaffected by governance structure choice6.  The relationship 
between governance structure choice, price, and transaction costs are developed further 
in later sections of this chapter.  Quantity is also assumed to be unaffected by the choice 
of governance structure, which restricts the analysis to the short run. 
Producer profits are constrained by several factors.  Firstly, producers have 
imperfect information on organic wheat prices across buyers and across time.  Producers 
cannot survey all possible buyers of their wheat from various governance structures, nor 
can they know exactly when to sell, but they can search until they have conducted an 
“optimal” amount of search activities.  This concept is developed later in this chapter.   
Producers are also constrained by their ability to choose a governance structure.  
Not all producers are free to participate in POFs that have closed memberships.  
Producers that are not members of such organizations have the option to create their own 
producer-owned firm, but the large amounts of resources needed to accomplish this task 
relative to the expected pay-off may discourage producers from taking that initiative. 
4.1.2 The Buyer’s Objective Function 
Several types of firms purchase organic wheat.  These firms can be organized into 
five main categories: CWB agents, non-agents, brokers, POFs and processors.  There is 
a succession of firms that buy and sell organic wheat before the wheat product is sold to 
                                                 
6 The use of production specification contracts (Mighell and Jones 1963) can affect transformation costs 
by specifying production practices, thus affecting transformation costs.  This type of contract is not used 
between organic wheat producers and their buyers, so it can be assumed that transformation costs are held 
constant. 
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consumers.  Regardless of the firm type or position in the supply chain, each firm 
maximizes its profit as 
FPCFTCQVPCVSTCVBTCQPP
n
k
k
m
j
jbuysell
t
buyer −−⋅−−−⋅−=Π ∑∑
== 11
)(    (4.3) 
where Psell represents the buyer’s selling price for organic wheat, Pbuy is the buyer’s 
purchase price of organic wheat and Q is the quantity of organic wheat sold in year t.  
buysell PP −  represents the gross margin of the firm.  The term ∑
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variable transaction costs associated with each buying transaction, where VBTCj is the 
variable transaction cost of the jth  purchase in year t.  The term ∑
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 represents the 
variable transaction costs associated with each selling transaction, where VSTCk is the 
variable transaction cost of the kth  sale in year t.  Variable transaction costs include the 
search, negotiation, and monitoring costs that are required when transacting organic 
wheat, either through buying from producers or selling to downstream firms.  VPC is the 
amount of variable production (transformation) costs that the firm incurs, which is 
comprised mainly of the transportation, storage, blending and possibly milling costs.   
The terms FTC and FPC are the amounts of fixed transaction and production 
(transformation) costs respectively.  Fixed transaction costs include those costs that are 
incurred regardless of the number of transactions performed, and include certification 
costs, marketing-related overhead items, and general marketing efforts that do not accrue 
to any one particular transaction.  Fixed transformation costs include capital costs and 
overhead that are incurred regardless of the quantity of organic wheat transacted. 
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Firms that buy organic wheat maximize profit by simultaneously buying at the 
lowest price possible, selling at the highest price possible (thereby maximizing their 
gross margin) and having as much throughput as possible, while keeping their 
transformation and transaction costs low.  Economies of size and scope can effect the 
profits of marketing firms. 
While the transformation costs associated with producers and their buyers are 
significant sources of costs, they are assumed to be unaffected by governance structure 
choice and therefore are not the focus of this thesis.  The theoretical framework focuses 
on the affect of governance structure on transaction costs and prices.  This focus begins 
in section 4.2 with respect to transaction costs and in section 4.3 with respect to prices. 
4.2 The Effect of Governance Structure on Transaction Costs 
The theory of TCE as developed by Coase (1937), Williamson (1979) and others 
forms the basis of this section.  The central thesis of this section is that governance 
structures in the organic wheat supply chain between producers and buyers have 
differing transaction costs.  The theoretical framework must therefore explain why 
differences in transaction costs occur.  The behavioural assumptions of TCE as it relates 
to the organic wheat supply chain is first outlined, followed by the characteristics of 
organic wheat transactions and their connection to producer transaction costs.  The 
predicted effect of more vertically-coordinated governance structures on transaction 
costs is then outlined. 
4.2.1 Behavioural Assumptions for Firms in the Organic Wheat Supply Chain 
There are two main behavioural assumptions with respect to transactions in the 
organic wheat supply chain.  The first assumption is that organic wheat producers and 
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their buyers exhibit bounded rationality in organic wheat transactions.  This assumption 
means that the producers and buyers act rationally, but their ability to act rationally is 
bounded by their knowledge of their transaction partner.  These agents do not know how 
their transaction partner will behave in the future when engaged in organic wheat 
transactions.  The second assumption is that organic wheat producers and their buyers 
may act opportunistically when conducting transactions.  This assumption means that 
organic producers and their buyers may act in a manner that benefits themselves at the 
expense of their transaction partner.  Bounded rationality and opportunism are core 
behavioural assumptions in the TCE literature (Williamson 1979). 
4.2.2 Definition of Transaction Characteristics in the Organic Wheat Supply Chain 
The combination of bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour in 
transactions leads to the existence of transaction characteristics that hinge on these 
behaviours.  The key characteristics of transactions are the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the transaction, the degree of asset specificity surrounding the transaction, 
and the frequency of the transaction (Williamson 1979).   
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty can be defined in the context of the organic wheat supply chain as the 
lack of certainty regarding the outcome of an organic wheat transaction.  Uncertainty is 
caused by the behavioural assumption of bounded rationality.  If the rationality of 
producers and buyers is not bounded, this would imply that everyone has perfect 
information and there would be no uncertainty.  There are several types of uncertainties 
that are involved in the outcome of organic wheat transactions.  Some uncertainties are 
completely exogenous, such as price fluctuations due to changes in the supply and 
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demand of organic wheat, and they are not affected by governance structure choice.  
Other uncertainties, however, are affected by the choice of governance structure.  These 
uncertainties are discussed further in section 4.3.4. 
Asset Specificity 
Asset specificity can be defined in the context of the organic wheat supply chain as 
an asset that is necessary to perform an organic wheat transaction with a particular party, 
but has a lower value when used in a transaction with any other party.  There are several 
assets that a producer may own in order to produce organic wheat.  These include land, 
equipment, human capital of time invested in learning organic farming techniques, and 
the organic wheat itself.   
Land, equipment and human capital, and organic wheat that has not yet left the 
farmgate do not have the characteristics of asset specificity because they have equal 
value in alternative transactions.  When organic wheat has been delivered to a buyer’s 
location but has not yet changed hands, however, the organic wheat can become site 
specific (Williamson 1985) if there are few or no other organic wheat buyers in the 
vicinity.  At the point where the organic wheat is at the buyer’s location, the salvage 
value of that organic wheat equals the alternative buyer’s price, less the cost to transport 
the organic wheat to the alternative buyer’s location, less the added costs to the producer 
related to conducting the alternative transaction.  The difference between the salvage 
value of the organic wheat and the initially agreed upon price represents the quasi-rents 
that can be extracted by the original transaction partner (Klein et. al. 1978).  An asset 
specific investment by one party, combined with uncertainty resulting from bounded 
rationality, can result in opportunistic behaviour by the other party to the transaction in 
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order to capture the specialized appropriable quasi-rents.  The quasi-rents of organic 
wheat in Western Canada can potentially be quite large because of the considerable 
distances between buyers in many cases, which leads to costly transportation in order to 
reach an alternative buyer. 
Frequency 
Frequency is defined as the number of times that a transaction occurs within a 
certain time interval.  In the case of organic wheat transactions between producers and 
buyers, producers may sell organic wheat once or more times per year, depending on the 
size of the farm and the homogeneity of their organic wheat crop.  The relatively 
infrequent nature of these transactions may amplify the probability of opportunistic 
behaviour.  On the other hand, relationships that develop between producer and buyer 
may lead to a mutual interest in maintaining the relationship and not exploiting the other.   
4.2.3 Definition of Transaction Costs in the Organic Wheat Supply Chain 
Following Hobbs (1996), there are three main types of transaction costs in the 
organic wheat supply chain: information (or search) costs, negotiation costs and 
monitoring and enforcement costs.  Information costs involve searching for information 
about organic wheat buyers, buyer reputations and organic wheat prices.  Negotiation 
costs include costs of transacting the organic wheat, including negotiating the details of 
the sale, writing the contract, or paying for a broker or POF to perform this task.  
Monitoring and enforcement costs occur after the contract has been made.  Costs are 
associated with monitoring quality.  Monitoring the behaviour of the transaction partner 
may be necessary in order to ensure that the transacting partner follows the pre-agreed 
terms of the sale.  Monitoring costs may also include the enforcement of a broken 
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contract.  This thesis compares the size of these transaction costs across different 
governance structures. 
4.2.4 Transaction Uncertainties, Asset Specificities and their Associated Transaction 
Costs in the Organic Wheat Supply Chain 
There are five main types of uncertainties in organic wheat transactions between 
producer and buyers, defined as quality uncertainty, price uncertainty, supply and 
demand uncertainty (Hobbs and Young 2000).  Payment uncertainty can also occur.  
Some aspects of quality, price, payment, supply and demand uncertainty are exogenous 
to the transaction and are unaffected by governance structure choice.  While it is 
important to realize that exogenous uncertainties exist, they do not cause differences in 
transaction costs between governance structures.  Uncertainties that are affected by 
governance structure, however, are the cause of differential transaction costs and are the 
focus of this section. 
Quality Uncertainty 
Weather is the greatest cause of wheat quality variability (Wilson and Dahl 1999).  
Buyers of organic wheat minimize this uncertainty by measuring its quality prior to 
purchase.  Quality uncertainty is therefore independent of governance structure as long 
as the producer or buyer do not act opportunistically.  The incidence of opportunistic 
behaviour, however, is dependent on the governance structure. 
There is a possibility that organic wheat buyers could use a quality clause in a 
contract in an opportunistic manner if the wheat is delivered to the buyer (and is 
therefore site-specific) before quality is assessed by the buyer.  The buyer may say, 
truthfully or not, that the quality of the organic wheat does not meet specifications and 
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that the agreed price must be discounted for the lower quality.  The seller can settle the 
dispute by having the grain tested by a recognized 3rd party grain quality testing 
institution, but this recourse may not be feasible if waiting entails a cost.  The discount 
would include some or all of the appropriable quasi-rents that are available to the buyer.  
A greater distance to an alternative organic wheat buyer would imply a greater available 
appropriable quasi-rent.  It is expected that discounts for quality inadequacies in organic 
wheat would be greater than conventional wheat because most organic customers 
demand only high quality wheat for the human consumption market.  Moreover, the 
distance between buyers that are willing to purchase a given quality of organic wheat is 
much larger than the distance between conventional wheat buyers.  The fear of 
opportunistic behaviour is especially a concern in transactions with overseas buyers. 
The inherent variability of organic wheat quality leads to measurement costs to 
determine its quality, which may include its grade, protein content, and other necessary 
characteristics.  Marketers have many tools available them for ascertaining producers’ 
wheat quality.  Visual inspection by the buyer and even the downstream buyer may also 
be required.  The quality of the organic attribute in the wheat is measured by a 
certification process and paper trail that accompanies organic grain shipments provides 
proof of organic authenticity. 
The uncertainty over whether a buyer will act opportunistically may lead 
producers to incur information costs in order to determine the likelihood of opportunistic 
behaviour.  These costs are defined as reputation search costs, and can involve 
communicating with other producers or with the Canadian Grain Commission (CGC) to 
determine if the buyer has a good reputation and is bonded.  Negotiation costs may also 
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be incurred in order to specify a contract that describes the dispute resolution mechanism 
for quality problems.  Monitoring costs may also be necessary to ensure the truthfulness 
of any quality-related disputes (via the CGC or another grain quality testing institution) 
and to enforce the pre-determined price if necessary. 
Price Uncertainty 
The price of organic wheat fluctuates depending on the complex world supply and 
demand situation, and the supply and demand of substitute products such as 
conventional wheat.  Demand is affected by changing tastes and the adoption of organic 
foods by consumers.  Supply is affected by the adoption of organic production by 
farmers, weather, and other factors.  Governance structure is irrelevant to these 
exogenous sources of price uncertainty, but has a profound effect on opportunistic 
behaviour related to uncertain prices.  Assuming that producers do not have perfect 
information about prices, and drawing on Stigler’s work, one can expect that a 
distribution of organic wheat prices will exist.  This price distribution results in the 
producer having uncertainty over present and future prices.  This uncertainty can be 
divided into two main sources.  Firstly, the producer is uncertain over the market-
clearing level of prices on a given day and in the future.  Secondly, the producer is 
uncertain of each buyer’s offering price in terms of its position in the distribution of 
prices.  The latter problem is a principal-agent problem of low task programmability and 
high nonseparability (Mahoney 1992), since the producer cannot adequately measure the 
input (effort) of the buyer in finding prices, nor can the producer measure the 
performance of the buyer’s output (its bidding price).  The decisions of when to sell and 
who to sell to are thus made in the context of price uncertainty. 
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The producer’s pursuit of the highest price possible within the distribution of 
potential prices across several buyers and over time leads to information costs of price 
search.  These price search costs occur over the entire year in order to follow the market-
clearing price level, and are also accrued to individual transactions.  Price search is 
performed by communicating with buyers and with other producers about the marketing-
clearing price levels and the offer prices of particular buyers. 
Payment Uncertainty 
Payment uncertainty can be defined as the chance that an organic wheat buyer will 
not pay the producer within the time period specified by the contract, or will not pay at 
all.  This uncertainty can cause injury to all firms upstream from the non-payer.  While 
non-payment by a downstream customer is an exogenous uncertainty, different types of 
governance structures can differ in the uncertainty of producers receiving payment. 
The uncertainty of the buyer delaying payment, for opportunistic reasons or 
because of non-payment by their downstream buyer, may lead producers to incur 
information costs to determine whether or not the buyer is likely to pay on time.  
Producers will thus search out the reputation of possible buyers by communicating with 
producers and buyers.  Enforcement costs may include the expenditure by the producer 
to collect the payment from the buyer. 
Supply and Demand Uncertainty 
Supply uncertainty can be defined as the likelihood of the producer failing to 
provide enough organic wheat to fulfil his or her required quantity as specified in a sale 
contract.  Weather can have a great effect on the quantity of organic wheat that is 
harvested by a producer.  This exogenous uncertainty can pose a problem for the buyer 
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when it is planning future sales and when it has entered a contract to buy a specified 
quantity of organic wheat before it has been grown.  The inability to deliver the required 
quantity can also result from opportunistic behaviour on the part of the producer.  The 
producer may choose to deliver a portion of his or her organic wheat to a different buyer 
offering a higher spot price.  The original buyer must then attempt to source organic 
wheat from a different producer.  This problem is an issue of moral hazard, since the 
behaviour of the producer changes after the contract is signed. 
Demand uncertainty is a problem for organic producers, as it is the uncertainty in 
finding a buyer.  Buyers may not want to buy the producer’s particular quality of wheat 
at the time that the producer wishes to sell. 
Transaction costs to negate opportunistic behaviour relating to supply uncertainty 
are incurred by the buyer.  The buyer’s costs include monitoring the producer’s 
production on contracted organic wheat fields, including the monitoring of storage after 
harvest.  The buyer may also incur costs of seeking redress from producers due to 
damages caused by a supply shortfall.  Damages could include the loss of business and 
additional search costs in order to find alternative supplies at short notice.  Transaction 
costs to negate the uncertainty of demand for the producer’s grain include search costs to 
find a buyer. 
4.3 Prediction of Governance Structures Based on Transaction Characteristics 
Given the uncertainties, asset specificities and measurement problems between 
producers and buyers in the organic wheat supply chain, the framework of Mahoney 
(1992) can be used to predict the governance structure that should emerge.  Separate 
predictions can be made from the perspective of the buyer and the perspective of the 
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producer.  If the endowments of asset specificity, task programmability and 
nonseparability are known then a prediction of organizational choice from Table 3.1 can 
be described. 
Buyers of organic wheat do not have assets that are highly specific in transactions 
with particular producers.  Buyers can adequately measure physical attributes of an 
organic producer’s organic wheat (i.e. low nonseparability) through visual inspection, 
protein tests, etc.  The only attribute that buyers cannot detect through output 
measurement is the organic quality of the wheat.  However, organic certification 
organizations provide a suitable measurement of the organic quality attribute through 
measurement of producer input (effort).  Organic wheat buyers thus interact with organic 
producers in a situation where task programmability is high and nonseparability is low.  
The Mahoney framework (Table 3.1) thus predicts that the marketer should use the spot 
market governance structure. 
Organic wheat producers do not have assets that are highly specific in transactions 
with a particular buyer, apart from the situation where the wheat itself becomes specific 
to a buyer upon delivery.  The endowments of task programmability and nonseparability 
that producers face in their transactions with buyers depend on the particular producer’s 
perception of price uncertainty.  Some producers may perceive that they can adequately 
measure the input (effort) of the buyer in finding prices (i.e. task programmability is 
high) and they can adequately determine if the buyer’s bidding price is high relative to 
other buyers (i.e. nonseparability is low).  The Mahoney framework thus predicts that 
producers that have these confident perceptions on price uncertainty should use the spot 
market governance structure.  On the other hand, some producers may perceive that they 
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cannot measure the effort of the buyer in finding downstream customers with high prices 
(i.e. task programmability is low), and they may have no idea if a particular buyer’s 
bidding price to producers is high compared to other bidding prices in the market (i.e. 
nonseparability is high).  The Mahoney framework predicts that producers that perceive 
buyer input and output measurement problems should use a relational contract 
governance structure.  Moreover, producers that perceive both measurement problems 
and a high threat of opportunistic behaviour (i.e. high asset specificity) should use 
vertical integration.  Given the acute lack of price information in the market, it is most 
likely that producers cannot effectively measure buyers’ input and output, which makes 
the relational contract the most plausible prediction for the producer. 
In summary, the Mahoney framework for organizational form prediction uses the 
information available on transaction characteristics to predict the optimal governance 
structure.  The framework predicts that organic wheat buyers should choose the spot 
market, while producers should choose relational contracting.  This simple prediction is 
useful because it can be compared to the results of the empirical comparison of 
governance structures that is developed and tested in this thesis.   
4.4 The Effect of Vertical Coordination on Transaction Costs 
While the previous section provided predictions of governance structure based on 
characteristics of organic wheat transactions, this section provides a detailed description 
of the resulting advantages and disadvantages of using governance structures that are 
more vertically coordinated.  The extent to which opportunistic behaviour is a problem, 
and therefore the extent to which producers and buyers incur transaction costs, can 
depend on the type of governance structure used to perform the transaction.  As 
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mentioned earlier, the types of firms that producers transact with represent different 
governance structures.  The range of different governance structures can be viewed on a 
continuum in terms of the degree of vertical coordination.  Grain companies entail lower 
degrees of vertical coordination, while POFs entail higher amounts of vertical 
coordination.  Similarly, direct sales to processors entail more vertical coordination than 
transacting through a grain company. 
In examining the effect of vertical coordination on transaction costs, this section 
compares more vertically coordinated alternatives with the standard case of transacting 
through a CWB agent grain company, which is referred to as the “spot market” 
transaction.  The effect of using a POF versus the spot market is first described, then the 
effect of selling directly to processors versus the spot market is assessed. 
4.4.1 Producer-Owned Firm 
Closer vertical coordination between producers and their adjacent downstream 
buyer can occur through a POF.The producers have the option of selling through their 
marketing firm, with the marketing entity financed via a commission.  The POF is a 
form of tighter vertical coordination that has attributes of vertical integration.  As 
indicated in chapter three, Williamson (1971) states that the advantages of a vertically 
integrated firm can be divided into three components: incentives, controls, and “inherent 
strategic advantages.”   
From an incentive perspective, vertical integration between producers and buyers 
could internalize any buyer opportunism manifesting itself in the form of quality 
disputes, price uncertainty or late payment.  The integrated marketer would act as an 
agent to the producers and would be required to act in their interests.  The problem then 
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becomes one of a principal and agent, with the marketer’s effort unobservable to the 
principal(s) (producer-owners).  The absence of opportunistic behaviour by the marketer 
with respect to quality disputes would decrease reputation search costs for both parties.  
Reputation search costs related to payment uncertainty for producers would also be 
eliminated.  In other words, more precise control of marketer performance could be 
possible through a POF than through the spot market. 
With respect to the control advantages of vertical coordination through a POF, the 
single entity is able to perform more precise own-performance evaluations and can 
control rewards and penalties within the organization.  Other potential control benefits of 
vertical integration include easier conflict resolution, resulting in lower negotiation and 
enforcement costs for both parties and economies of market information exchange.  The 
POF would also be required to sell members’ grain, thus reducing demand uncertainty 
and lowering buyer search costs for the producer.  
An inherent strategic advantage of vertical integration between the production and 
marketing stages is that economies of information exchange can occur.  Quality, price, 
and quantity information is allowed to flow more freely between producer and POF 
agent, thus decreasing monitoring costs for the buyer and decreased quality 
uncertainties, causing lower negotiation costs for the buyer.  POF producers would have 
access to information on current and future prices that other producers would likely not 
receive from buyers. 
The control of producer strategic misrepresentation is a cost to buyers using any 
degree of vertical coordination, but may be more efficient through vertical integration 
because it is easier to ascertain the misrepresentation that has transpired (Williamson 
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1971).  Moreover, contract relationships through a POF result in lower monitoring costs 
than would an investor-owned firm (IOF), since less information asymmetry would 
prevail regarding quality and quantity (Sykuta and Cook 1995).  This is not to say that 
strategic misrepresentation by producer-owners would not occur in a POF.  Producer-
owners may be tempted to strategically misrepresent the quantity and/or quality of their 
wheat destined for sale through the vertically integrated firm.  Producer-owners may not 
deliver all of their wheat to the POF if they find a better price elsewhere.  An 
enforcement mechanism would have to be put in place in order to avoid this problem. 
There would be a greater internal coordination cost under a POF governance 
structure compared to transacting through the spot market, mainly due to the propensity 
for a principal-agent problem to occur.  These costs would include the resources 
expended by the producer owners to control the operations of the marketing agent and 
monitor the marketing agent’s performance. The problem of moral hazard can result if 
the producers that own the marketing agency cannot induce the marketing agent to 
maximize the producers’ profits by finding the highest prices.  The greater the 
uncertainty of moral hazard, the greater the producer monitoring costs necessary to 
negate it.   
The setup cost of the POF must also be considered as an additional cost.  This cost 
is incurred by producers coordinating with each other in order to find a marketer, create 
the necessary contract with their agent, and make various decisions regarding the 
structure of their organization.  These setup costs may also be amplified by learning 
costs as they move away from their core competencies (Hodgson 1998). 
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Moving from a spot market to more tightly coordinated transactions changes the 
sources from which producers are exposed to uncertainty.   A POF does not shoulder 
any risk in the downstream transaction, and exposes producers to uncertainty that may 
otherwise accrue to a separate, independent marketer.  The uncertainty includes quality, 
payment, price and demand uncertainty in transactions between the vertically integrated 
POF and its downstream buyer(s). 
4.4.2 Direct Selling to Processor 
Producers can elect to sell directly to downstream firms that typically are the 
customers of grain companies.  By transacting in this manner the producer is eliminating 
the middleman, whether it is a grain company, a broker or a POF.  Selling directly to 
processors is a form of vertical integration, wherein all of the transaction and 
transformation activities associated with the sale are under the full responsibility of the 
individual producer. 
The advantages of completely eliminating the middleman from the transaction are 
very similar to the advantages of using a POF, and take Williamson’s theorized 
advantages to the extreme.  The necessary incentive, precise control and full flow of 
information for one’s own marketing efforts is self-evident.  It is clear that the producer 
will do the best job they can in order to find the best price possible.  There are no 
opportunistic behaviours associated with middleman transactions that incur transaction 
costs, but there are, however, transaction costs associated with transacting directly with 
the downstream processor.   
Transaction costs resulting from transacting with processors could be considerably 
larger than those accrued by a middleman firm for two main reasons.  Firstly, the 
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producer may not have transaction cost economies as they typically transact much 
smaller quantities than middleman firms.  Secondly, the producer may incur learning 
costs and diseconomies of scope as they move even further away from their “core 
competencies” (Hodgson 1998) compared to the grain company and the POF case.  The 
effect of scope and scale diseconomies may be significant, depending on the marketing 
ability of the producer. 
Coordination costs necessary under a POF governance structure in order to 
monitor marketer and producer-owner performance are non-existent in the direct sale 
case.  Eliminating the middleman does not necessarily mean that transaction costs 
decrease, because the producer must deal with the processor instead of the marketer. 
4.4.3 Summary of the Effect of Vertical Coordination on Transaction Costs 
Section 4.3 has described several effects of more vertically coordinated 
governance structures on transaction costs and coordination costs.  These cost 
differences were examined from the perspective of both the producer and the marketer.  
Given the array of cost differences, it is useful to summarize these differences for the 
reader.  The hypothesized effect of increased vertical coordination on the various search, 
negotiation, and monitoring costs, and on coordination costs, compared to a spot market 
governance structure, is laid out in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 for organic producers and a 
POF respectively.  The signs indicate an expected positive or negative effect of 
governance structure on each producer cost.   
The net benefit of vertical integration between the producer and marketing entities 
depends on whether market transaction cost savings exceed internal coordination costs.  
If coordination costs related to controlling the marketing agency or information agency 
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and monitoring the agent’s actions are sufficiently high, or if marketing transaction cost 
savings are sufficiently low, there will be no net benefit to tighter vertical coordination 
initiatives.  Overall, the POF governance structure is expected to lower producer 
transaction costs while the effect of a POF on marketer transaction costs is ambiguous.  
This reflects the prediction of the of Mahoney framework (1992) that greater vertical 
coordination is unnecessary from the marketer’s perspective. 
Table 4.1 - Summary of Vertical Coordination Effects on Producers Transaction 
Costs, Compared to the CWB agent Governance Structure 
Producer Costs Effect of POF Effect of Direct Marketing 
Information Costs   
     Buyer Reputation Search – +/– 
     Price Search – +/– 
   
Negotiation Costs – +/– 
        
Monitoring and Enforcement Costs   
     Monitoring – +/– 
     Enforcement – +/– 
   
Coordination Costs   
     Marketer Performance control + + 
Source: Author’s estimates   
 
Table 4.2 - Summary of Vertical Coordination Effects on Marketer Transaction 
Costs, Compared to the CWB agent Governance Structure 
Marketer Costs Effect of POF 
Search Costs  
     Reputation Search (of producers) – 
     Quantity Search – 
     Quality Search – 
       
  
Negotiation Costs – 
       
Monitoring and Enforcement Costs  
     Monitoring + 
     Enforcement + 
  
Coordination Costs  
     Misrepresentation control + 
Source: Author’s estimates  
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4.5 The Effect of Vertical Coordination on Prices 
4.5.1 Information Asymmetry in the Organic Wheat Supply Chain 
There is no publicly available price data in the Canadian organic wheat market.  
There is no method for producers or other supply chain members to access price data, as 
a futures contract for organic wheat does not exist, and no agencies exist that report 
present cash prices.  Direct communication with other supply chain members is the only 
method of obtaining price information in organic markets.  Organic wheat marketers and 
processors transact wheat on a daily basis and, unlike producers, have economies of size 
in gathering and interpreting data on supply and demand factors that contribute to 
current and future price.  Since organic wheat producers transact with marketers and 
processors who have superior information on current and future downstream prices, this 
situation can be characterized as an information asymmetry problem for producers.  
Organic wheat producers cannot undertake market surveillance that indicates the market 
clearing price in current and future periods.  Without knowing the market clearing price, 
producers have difficulty measuring the effort of the buyer and the calibre of the buyer’s 
price offer, known as the problems of low task programmability and high 
nonseparability (Mahoney 1992).  The next section describes the theoretical process by 
which information asymmetry occurs and posits the implications of price information 
asymmetry. 
4.5.2 The Economics of Information and Organic Wheat Prices 
Given diminishing returns to search, an optimizing organic producer will search 
for organic wheat prices to the point where the marginal return from search equals its 
marginal cost.  The producer will search for the time to sell and the buyer to sell to that 
78 
results in the highest price.  The marginal return is the expected increase in price that 
results from undertaking one more unit of search.  The marginal cost of search is the 
amount of time and other resources expended in order to undertake the additional unit of 
search.   
Following Stigler (1961), the lack of price discovery mechanisms, other than by 
personal communication among individual producers, suggests that a bidding price 
dispersion may exist for organic wheat.  The bidding price dispersion of organic wheat 
prices is a function of the amount of search that is undertaken by the producer.  The 
amount of search is a negative function of the cost per unit of search, and a positive 
function of the percentage of the seller’s expected revenue and the percentage of 
experienced producers in the market.  Cost per unit of search for organic wheat 
producers is not prohibitively expensive, which allows for search to be undertaken.  
Wheat is the largest organic crop in Saskatchewan, and constitutes a large proportion of 
organic producers’ revenue.  Experienced organic producers exist in the market.  These 
characteristics lead to some positive amount of search costs, and thus a bidding price 
dispersion of organic wheat prices.  The variance of supply and demand in the organic 
wheat market can compound the size of the price dispersion.   
It is assumed that a decrease in price dispersion will decrease the chance of 
transacting at lower prices, which will increase the average transaction price.  Price 
dispersion can be decreased by increasing the amount of search, which can be made 
more economical by decreasing search costs. 
There are several ways that search costs can be decreased.  The cost of search for 
organic wheat prices can be a function of the geographic size of the market, but given 
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that telephone communication is currently the most common method of price search, 
geographical size should not be a significant determinant of search costs.  A synthesis of 
TCE concepts reveals that the choice of governance structure can also affect the cost of 
search, which was described earlier in the chapter.  The presence of organizations that 
transmit price information to individuals in the organic wheat supply chain can decrease 
the cost of search.  The effect of governance structure and organizations on search cost 
and thus price dispersion and average price is described in the next section. 
4.5.3 Governance Structure/Organizational Choice, Price Search Costs and Price 
Dispersion 
A governance structure or organization that has economies of size in price 
information search, and that passes this information to the producer, can help to reduce 
or eliminate the information asymmetry problem.  The POF allows producers to better 
measure the marketer effort and compare bidding prices.  A POF that collects and 
disseminates price information to its members would decrease producer search costs, 
since those costs would be contained in the marketing commission earned by the 
marketing agent.  The vertically integrated firm would have economies of size in price, 
supply and demand data collection.  Moreover, the POF would provide a greater 
quantity of price information than could be found by the producer on his or her own, for 
a similar cost.  Producer-members could also benefit from the POF’s economies of 
market information exchange for use in transactions outside the vertically-coordinated 
arrangement.  Typically, POFs are characterized by greater trust and less incentive to 
withhold information compared to Investor-Owned Firms (Sykuta and Cook 1995), 
which allows for this method of alleviating information asymmetry to function. 
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An organization that transmits price information to producers is an alternative to 
the vertical coordination solution to the problem of information asymmetry.  
Specifically, an organization that collects price information and distributes it to 
producers would effectively increase the amount of price search that producers could do 
at a lower cost than would be possible on their own.  An example of such an 
organization in agriculture is the bi-weekly bulletin provided by the Market Analysis 
division of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada in the grain industry or the market 
information provided by CANFAX in the Canadian cattle industry.  The degree of cost 
saving would depend on the price charged by the organization for this information. 
Increased vertical coordination through a POF or the use of a price information 
organization that decreases search costs and improves information quality would 
decrease price dispersion and therefore lower price uncertainty.  Moreover, a decrease in 
search costs directly affects the efficiency of transactions between producers and buyers.    
It is important to note that the use of a price information organization may sufficiently 
decrease problems of information asymmetry such that spot market-type governance 
structures become transaction-cost efficient.  Producers that are currently members of 
POFs may oppose the formation of a separate price information organization because it 
may allow producers that use the service to be more competitive with producers that 
already have superior information through a POF. 
Some alternative governance structures do not have mechanisms that decrease 
search costs below that of a spot market transaction.  Producers that choose to market 
directly to processors are expected to incur higher search costs in order to complete 
those transactions.  Higher search costs are expected in these transactions because 
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producers must exert more effort to find buyers, particularly those in foreign countries.  
The process of finding processors or other customers in other locations can take 
considerable time and resources.  The “direct to processor” governance structure thus 
does not have any characteristics that decrease search costs per unit.  The extra effort 
that is exerted to find processors and other remote buyers is expected to result in higher 
prices.  This does not result from lower search costs per unit, but from higher amounts of 
search that lead to finding higher prices in the distribution of available prices, assuming 
the search is effective. 
Producers that choose the “direct to processor” governance structure may 
especially benefit from the presence of a price information organization, since they have 
the largest potential for search cost savings.  The extent to which producers could benefit 
from price information would depend on the applicability of the information to their 
specific marketing strategy.  The price information provided would have to relate to the 
region of the world to which they marketed their organic wheat.  On the other hand, 
producers that market directly to processors may oppose the formation of a separate 
price information organization for similar reasons as POF members.  An information 
organization may allow producers that use the service to more easily compete with 
producers that already sell to processors.  Similarly, an increase in price information 
through a POF or a price information organization that benefits producers would do so at 
the expense of buyers.  Buyers therefore may not see any benefit to becoming a POF 
marketer, which coincides with the prediction from the Mahoney framework that buyers 
prefer the status quo spot market governance structure. 
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The theoretical framework has thus far described the transaction characteristics 
and transaction costs in the organic wheat supply chain, and it has described how 
transaction costs and prices are affected by increased vertical coordination.  The 
theoretical framework continues by developing a framework for comparing governance 
structures that differ in costs and prices. 
4.6 Introduction to the Theoretical Model 
The purpose of the theoretical model is to provide a general method for comparing 
alternative governance structures empirically.  The remainder of this chapter brings the 
measurements of price and cost together to use profit per unit as a metric for comparing 
governance structures.  The methodology chapter employs the model presented in this 
section as a means to illustrate the differences between governance structures. 
Two models that can be used to compare governance structures in a supply chain 
are outlined in this chapter.  These models illustrate the effect of alternative governance 
structures from the perspective of one and two levels of a supply chain respectively. 
4.7 Dorward Model of Average Costs, Prices, and Profit Margins for One Level 
of a Market 
4.7.1 Description 
Figure 5.1 depicts, for two alternative governance structures, the profit margin per 
tonne of one input-providing firm in a supply chain.  Firms can choose either 
governance structure, and they make this decision by maximizing their utility, as stated 
earlier in the theoretical framework. 
The model, adapted from Dorward (2001), examines prices, costs, and profit per 
tonne for different governance structures transacting the same product.  The effect of 
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governance structure on the quantity a firm sells is assumed to be negligible in this 
model.  The profit margin is the difference between the net price (value added) that a 
firm receives and the sum of average transformation costs and average transaction costs 
incurred by that firm.  The value that is added, the size of average transformation costs 
and the size of average transaction costs can differ between governance structures for a 
given firm.  Differences in the degree of vertical coordination between the governance 
structures can explain why value-added and costs differ. 
4.7.2 Evaluation Criteria 
In Figure 4.1, a firm operating under governance structure 2 is illustrated as 
achieving a higher price per unit (P2) than the firm operating under governance structure 
1 (P1).  However, governance structure 2 results in a smaller profit margin (M2 < M1) for 
the firm.  The discrepancy between the governance structure giving the highest price and 
the greatest profit margin occurs because the average transaction costs arising from 
governance structure 2 are much greater than the average transaction costs arising from 
governance structure 1.  The optimal governance structure for a supply chain level is the 
one with the greatest profit margin per tonne, which is governance structure type 1 in 
Figure 4.1. 
The governance structure with the highest price is not necessarily the optimal 
governance structure from the perspective of a firm at one level of a vertical market.  A 
firm must consider both the price and the average transaction costs and transformation 
costs when choosing the optimal governance structure from the set available. 
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Figure 4.1 - Model of Two Alternative Governance Structures or One Supply 
Chain Level 
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4.8 Dorward Model of Average Costs, Prices, and Profit Margins For Two 
Adjacent Market Levels 
4.8.1 Description 
In the previous example, the implications of governance structure choice for one 
level of a vertical market was discussed.  Figure 4.2 illustrates the implications of 
governance structure choice for two firms that are vertically adjacent to one another, an 
upstream firm and a downstream firm.  The price that is achieved by the downstream 
level, Pp, can vary by governance structure, or it can be identical across governance 
structures.  This would depend upon the available price data, and the assumptions made 
about the downstream market.  If it is assumed that a governance structure has a 
differentiated product that achieves a different price, then the downstream prices can 
vary by governance structure.  If it is assumed that all governance structures sell a 
homogeneous product, then the downstream price will be the same across all governance 
structures. 
Figure 4.2 is also drawn to illustrate that both transformation and transaction costs 
can differ between governance structures at the upstream or downstream levels.  The 
value added by the upstream level is the farm price, either P1 or P2.  The value added by 
the downstream level is the vertical difference between either P1 or P2 and the processor 
price, Pp. 
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Figure 4.2 - Model of Two Alternative Governance Structures for Two Adjacent 
Supply Chain Levels 
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4.8.2 Evaluation Criteria 
The value of average transformation costs and average transaction costs can differ 
between governance structures because the division of functions between the supply 
chain levels differ and the cost of each level to perform each function may differ.  As 
with the previous model, differences in the degree of vertical coordination between the 
governance structures employed can explain why prices and costs differ. 
The optimal governance structure from the perspective of the supply chain being 
evaluated (only two levels of a multi-level supply chain in this thesis) is the one that has 
the highest combined profit margin per tonne.  If the downstream price, Pp, is identical 
across the governance structures, then the optimal governance structure is the one that 
minimizes average cost.  If governance structures obtain different downstream prices, 
then the criteria for selection of the optimal supply chain is the one that maximizes the 
combined profit margin per tonne. 
It follows that the optimal governance structure from a multi-level perspective 
may not necessarily be the best governance structure from the perspective of firms at 
each level.  Whether indicated by governance structure predictions (Mahoney 1992) or 
by direct testimony from firms, vertically adjacent firms may or may not prefer different 
governance structures.   
Differences in governance structure preferences by firms can be caused by 
differences in their approach to marketing.  For example, a marketing firm without 
financing or information economies may find it optimal to enter into a long term 
contract with a group of producers and share information, in the hopes of creating a win-
win situation.  A marketing firm that has economies of size in financing and market 
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information may find it optimal to treat the market as a profit centre, where the traders 
are given license to use the firm’s resources to maximize profit through speculation in 
the market, treating market intelligent as a competitive advantage.  The differences in 
management approach and hence governance structure preference can be based on the 
characteristics of the firm when it enters the market. 
A difference in governance structure preference between two levels could create a 
governance structure misalignment wherein one level would prefer to use one type of 
governance structure, but firms at the adjacent level are not willing to engage in that 
particular governance of the transaction.  This situation has no direct pareto-improving 
options, as simply changing from one governance structure to the other will make one 
level (e.g.: producers) better off at the expense of the other level (e.g.: grain company).   
Kennett et al. (1998) state that two conditions must exist in order for an initiative 
in supply chain management to be sustainable.  The first condition is that the economic 
rents created for the whole system must be greater than the economic rents generated 
from alternative systems.  The second condition is that each party’s share of the 
economic rent must exceed their costs.  Kennett’s two conditions, assuming that 
producers are boundedly rational regarding governance structure choice, explain why 
there may be sub-optimal governance structures existing in the organic wheat market.  
Producers use the status-quo governance structure because they generate some profit and 
they are unaware of greater profit available from alternative supply chain configurations.    
Kennett et al. does not explain conditions for a new initiative in supply chain 
management to emerge.  In order for a new initiative in supply chain management to 
emerge, the economic rents accrued to each firm must be greater than the economic rents 
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generated from the status quo system.  While quantities sold by producers likely do not 
change due to governance structure choice, the governance structure choice of marketing 
firms may affect marketing firms’ quantity transacted, which directly affects marketer 
profits.  Marketing firms can compete for market share in upstream markets by 
providing governance structures that producers prefer, providing that the marketer’s 
performance downstream is not hindered as a result.  If an emerging governance 
structure resulted in lower profits per tonne for the marketer, quantity transacted would 
have to sufficiently compensate for the decrease in profits per tonne for marketer to use 
the emerging system.  Governance structures that differ in scope may have different 
limits to the size of the marketing firm.  For example, a particular governance structure 
may not allow for large economies of size in marketing throughput, and may be suited to 
small marketing firms.  Thus, a large firm may not be able to adapt to that particular 
governance structure.  The relationship between governance structure choice and 
quantity transacted by the marketer is beyond the scope of this thesis, and considerations 
of quantity are not incorporated into the model. 
4.9 Adaptation of the Dorward Model to the Organic Wheat Supply Chain 
4.9.1 Description 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 can easily be adapted to represent the farm and buyer levels of 
the organic wheat supply chain.  Figure 4.1 can represent a single farm, where the profit 
margin per tonne is the difference between the farm price and the sum of the farmer’s 
average transformation and average transaction costs.  Figure 4.1 is drawn to illustrate 
that at the farm level, the choice of governance structure does not affect production 
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costs.  Production costs are only affected by governance structure if farm inputs are 
altered or production incentives are altered. 
Figure 4.2 can represent a single farm and two different marketer choices in the 
organic wheat supply chain, where the farm firm is the upstream level and the marketer 
firms are the downstream level.  Within a given governance structure, the marketer’s 
profit margin is the difference between the value added at the marketing level (also 
known as the “marketing margin”) and the sum of average transformation costs and 
average transaction costs.  Since it is not possible to test for differences in downstream 
processor price between different governance structures, it is necessary to assume that 
downstream prices, Pp, are equal across all governance structures.7  
4.9.2 Governance Structure Evaluation – Organic Wheat Supply Chain Example 
In Figure 4.2 it can be seen that governance structure type 1 has higher marketer-
firm average costs and lower farm average costs than governance structure type 2.  Farm 
and marketing firms using governance structure type 1 have the lowest combined 
transformation and transaction average costs.  Given the assumption of an equal 
processor price, this means that governance structure type 1 provides the highest 
combined profit margins and is thus the optimal governance structure, despite the fact 
that its upstream firm price, P1, is lower than the upstream firm price for governance 
structure type 2, P2. 
                                                 
7 The prices that processors pay for organic wheat are not publicly available, and it is not possible to find 
out the prices received by marketing firms.  A downstream price can be assumed, but the assumption must 
be identical for all firms.  The assumed downstream price can be calculated by using the transparent 
marketing margin of POF transactions. 
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As described in the general model, the determination of the optimal governance 
structure from the perspective of one market level differs from the perspective of the 
entire supply chain.  The optimal governance structure from the perspective of the 
producer level is the one that maximizes profit margin per tonne for the producer by a 
combination of a high farmgate price and/or low farm-level average costs.  Given a 
common downstream price, Pp, a higher farmgate price is a direct result of a narrower 
marketing margin.  The optimal governance structure from the perspective of a 
marketing firm is the one that maximizes the firm’s profit margin per tonne, by a 
combination of a low farmgate price and/or low average costs.  In Figure 4.2, 
governance structure type 1 offers both the farm-level and marketer-level firms the 
greatest profit margin per tonne. 
As discussed earlier, firms may not have complete freedom in their choice of 
governance structure.  For example, it would be very difficult for a large grain company 
to alter governance structure to become a POF due to several financial and governance 
constraints.  Such corporate governance constraints may be alleviated by forming a 
subsidiary8.  Certain governance structures may also have barriers to entry at the farm 
level, such as restricted membership in POFs. 
4.9.3 Model Weaknesses  
The model above offers a simple representation of alternative governance 
structures.  A weakness of the model, however, is that it uses profit margins per tonne as 
                                                 
8 Although a marketer firm can choose between governance structures in terms of input provision, 
production management contracts are not used in organic wheat in Western Canada and are not the focus 
of this thesis. 
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its metric, and ignores the effect of governance structure on quantity transacted, and the 
effect of quantity on firm profit.  The exclusion of quantity in the model also prohibits 
the measurement of surplus in each market, which is often a popular tool to illustrate 
differences in efficiency between economic systems.  The adapted Dorward model is 
thus best suited to short-run analyses that focus on a single agent’s choice of governance 
structure. 
The Muth model of fixed or variable proportions is an alternative model that can 
be used to measure the profit and welfare effects of transaction cost and price changes 
due to governance structure and organizational changes.  The Muth model is well suited 
to analyses that examine welfare and profit for the aggregate market, as many firms’ 
supply curves can be horizontally aggregated using this approach.  The ability of an 
adapted Muth model to illustrate aggregate effects makes it best suited to examining 
governance structure effect on the entire market, such as a change in transaction costs 
that affects every unit transacted.  An example of this application is found in Martinez 
et. al. (1998), where lower measurement costs shift the supply curve downward.  The 
Muth model is not suited, however, to the task of measuring governance structure 
choices from the perspective of a single firm in the short run, since supply becomes very 
inelastic, demand becomes perfectly elastic, and the model comes to resemble the 
simpler Dorward model. 
4.10 Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to develop a theoretical framework in which to 
analyze the differences between governance structures that are used to transact organic 
wheat between producers and their buyers.  It was assumed that the objective of firms in 
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the organic wheat supply chain is to maximize utility.  Utility includes profit from 
producing and transacting organic wheat as well as other non-monetary utility.  The 
profit functions include transaction costs as well as transformation costs. 
The central thesis of the theoretical framework is that governance structure choice 
has economic effects.  The effects of governance structure in transactions can be 
separated into effects on transaction costs, which follows Transaction Cost Economics, 
and effects on price, which follows the Economics of Information.  Given the 
assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour, the characteristics of 
uncertainty, asset specificity and frequency lead to transaction costs for organic wheat.  
A price distribution arises due to price search costs, which can lead to different prices 
being received by producers, depending on the governance structure chosen and the 
organizations functioning in the market.  Using a framework proposed by Mahoney 
(1992), it is predicted that organic wheat buyers should choose the spot market 
governance structure, while producers should use relational contracting governance 
structure. 
POF and processor governance structures, which exhibit closer vertical 
coordination than grain company governance structures, may decrease producers’ 
transaction costs.  Increased vertical coordination between producers and their buyer can 
decrease transaction costs through efficiencies that are gained by increased sharing of 
information between producers and marketing agents.  Sharing information on price, 
quantity and quality information can lead to lower transaction costs for producer and 
marketer.  The mutual gain derived from the vertically coordinated arrangement can 
reduce incentives for the producer and marketer to act opportunistically.  Less chance of 
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opportunistic behaviour can lead to lower transaction costs, but coordination costs of 
maintaining the arrangement are an additional cost that must be considered.   
Producers that sell directly to processors may lack the economies of size in 
transaction functions, which may negate the efficiencies of vertical integration between 
producer and marketer.  Selling directly to a processor or through a POF may also be 
characterized by a lack of economies of size in transformation functions, which may 
lead to increased cost and lower efficiency.  A lack of economies of scale may 
counteract any transaction cost savings from increased vertical coordination.  Economies 
of size in transformation costs are not considered by this thesis, nor are economies of 
size in transaction costs at the marketer level. 
This chapter also provided a general model for comparing governance structures 
and illustrating the effect of governance structure choice.  This chapter has also provided 
general criteria for evaluating the optimal governance structure from the various 
perspectives of a supply chain.   
In each model, the difference between average cost and price is calculated in order 
to calculate profit as a metric for governance structure comparison.  The models 
illustrate the profit per tonne for one level and two levels respectively of a vertical 
market, and are adapted from Dorward (2001).  The model can be illustrated for various 
governance structures employed in the supply chain.  The optimal governance structure 
for a firm at a given level is that which creates the greatest profit.  The choice of model 
used to illustrate governance structure differences depends on the type of analysis to be 
performed. 
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The next chapter describes the methodology of the analysis.  The model of two 
adjacent supply chain levels provided in this chapter will be used to compare governance 
structure differences in price and cost.
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5 Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The methods used to test the null hypothesis of this thesis are outlined in this 
chapter.  The null hypothesis is that there are no significant differences in price or cost 
between the various governance structures available for producers to transact their 
organic HRSW to downstream firms.  The construction of the organic producer 
questionnaire and collection and calculation of transaction costs and prices through a 
survey is first described.  The econometric approach to determine the effect of 
explanatory variables on average transaction costs and price is then provided. The 
procedure for using the regression data and other data to compare the governance 
structures concludes the chapter.
5.1 The Organic Producer Survey 
Producer prices and transaction costs per tonne under each governance structure is 
the metric that is used to test the hypothesis.  Transaction costs are included in the 
average cost calculation.  As the transaction is the unit of analysis in this study, a 
random sample of transactions is required.  The methodology must provide a procedure 
to isolate the effect of governance structure on price and average transaction costs from 
all other factors.  The methodology must also allow for testing of significant differences 
in price and average transaction cost between governance structures.  The construction 
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and intuition behind the questionnaire is first described, followed by an explanation of 
how the transaction cost and price data is used in the analysis. 
5.1.1 Survey Construction 
A lack of primary data on producer transaction costs, organic wheat prices and the 
associated transaction characteristics necessitated a survey of organic wheat producers.  
The survey needed to link transaction cost and price data with the governance structure 
used and the characteristics of the wheat (quality, location, date) and the characteristics 
of the producer (age, experience, education).  The survey was constructed in a manner 
that collected this data in the most efficient way possible. 
The survey gathered additional information for other research questions not part of 
this thesis, and the questionnaire was very detailed and required a large time requirement 
from producers.  A copy of the questionnaire is contained in Appendix A.  The 
questionnaire contained nine major parts.  Parts one, two, four, six and nine in the 
questionnaire collected data necessary for this thesis. 
Part one of the questionnaire asked producers to provide their first transition year 
of organic production and their first certified year of organic production.  This data was 
used to calculate the producer’s experience in organic farming.  The producer was also 
asked to provide the number of acres that are certified organic, in transition to organic, 
and non-certified. 
Part two of the questionnaire asked producers to provide information on specific 
transactions of HRSW, oats, brown flax and laird lentils.  Producers were first asked to 
provide several details on each sale.  The details included the buyer name or buyer type 
(which determines governance structure in this analysis), the crop type, the quantity 
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sold, the farm price, the quality of the grain, the date of contracting, price setting, 
delivery and payment, and other characteristics.  The idea of the sale-specific data 
gathering was to understand as much as possible about each sale of HRSW used as data 
in the thesis.  Producers could provide this detailed information for up to ten sales. 
Part two continued by gathering data on producer transaction costs for a typical 
sale of HRSW, oats, brown flax or lentils.  Questions 2.2.1 through 2.2.12 in the 
questionnaire asked producers to estimate the amount of time devoted to different 
transaction tasks.  These transaction tasks are explained in detail in Section 5.2 of the 
thesis.  Wherever possible, the questions were laid out in the same order that the tasks 
are actually undertaken by the producer in order for participants to more easily follow 
the questionnaire. 
Part four of the questionnaire asked participants about their thoughts on the 
creation of a price information agency.  These questions were asked in order to 
determine producers’ interest and willingness to pay for more price information.  Part 
six of the questionnaire asked participants several questions about their relationships 
with buyers.  Question 6.2, titled “Marketing problems”, asked producers to indicate the 
extent of several different problems that producers may have.  Data from Parts four and 
six are analyzed in Chapter 8 of the thesis. 
Part nine of the questionnaire was titled “Personal Information” and asked 
producers to provide several demographic characteristics, such as their age, education 
level and net farm income.  Part nine also asked producers if they were interested in 
joining a POF, how much they value their time, whether or not they use the internet to 
market organic grains, and the amount of computer and fax machine usage they devote 
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to organic grain marketing.  Much of the data collected in Part nine describes producer 
characteristics. 
Prior to the construction of the survey it was necessary to understand the 
characteristics that potentially effect price and the transaction tasks that producers 
undertake.  An accurate knowledge of producers’ tasks allowed for very specific 
transaction cost questions to be asked in Part 2 of the questionnaire.  It was also 
important to have a good understanding of the transaction problems that producers have 
in order to create questions that uncover the extent of producer problems in Parts four 
and six of the questionnaire. 
5.1.2 Sample Description 
After performing three pilot surveys, a sample of organic producers in 
Saskatchewan was compiled.  The data on organic HRSW transactions consists of 76 
observations that were taken from 31 randomly sampled and six non-randomly sampled 
certified organic producers in Saskatchewan.  Saskatchewan producers were sampled 
because there is a large population and many of them produce organic wheat on their 
farms.  The data were collected through a mail-out survey in November 2003-March 
2004.  A random sample of producers was first selected using lists requested from the 
various organizations that certify organic producers in SK.  The randomly selected 
producers were contacted by telephone and asked if they would participate in the study 
by filling out a questionnaire.  Questionnaires were mailed to producers that were 
receptive to participating in the survey.  Ninety surveys were mailed, with 57 surveys 
returned.  Thirty one of these producers recorded a total of 65 HRSW transactions. 
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As it was important to collect data on less common governance structures, it was 
deemed necessary to select several farmers from a list of members of the POF that chose 
to participate in the study.  Eleven transactions from six of the POF members were 
included in the sample.  In total, the survey collected data on 65 randomly-selected 
HRSW transactions and 11 non-random HRSW transactions, totalling 76 transaction 
observations. 
The transaction of primary interest was the selling of organic HRSW into the 
human consumption market in bulk, which may or may not be cleaned before it leaves 
the farmgate.  There are many deviations to this typical type of sale, such as selling 
organic HRSW as seed, animal feed, or selling in bags.  As this analysis seeks to 
evaluate differences between governance structures for a “typical” organic HRSW 
transaction, any of these transactions that deviated from the norm were not included in 
the analysis.  Five transactions were thus eliminated from the sample to arrive at the 
sample of 76 that conformed to the specifications of the study. 
5.2 Transaction Cost Data 
The survey gathered data on the costs and time spent for the various search, 
negotiation, monitoring and enforcement costs that the producers incur in their routine 
tasks in the marketing of organic wheat.  Producers typically do not keep records of 
transaction costs, so it was necessary to ask for an estimate of these costs for the various 
“marketing tasks” and the annual costs of marketing. 
5.2.1 Marketing Tasks - Single Sale-Specific and Multiple Sale-Specific 
There are several tasks that producers undertake when selling their organic HRSW 
either through a single sale or multiple sales.  The questionnaire included questions 
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about the time spent by the producer for several specific tasks.  The data collected on 
producers’ marketing tasks reflects their transaction costs.  Transaction cost questions 
were not tied to specific transactions, but rather to all of the organic HRSW transactions 
that a producer had conducted during the sample period.  The marketing tasks of the 
producer are described in Table 5.1, with the “X”s in the right columns denoting the 
classification of each cost as a core transaction cost (C), negotiation cost (N) and search 
cost (S).  All costs in Table 5.1 are included as a part of total transaction cost.  The far 
right column provides the question number in the questionnaire that asked for the 
particular data. 
5.2.2 Determining the Reputation of a New Buyer 
Determining the reputation of a new buyer is important when selling to that buyer for the 
first time.  This represents a search cost to the producer.  Attributes of reputation include 
trustworthiness, the ability to pay promptly, and whether or not the buyer is bonded with 
the Canadian Grain Commission (CGC)9.  The producer may also contact other 
producers in order to determine the buyer’s reputation.  The producer may also attend 
meetings in order to ascertain a buyer’s reputation.  After a producer has made one or 
more sales to a specific buyer, it is assumed that their reputation is known and the 
producer does not incur any additional costs associated with determining the reputation 
                                                 
9 The Canadian Grain Commission (CGC) is a Federal government body that is responsible for regulating 
the Canadian grain industry.  The CGC requires that all grain buyers in Canada provide payment insurance 
to producers, in the form of a bond that covers their accounts receivable in the event that the buyer 
becomes bankrupt. 
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of that buyer.  This activity represents a search cost to the producer.  This information is 
attained in question 2.2.3 of the producer survey. 
Table 5.1 - Average Transaction Cost Constituents 
Task/Transaction Cost Type            Details                                      C  N  S          # 
Search  
  Reputation search Time Talking to buyers and producers         X      X       2.2.3   
  Price search Time Talking to buyer and producers         X      X       2.2.4 
Negotiation   
  Negotiation Time Arranging sale, paperwork,  loading truck                                   X  X           2.2.5 
  Extra time to sell to the  
  U.S. Time 
Extra paperwork, faxing documents 
 to the border                                       X  X         2.2.10 
  Customs agent fee (U.S.) Fees $/transaction                                        X  X        2.1.1w 
  Extra time to sell to RoW  Time Extra paperwork                                  X  X        2.2.11 
Fee $/t                                                        X  X         2.2.1f 
Time Paperwork                                           X  X         2.2.6i 
  Producer Direct   
  Sale (PDS) 
Driving Driving to local elevator                                      2.2.6ii 
  Sample preparation and  
  sending to buyers Time 
Prepare package, send by mail                             2.2.8, 
Or bus                                                  X  X         2.2.9 
Fees Depends on type of test                       X  X         2.2.12 
Time Preparing and sending sample             X  X 2.2.12 
  Quality testing 
Driving Driving to mail office or  testing company                                     2.2.12
Monitoring/Enforcement  
  Extra time Time Phoning buyer  2.3
  Extra money $ Legal fees etc.  2.3
  Value lost/discount $ $/t loss or discount  2.3
Fixed/Annual   
Time, Grower meetings  2.2.2  Marketing meetings  
  (special trip) Driving  
Time, Discuss certification body matters  2.2.2  Certification  
  meetings Driving  
Time, Learning how to market etc.  2.2.2  General marketing  
  Meeting Driving  
Time, Combination of certification and marketing  2.2.2   Certification and    
  general marketing  
  meeting Driving 
 
  Fax machine usage $ $100 x % used for organic wheat marketing   10.9 
  Computer usage $ $1000 x % used for organic wheat marketing   10.8 
Coordination Cost   
POF Member Time, Driving Meetings to discuss POF performance  2.4.2
C = Core transaction costs  
N = Negotiation costs 
S = Search costs 
# = Question Number in Questionnaire 
Source: Producer Survey  
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5.2.3 Acquiring Information on Prices 
Acquiring price information is an activity that a producer may take part in on a 
continual basis, in an effort to keep track of prices over the entire year.  Some producers 
sell their grain soon after harvest, while others sell their grain later in the year if they 
believe that the price may improve.  Acquiring price information represents a search cost 
to the producer.  The producer may talk with or contact other producers and marketers in 
order to keep track of prices.  Communication typically occurs on the telephone or in 
casual visits, but producers may also attend meetings organized by producer groups in 
order to find information on prices. 
Producers also gather information on prices at the time that they want to sell their 
grain.  The producer may contact several buyers and compare the various prices that 
they offer.  Communication at this point typically occurs on the telephone, but may also 
include trips to visit a potential buyer.  These activities represent search costs to the 
producer.  This information is attained in question 2.2.4 of the producer survey. 
5.2.4 Coordinating the Transaction with the Buyer and Completing Forms 
Once the producer has found a buyer that has a satisfactory reputation and price 
offer, they begin to communicate regarding the details of the sale.  This may include 
further negotiation of the price and date of the transaction.  Both the producer and buyer 
must fill out forms in order to maintain the integrity of the audit trail that certifies that 
the wheat is organic.  These forms include a transaction certificate that is issued by the 
producer’s certifying body.  The producer usually assists with the loading of the truck 
and signs an affidavit that the truck is clean prior to loading.  Once the grain has left the 
farm, the producer may have to fax documents to the border in the case of export to the 
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U.S. and/or pay a customs agent fee (in the case of U.S. sales).  All of these tasks 
represent negotiation costs to the producer.  This information is attained in question 
2.2.5 of the producer survey. 
5.2.5 Performing the Producer Direct Sale 
In the case of wheat, the producer may have to perform a producer direct sale, 
unless the buyer handles this task.  If the producer is responsible for this activity, he or 
she can pay another grain company to perform this service, or they can fill out the form 
and complete this task on their own.  Performing the PDS represents a negotiation cost 
to the producer.  This information is attained by finding out how the producer performed 
the PDS (question 2.1.1w) and finding out the time spent to perform the PDS (question 
2.2.6). 
5.2.6 Sending Samples to the Prospective Buyer(s) 
Prospective buyers may request that the producer send a sample of their grain so 
that they can determine its quality.  Producers in Western Canada usually send a sample 
in the mail, bus, or courier to the buyer.  This represents another negotiation cost to the 
producer.  This information is attained by multiplying the number of samples sent for 
HRSW sales (attained in question 2.2.7) times the cost per sample (attained in question 
2.2.9). 
5.2.7 Sending Samples for Testing Quality 
In some cases the buyer requires that the producer provide test results.  In the case 
of wheat, this may include a test of grade, protein, or test weight.  The producer must 
send a sample to a company that specializes in these tests.  Quality testing tasks 
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represent a negotiation cost to the producer.  This information is attained in question 
2.2.12 of the producer survey. 
5.2.8 Enforcing payment from buyer (if required) 
If the buyer does not pay by the time that the producer has expected payment or 
pays an amount that is lower than expected, the producer may decide to spend time and 
money in order to enforce proper payment.  This typically includes calling the buyer 
several times.  In some cases the producer may drive to the buyer’s location in order to 
discuss the matter with the buyer.  Enforcing payment represents an enforcement cost to 
the producer.  This information is attained in question 2.3 of the producer survey. 
5.2.9 Monitoring Marketing Agent Performance  
In the case where the producer hires an agent to market his or her grain, the 
producer may spend time and money in order to ensure that the marketer is doing a good 
job.  The producer may meet with the marketer in order to ascertain the marketer’s 
performance.  In the group marketer case, a board of directors may oversee the 
marketer’s activities, and meetings may be held in order to discuss the marketer’s 
performance.  This represents a monitoring cost to the producer.  This information is 
attained in question 2.4.2 of the producer survey. 
5.2.10 Multiple Sale-Specific Tasks – Special Trips 
Several of the marketing tasks described in the previous section may include a 
special trip to a buyer or meeting.  Moreover, these special trips may include several 
types of marketing tasks at once.  The survey asked producers to explain the purpose of 
their trips, the time spent, and the distance driven.  The purpose of this trip information 
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was categorized by the researcher as either for the purposes of certification, general 
marketing, a combination of certification and general marketing, or specific marketing 
meetings.  The specific marketing meetings may include aspects of reputation search, 
price search or negotiation costs.  Specific marketing trips include one-on-one 
discussions between the producer and buyer, dropping off a sample, or grower meetings, 
in which a buyer invites producers to hear about marketing opportunities.  The 
information on special trip costs is attained in question 2.2.2 of the producer survey. 
Some special trips are accrued to only one transaction, while others accrue to 
multiple transactions (such as dropping off samples for several sales).  Certification and 
general marketing meetings are categorized as annual costs.  Transaction costs for 
special trips are not separated into the marketing task categories of search, negotiation 
and monitoring discussed in the last section, but they are accounted separately and added 
to the other search, negotiation and monitoring costs. 
5.2.11 Annual Costs 
Producers incur transaction costs through certification fees and time spent at 
certification body meetings.  Many certification bodies hold producer meetings several 
times per year that many organic producers attend.  The survey collected information on 
the time that producers spend at these meetings.  Information on certification body fees 
is collected from the various certification organizations in Saskatchewan.  General 
marketing meetings may include learning about how to market organic grains. 
Many organic farmers own a fax machine and/or a computer for the exclusive 
purpose of marketing.  The annual cost of owning a computer and fax machine is 
assumed at $1000 and $100 respectively and the survey asked producers to estimate the 
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amount of their computer and fax usage that is devoted to marketing organic grain.  
Information on these costs is attained in questions 10.8 and 10.9 of the producer survey. 
5.3 Transaction Cost Calculation 
In the questionnaire, producers were asked about the time spent and kilometres 
driven for all of the sale-specific tasks, multiple sale-specific tasks and annual costs 
described above.  For the sale-specific tasks, the survey asked for estimates of the 
average time taken per sale.  Tasks that accrued to multiple sales, such as special trips to 
meetings, were accounted for by distributing the time spent at the meeting(s) over the 
multiple transactions to which those meetings are related. 
Once the time and distance data was collected for the various transaction tasks, 
these numbers were converted into dollar values.  A common time value of $10 per hour 
is also used across all respondents, which is a value used in several government 
publications as an estimate of labour cost per hour (SAFRR 2004, AAFRD 2001)  A 
driving cost of $0.36 per kilometre was also assumed in order to convert driving 
distances into dollar values.  The costs of various grain tests were taken from a local 
testing company. 
Once all of the data were converted into dollar values, each cost was summed to 
provide a total transaction cost for each transaction in the sample.  The average 
transaction cost per tonne is calculated as the sum of transaction costs for each 
transaction divided by the quantity of that transaction. 
Examining the sum of all average transaction costs in one number is one method 
of comparing transaction costs between different governance structures.  This method, 
however, does not explain differences in certain types of transaction costs between 
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governance structures.  It is thus of interest to this thesis to examine the constituent 
transaction costs, which are summarized in Table 5.1.  There are several ways of 
aggregating the transaction cost values, including search costs, negotiation costs, or 
“core” transaction costs.  Core transaction costs represent search, negotiation and 
monitoring marketing tasks and do not include special trips or annual costs.  Examining 
these particular groups of transaction costs may reveal differences in transaction costs 
that are not apparent in the total average transaction cost values. 
5.4 Farmgate Price Data 
There is very limited price information presently available for organic wheat.  
Moreover, the available price data does not identify the governance structure employed 
or any other factors that may determine price.  Primary data were deemed necessary in 
order to glean this transaction-specific information, which was collected through the 
organic producer survey.  Organic producers were asked to provide detailed information 
related to their Hard Red Spring Wheat (HRSW) transactions during the period between 
2000 and 2003 in section 2.1.1 of the questionnaire.  For each HRSW transaction, the 
survey collected data on the farmgate price that the producer received, plus any other 
characteristics of the wheat that may affect its price.  These characteristics include the 
quantity, grade, protein content, the date of sale, whether or not it was cleaned, whether 
or not it was bagged, and other factors.  The governance structure that was employed in 
each transaction was also established. 
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5.5 Measurement of Governance Structure Effects 
An OLS regression can be used to separate the effect of governance structure from 
other factors that can affect prices and average transaction costs.  The regression 
equations are given in Equations 5.1 and 5.2 respectively: 
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A description of each variable and the expected sign for equations 5.1 and 5.2 is given in 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
5.5.1 Price Regression Dependent Variable: Farmgate Price 
The dependent variable in equation 5.1 is the farmgate price, with a few 
adjustments in order to improve the usefulness of the regression.  The farmgate price is 
the net price that the producer receives, in dollars per tonne, after the CWB Producer 
Direct Sale (PDS) is performed and transportation charges accrued to the producer are 
deducted.  The price is also adjusted for changes in price between crop year by 
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subtracting the CWB pool price from each observation.  This approach simultaneously 
corrects changes in prices between crop years and provides a farmgate price that is 
adjusted for quality, at least by measures available in the conventional market, which is 
the price spreads in the final payments by the CWB (CWB 2001, 2002, 2003).  The 
result of these adjustments is a crop year-adjusted, conventional quality-adjusted 
farmgate price. 
Table 5.2 - Price Regression Variables 
Variable Description Variable 
Name 
Measurement Expected 
Sign 
Dependent variable    
    Organic Wheat Price in the      
    Transaction Price Transaction prices ($/t)  
Explanatory variables    
    Grain company (not CWB agent) Nonagent Non CWB agent or not (1-0) + 
    Producer–Owned Marketing firm  
    (POF) POF 
POF marketed or not 
(1-0) + 
    Direct to processor  Processor Marketed direct to processor or not (1-0) + 
    Producer’s experience as certified   
    organic producer Exper (years) + 
    Transaction quantity Q (tonnes) + 
    Number of buyers contacted Number buyers Whole number + 
    Transportation basis from  
    farmgate to port Transcost 
Trucking cost + rail freight 
($/t) − 
    Effect of distance on  
    transportation basis 
Transcost*
Trans Interaction term + 
    Conventional Wheat Price Thunder 
Domestic Human 
Consumption Price, basis 
Thunder Bay ($/t) 
+ 
    Protein content Protein % + 
    CGC Grade Grade 1-4 − 
    Producer’s risk aversion Volatile 
prices 
Degree to which volatile 
prices are a problem (1-5) + 
    Desire to become a member of a  
    POF 
Want 
member 
Want to join a POF or not (1-
0) + 
    European sale by producer or  
    though POF Europe European sale or not (1-0) + 
    U.S. sale by producer or through    
    POF US U.S. sale or not (1-0) + 
    Farm size Farm size Cultivated area (acres) + 
Source: Author’s estimates    
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Table 5.3 - Average Transaction Cost Regression Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
Variable Description Variable 
Name 
Measurement 
C N S T
Dependent variable    
    Producer Average Transaction Cost  
    in the transaction 
ATC Average transaction costs 
($/t)  
Explanatory variables    
    Grain company (not CWB agent) Nonagent Non CWB agent or not (1-0) + + + +
    Producer–Owned Marketing firm  
    (POF) 
POF POF marketed or not  
(1-0) − − − −
    Direct to processor  Processor Marketed direct to processor 
or not (1-0) − − − −
    Producer’s experience Exper (years) − − − −
    Transaction quantity Q (tonnes) − − − −
    Distance to buyer Trans (km) + + + +
    Producer’s risk aversion Volatile 
prices 
Degree to which volatile 
prices are a problem (1-5) + + + +
    Farm size Farmsize Cultivated area(acres) − − − −
C = Core transaction costs       
N = Negotiation costs 
S = Search costs 
T = Total transaction costs 
Source: Author’s estimates 
      
5.5.2 Cost Regression Dependent Variable: Average Transaction Cost 
The dependent variable in equation 5.2 is average transaction cost.  This variable 
can be defined in different ways, depending on the costs that are included in the 
calculation.  Equation 5.2 is regressed using several different forms of average 
transaction cost.  First, a total average transaction cost variable is used (5.2a), which 
includes all transaction costs.  While the total average transaction cost encompasses all 
transaction costs, it is expected that transportation and quantity variables will explain 
most of the significance.  The second, third and fourth regressions thus remove 
transaction costs that are transportation and quantity dependent, such as special trips, 
annual transaction costs and any other driving expenditures.  In the second regression 
(5.2b), a “core transaction cost” variable is used, which includes only searching and 
negotiating costs, and excludes all driving costs.  The core transaction costs are the 
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quantitative manifestation of the uncertainty and asset specificity problems developed in 
the theoretical framework.  A third regression (5.2c) uses the sum of reputation and price 
search costs, representing “search costs”, as the dependent variable.  Search costs are 
interesting because they can cause bidding price dispersion, as discussed in the 
theoretical framework.  A fourth regression (5.2d) sums negotiation costs as the 
dependent variable.  The four different groupings of transaction costs are given in Table 
5.1.  Since the dependent variable may be regressed in logarithmic form, a value of 1 is 
added to all observations in order to preserve degrees of freedom.  A discussion of this 
technique can be found in Woolridge (2003). 
5.5.3 Price Regression Explanatory Variables: Factors That May Affect Farm Price 
Since the hypothesis of this thesis posits that farm prices could differ depending on 
producers’ governance structure choice, governance structure must be included as an 
explanatory variable.  As prices can vary for several reasons other than governance 
structure, these other factors must also be present as explanatory variables.  This section 
describes all of the factors that may affect farm price, which are contained in Equation 
5.1. 
Governance structure can affect farm prices by resulting in different downstream 
prices and/or having different marketing margins.  The marketing margin can be affected 
by the number and types of functions that marketers perform, and by the effects of 
opportunism and information asymmetry described in the theoretical framework.  
Transportation, cleaning and blending functions at the marketing level entail 
transformation costs for the marketer, while opportunism and information asymmetry 
lead to transaction costs for the marketer. These costs are included in the firm’s 
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marketing margin.  The effect of vertical coordination on marketer costs is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but a few points can be made.  Governance structures employing 
more vertical coordination may have lower marketer transaction costs, which may be 
transmitted into a narrower marketing margin.  On the other hand, governance structures 
employing more vertical coordination often lack the economies of scale that may lead to 
a narrower marketing margin.   
The size of the marketing margin may also be affected by the degree of 
information asymmetry facing producers, which may be affected by governance 
structure.  Governance structure choice may affect the distribution of prices offered, 
such that the mean price may be higher when information asymmetry is reduced.  Since 
marketer cost structure is not known, it is not possible to measure how much of the 
marketing margin differences can be attributed to the marketer costs or marketer 
information advantages. 
Dummy explanatory variables for each type of governance structure are included 
in the regression equation, including grain companies that are not CWB agents 
(Nonagent), Producer-owned firms (POF), and Direct to processor (Processor) 
transactions.  These dummy variables take a value of 1 if the transaction uses that type 
of governance structure, and take a value of 0 otherwise.  The governance structure that 
is not included in the regression (in order to avoid the dummy variable trap10) is grain 
companies that are handling agents of the CWB.  CWB agents are the most common 
governance structure for organic wheat, and therefore provide a suitable benchmark 
                                                 
10 The dummy variable trap is the problem of including a dummy for the base group when a constant term 
is already included in the regression. 
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from which to compare the other three governance structures.  These governance 
structures are hereafter be referred to as non-agents, POFs, processors and CWB agents. 
A significant coefficient on the Nonagent, POF or Processor variables indicates 
that those governance structures have a significantly different price compared to CWB 
agents.  The POF and processor governance structures entail greater vertical 
coordination than the base CWB agent governance structure and it is expected that POF 
and Processor will have a positive sign.  The non-agent governance structure, however, 
has similar levels of vertical coordination to the CWB agent governance structure, and 
differs in other attributes, such as risk sharing and scale.  It was determined that non-
CWB agents differed significantly enough from the base governance structure to merit a 
distinction in the regression.  This sign of the Nonagent coefficient may be positive if 
non-agents do not incorporate a risk premium into their prices, due to the fact that they 
typically perform back-to-back sales.  CWB-agents do not always perform back-to-back 
sales, but sometimes purchase a significant portion of their wheat from producers before 
downstream buyers have been arranged.  CWB-agent companies may discount prices in 
order to account for the risk that the organic premium may decrease before a buyer can 
be found.  
The experience of the organic producer (Exper) may also significantly affect farm 
price, whereby more experienced producers may have more efficacious price searches 
because they would know where to find higher prices (or alternatively, would know how 
to avoid low prices).  The quantity of the transaction (Q) may affect price because price 
premiums may be given for larger transactions.  This would arise because marketers 
could have economies of scale that are passed down to producers.  The size of the farm 
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(Farmsize) may also affect price if larger farms receive higher prices because marketers 
want to attract the producer’s business.  The effort made to search for prices, as 
indicated by the number of buyers contacted before selling, (Numberbuyers) may also be 
a significant explanatory variable, which represents a return to price search that could 
indicate that a distribution of prices exists in the market.   
Variables that proxy location attributes may be important in explaining organic 
HRSW prices.  The transportation basis from the farmgate to export position, 
(Transcost) may affect farmgate price if it is assumed that buyers deduct truck and rail 
freight respectively from the farmgate price.  The Transcost variable represents bulk 
wheat freight rates from the buyer’s location plus the trucking cost from the farmgate to 
the buyer, assuming that the truck hauls 40 tonnes, and that the cost is $50 per load, plus 
$2.19 per km (Nolan 2004). 
The organic wheat price on a given day may be affected by the conventional price 
on the same day, as represented by the #1 13.5% protein domestic human consumption 
HRSW price, basis Thunder Bay (Thunder).  Within a given crop year, however, the 
performance of a PDS with the CWB essentially “cancels out” the effect of conventional 
prices that deviate from the CWB pool price.  Over multiple crop years one would 
expect a relationship between organic and conventional prices, but this effect should not 
be present in the regression because this variable, like the dependent variable, is crop 
year adjusted by subtracting the CWB pool price from each observation.   
There are two factors that may explain any explanatory power of the conventional 
price variable within a given crop year.  Firstly, the price premium of organic HRSW 
may be correlated with the conventional price.  This can occur if the organic premium 
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(organic price minus conventional price) is correlated with the conventional spot price 
over time.  Thus, price spikes in conventional HRSW result in a higher organic 
premium, and thus an organic price that is elastic to conventional price changes.  
Secondly, some producers may not be performing the PDS when they sell their organic 
HRSW.  If producers do not perform the PDS and report their price in the survey, the 
group of producers that “cheat” would exhibit a positive relationship between organic 
and conventional prices.11  The inclusion of a conventional price variable in the 
regression partially controls for the effect of cheating on organic price and fully controls 
for any correlation between conventional and organic prices.12  The Domestic human 
consumption daily prices and the CWB pool prices are taken from CWB records (2004). 
The sensitivity of organic HRSW price to quality, as measured by protein levels 
(Protein) and grade number (Grade) may differ from the sensitivity of conventional 
HRSW.  Since the dependent variable is adjusted for conventional price spreads in 
quality, any difference between organic price spreads and conventional price spreads are 
illustrated by the coefficients of the quality variables.  The level of producers’ risk 
averseness, as indicated by their opinion on the degree to which volatile prices are a 
problem (Volatileprices) is expected to positively affect prices, as more risk averse 
producers may exert more effort in order to find higher prices. 
                                                 
11 This idea assumes that organic and conventional HRSW prices are correlated over time 
12 Cheating can only be partially controlled for by the coefficient, as only some unknown portion of the 
sample of reported prices have not performed the PDS.  The “cheaters” would have a greater effect on the 
Thunder coefficient than the non-cheating portion of the sample.  The effect of the cheating portion on the 
Thunder coefficient is diluted by the non-cheating portion, since the coefficient represents the average 
effect of conventional prices over the entire sample, including possible cheaters and non-cheaters. 
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The location of the downstream buyer may affect the price that is paid to the 
producer.  A dummy variable for European sales (Europe) and U.S. sales (US) is used to 
detect if buyer location affects price.  Any significance in these dummy variables 
indicates that prices are significantly higher in those markets compared to other markets.  
A summary of the explanatory variables is found in Table 5.2.  
5.5.4 Cost Regression Explanatory Variables: Factors that Affect Producers’ 
Average Transaction Costs 
The TCE theory explained in the theoretical framework chapter provides a strong 
argument that governance structure choice affects transaction costs for producers and 
their buyers.  There are, however, several other characteristics of transactions that can 
affect transaction costs that are not explained by TCE theory.  This section describes the 
factors affecting average transaction costs, which were used in regression equation 5.2. 
Governance structure choice can affect transaction costs for organic wheat 
transactions between a producer and his or her buyer.  As detailed in the theoretical 
framework, governance structures vary in the degree of uncertainty and asset specificity 
that accompany them.  These differences in transaction characteristics result in 
transaction costs to mitigate their effect.  Dummy explanatory variables for each type of 
governance structure are included in the regression equation, including non-agents 
(Nonagent), POFs (POF), and processor (Processor) transactions.  These dummy 
variables take a value of 1 if the transaction uses that type of governance structure, and a 
value of 0 otherwise.  The governance structure that is not included in the regression (in 
order to avoid the dummy variable trap) is grain companies that are CWB agents.  A 
significant coefficient on the Nonagent, POF or Processor variables indicates that those 
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governance structures have a significantly different average transaction cost compared to 
CWB agents. 
The experience of the producer (Exper) may have a negative effect on average 
transaction costs by efficiencies gained through experience as organic producers 
improve their searching, negotiating, and monitoring/enforcing techniques and learn 
how to avoid these costs. The size of the transactions (Q) can affect average transaction 
costs if larger transactions allow producers to capture economies of scale in transaction 
costs.  Economies of scale exist because the same tasks are necessary in order to conduct 
a transaction regardless of the size of the transaction.  Holding all other factors equal, the 
amount of average transaction costs decrease as a transaction quantity increases.  Farm 
size (Farmsize) can also affect average transaction costs, since larger farms spread their 
annual transaction costs over more transactions.  It is expected that the relationship 
between farm size and average transaction cost will be negative, but since this study 
focuses on the transaction as the unit of analysis, this effect may not be apparent in the 
data. 
The degree of producers’ risk aversion (Volatileprices) can affect producer 
transaction costs, with increasing risk aversion leading to increasing transaction costs.  
Risk aversion in transactions represents the degree to which an individual prefers a 
certain outcome of a transaction to an uncertain outcome.  Producers that are more 
averse to transaction uncertainty take greater measures in order to ensure that the 
transaction is completed without problems related to opportunistic behaviour. 
The transportation distance from the producer to the buyer, in km, (Trans) may 
affect the transaction cost dependent variable if it accounts for trips to visit the buyer to 
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negotiate a sale or drop off samples.  With increasing distance, costs associated with 
driving time and vehicle mileage increase.  The Trans variable may also be important 
because increasing distance may lead to increasing fear of opportunistic behaviour 
arising from the difficulty in monitoring and enforcing contracts over greater distances, 
thus increasing the producers’ transaction costs.  A summary of the explanatory 
variables is found in Table 5.3. 
5.6 Comparison of Governance Structures 
The methodology for comparing the price and cost of each governance structure is 
described in this section.  Price and transaction cost under each governance structure is 
first predicted using the regression results, then the remaining transaction and 
transformation costs are added to the prediction in order to arrive at an average cost 
value and price value for each governance structure.  These values are then illustrated 
using the Dorward model and the optimal governance structures from all perspectives is 
discussed.  This methodology in more detail, followed by a presentation of the results, is 
described in this section. 
5.6.1 Prediction of Price and Cost 
Given the regression results, one can predict price and average cost for each cost 
regression, under each governance structure.  This technique is especially useful in 
interpreting the coefficients of the log-linear cost regressions.  Predictions are made by 
using values for the non-governance structure variables (experience, age, transaction 
quantity, farm size, and conventional price) and one of the governance structure 
variables at a time.  The price and cost predictions for each governance structure include 
a 90% confidence interval, which illustrates the degree of error associated with the 
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predictions.  The total transaction cost, search cost and negotiation cost regressions are 
not to be used in the theoretical model, but their predicted values are useful nonetheless 
in describing the differences in search costs and negotiation costs between governance 
structures. 
5.6.2 Calculation of Average Cost 
Total average cost is the sum of all average transaction and transformation costs 
for the producer.  The predictions from either the total average transaction cost 
regression or the core transaction cost regression can be used to calculate total average 
costs.  The most suitable prediction to use is the prediction that contains significance on 
the governance structure coefficients.  The mean values of the other, non-core 
transaction costs, plus the average transformation cost estimate, can be added to the 
predicted core transaction cost values to create a total average cost variable. 
Using the regression predictions from only the core transaction costs and simply 
adding the missing transaction costs to create a total implicitly assumes that the other 
transaction costs, specifically the special trip costs, travelling costs and annual costs, are 
identical across governance structures.  An average cost of certification is also added to 
the cost of each governance structure, taken from Pro-Cert (2004).  Annual certification 
costs for an experienced organic wheat producer include a $200 flat fee, plus a fee of 
$.50 per cultivated acre.  Annual inspection costs an additional $50 to $100, depending 
on travel costs for the inspector.  Assuming an inspection cost of $75, a farm size of 
1220 acres and an organic wheat yield of 35.25 bu/ac (AAFRD 2001), the average 
certification is $0.73 per acre or $0.76 per tonne. 
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5.6.3 Transformation Cost 
Transformation costs accrued to the producer include the cost of production.  It is 
assumed that producers’ costs of production are the same regardless of the governance 
structure that they employ.  This assumption is appropriate because there does not 
appear to be any governance structures presently used in the organic wheat industry that 
affect the production techniques of producers.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, production 
specification contracts are not used in organic wheat marketing in Canada, except the 
requirement that the wheat be certified organic.  A single estimate of production costs 
taken from a study by Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development (2001), for 
dryland organic wheat production, is assumed for all governance structures.  A value of 
$124.55/tonne, which includes all variable and fixed production costs, is taken from the 
report.  A detailed description of the production costs is given in Appendix B. 
5.6.4 Governance Structure Comparison 
Each governance structure is evaluated from the perspective of the producer, the 
marketer, and the system as a whole.  As described in Chapter 4, the optimum 
governance structure from the perspective of the producer or marketer is that which 
results in the most individual profit per tonne.  The optimum governance structure from 
the perspective of the supply chain as a whole is the one that results in the greatest 
combined profit per tonne. 
The performance of each governance structure from the producers’ perspective is 
compared by subtracting producer average cost from the price received to attain a 
measure of producer profit per tonne.  The marketer profit per tonne is estimated by 
assuming that the POF marketing margin (the commission that the POF takes) equals the 
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marketer average cost, and that marketer average costs are identical across governance 
structures.  This assumption ignores potential differences in transaction cost economies 
of size across governance structures.  The profit per tonne for producers and their buyer 
under each governance structure is illustrated graphically using the adapted Dorward 
model.   
Data on marketer average costs is not available, but a reasonable assumption can 
be made in order to estimate marketer profit per tonne.  Assuming that the POF operates 
with zero profits, the POF sets its marketing margin equal to its average cost.  Assuming 
that all four governance structures have similar average costs, the estimated marketer 
profit can be calculated for each governance structure.  Given these assumptions, a wider 
marketing margin results in greater marketer profits per tonne.  Note that the marketing 
margin does not include any value-added due to transformation costs; the downstream 
price is based on bulk HRSW from the marketer’s location. 
Given the estimates of producer and marketer profit for each governance structure, 
one can evaluate the optimal governance structure from the perspective of producers, 
marketers, and from a multi-level perspective. 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
The procedure for testing the hypothesis of the thesis was described in this chapter.  
The collection of the transaction cost and price data was first described.  The method of 
converting the transaction cost information into dollar values was also described.  The 
chapter continued by describing the regression approach to testing for significant 
differences in prices and transaction costs between governance structures.  The 
independent and dependent variables were also discussed.  In order to illustrate these 
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differences in price and cost and their effect on producer profits, a method of using 
predictions of prices and core transaction costs from their respective regressions was 
developed.  The predicted core transaction costs are to be summed with all other relevant 
costs and plotted using the Dorward model to illustrate producer profit per tonne.  The 
results of the hypothesis test are provided in the next chapter. 
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6 Chapter 6: Hypothesis Test Results 
 
6.0 Introduction 
The results of the hypothesis test are presented in this chapter.  First, the sample 
statistics on the characteristics of each governance structure are given.  Second, the 
transaction cost data is described in detail.  Third, the descriptive statistics from the 
regression results are reported.  Fourth, the calculations and final results of the 
governance structure comparison are provided. 
6.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.1 provides the mean of several explanatory variables in the price and cost 
regressions, plus age, education level and annual income.  These values are taken from 
the sample of HRSW transactions for each particular governance structure.  The 
descriptive statistics are provided in order to illustrate differences in producer and 
transaction characteristics between governance structures.  The descriptive statistics for 
each governance structure are random, so the sample means can be used to make 
inferences about the population of organic HRSW transactions. 
The descriptive statistics illustrate that POF transactions involve producers with 
the most experience, most likely because membership has been closed for several years.  
CWB agent transactions clearly have the greatest quantity transacted, while processor 
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transactions have the least quantity transacted per sale.  Producers making processor 
transactions contact the most buyers, while producers making POF transactions make 
the least contacts with buyers.  The conventional HRSW price (domestic human 
consumption price, basis Thunder Bay, #1 13.5% protein), grade, protein and education 
are similar across all governance structures.  Producer transactions with non-agent grain 
companies reported the highest aversion to volatile prices, but showed the least interest 
in joining a POF, were the oldest, and had the smallest farms.  Producers that transacted 
with processors had showed the most interest in joining a POF and had the lowest 
income levels.  Producers that transacted with CWB agent grain companies and POFs 
had the largest farm size and the highest incomes.  Producers in POF transactions 
reported the largest transportation distance to their buyer, which contributed to their 
transportation cost to port.   
Table 6.1 – Producer Sample Descriptive Statistics, by Governance Structure 
Variable Name Mean 
 CWB Agent n = 46 
Non Agent 
n = 11 
Processor 
n = 8 
POF 
n = 11 
     
    Experience (years) 5.61 4.91 6.25 8.55 
    Quantity transacted (t) 95.63 42.12 34.81 59.94 
    Number of buyers contacted 8.39 7.27 10.00 3.27 
    Transportation cost to port 48.14 47.24 47.09 50.80 
    Domestic Human Consumption  
    Price, Thunder Bay ($/tonne) 226.01 223.74 214.18 211.88 
    Protein (%) 13.68 13.93 14.23 13.94 
    Grade (1-3) 1.17 1.27 1.00 1.18 
    Volatile Prices problem (1-5) 1.80 2.27 1.88 1.64 
    Want Membership in POF  
    (% reporting “yes”) 50% 45% 63% 55% 
    Age (years) 41-50 51-60 41-50 41-50 
    Education High School High School 
High 
School 
High 
School 
    Annual Income ($ thousands) 30 to 40 20 to 30 10 to 20 30 to 40 
    Farm Size (cultivated acres) 1373.61 599.09 1149.63 1252.09 
    Transportation distance to buyer or 
    marketer location (km) 231.83 267.36 196.50 323.09 
Source: Producer survey, Author’s calculations 
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The observations made from these statistics are consistent with expectations.  It is 
important to note that from this information we are not able to conclude that these 
differences affected producers’ choice of governance structure, nor can one conclude 
that these differences are an effect of governance structure choice. 
6.2 Transaction Cost and Price Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for transaction costs derived from the producer sample, 
using a time value of $10 per hour, are given in Table 6.2.  The first column lists the 
transaction costs, distinguishing between search costs and negotiation costs, and 
providing a core transaction cost value and total transaction cost value.  The second 
column provides the average time or distance accrued to a single HRSW transaction.  
The third column provides the average valuation of time spent and distances traveled in 
dollars per tonne.  The fourth column provides the standard deviation of the dollar per 
tonne estimate.  It is important to note that the descriptive statistics of the sample are not 
completely random, and thus cannot be used to make any inferences about the 
population of organic HRSW transactions in general.  Averages of the non-zero 
responses are given for costs that were seldom occurred in the sample, such as extra time 
selling the the U.S. or the Rest of the World (RoW), which are identified by an asterisk.  
The total average core transaction costs and total average transaction cost values are a 
sum of all values, however, including all responses for all of the different types of 
transaction costs. 
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Table 6.2 – Transaction Cost Statistics 
Variable Type Average (hours, km) Average $/t 
Standard 
Deviation $/t 
    
Core Transaction Costs:    
    Search    
        Reputation search Time 1.47 0.25 0.75 
        Price search Time 2.54 1.90 7.44 
    Negotiation    
        Negotiation Time 3.83 1.25 3.05 
        Extra time to sell to the  
        U.S. Time 0.44 1.07* 1.38* 
        Customs agent fee Fee 0 0 0 
        Extra time to sell to  
        RoW Time 0.81 5.68* 0.79* 
Fee  2* 0*         Producer Direct Sale   
        (PDS) Time 1.01 0.37* 0.17* 
        Sample preparation and  
        Sending to buyers Time 1.17 0.88 1.98 
Fees 17.40 0.68 1.41         Quality testing 
Time 1.06 0.58 2.33 
A. AVERAGE CORE TRANSACTION COST:  4.41  
Non-Core Transaction Costs:    
    Negotiation    
        Producer Direct Sale Driving 4.68 0.001* 0.001* 
        Quality Testing Driving 9.68 6.79 31.08 
    Monitoring/Enforcement    
        Extra time Time 0.001 0.002 0.02 
        Extra money $ 23.53 1.31 9.82 
        Value lost/discount $ 0 0 0 
    Fixed/Annual    
Time 0.24 0.04 0.14         Marketing meetings  
        (special trip) Driving 0.26 0.05 0.21 
Time 0.64 0.26 0.97         Certification meetings 
Driving 0.41 0.20 0.83 
Time 0.25 0.09 0.38         General marketing  
        Meeting Driving 0.14 0.05 0.19 
Time 0 0 0         Certification and    
        general marketing  
        meeting Driving 0 0 0 
        Fax machine usage $ 16.01 0.33 0.91 
        Computer usage $ 6.53 0.14 0.42 
    Coordination Cost    
        POF Member Time, 
Driving 4.55* 0.46* 0.97* 
B. AVERAGE NON-CORE TRANSACTION COST: 18.67  
AVERAGE TOTAL TRANSACTION COST (A+B): 23.08  
* = calculated using only non-zero responses 
Source: Producer Survey   
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Upon examining the second and third columns of Table 6.2, one can see that 
producers spend several hours searching and negotiating their transactions.  Reputation 
search costs are relatively low, while price search costs are higher.  The various 
negotiation costs involve considerable amounts of time and result in large costs per 
tonne.  Negotiation time is increased in transactions to the U.S. and the rest of the world 
(RoW).  Quality testing costs are very high, mainly due to the large distances traveled in 
some cases in order to have tests completed.  Summing the search and negotiation costs 
(excluding driving costs13) provides an estimate of the “core transaction costs” in HRSW 
transactions.  The value of $4.42 per tonne indicates that search and negotiation tasks are 
a small cost for producers.  Monitoring and enforcement costs are relatively low.  It is 
important to note that only two of the transactions in the sample reported any monitoring 
costs.  Meetings accrued low costs in terms of time spent but high driving costs because 
of the long distances between the farm and the meeting location.  Costs for fax machine 
and computer usage were low.  Of the transactions that were made through a POF, the 
coordination costs related to monitoring POF performance were high.  In total, the sum 
of all transaction costs equal $19.59 per tonne on average.  Compared to producer 
transformation costs of about $125/tonne, transaction costs are a considerable part of 
producer costs. 
The survey sample revealed an average farmgate price of $289.65, with a standard 
deviation of $56.24.  Note that this statistic represents the average prices derived from 
several transactions that differ in many attributes, including quality, location and time. 
                                                 
13 Driving costs are dependent on the distance from the farm to the buyer.  It would be erroneous to 
include such a cost in the same category as searching and negotiating.  
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6.3  Regression Descriptive Statistics 
A summary of the descriptive statistics for the regression variables is contained in 
Table 6.3.  Again, it is important to note that the descriptive statistics of the sample are 
not completely random, and thus cannot be used to make any inferences about the 
population of organic HRSW transactions.  The descriptive statistics of the price 
regression variables are first described, followed by a discussion of the variables that are 
unique to the cost regression. 
In the price regression, the average farmgate price, adjusted for crop year and 
conventional HRSW quality, is $289.65.  Producers have an average of six years of 
experience transacting HRSW (Exper).  The average quantity of organic HRSW (Q) 
sales is 76.31 tonnes.  Producers contact between seven and eight buyers before they 
make a sale of organic HRSW (Numberbuyers).  The average farm size (Farmsize) is 
1220 acres, which is very similar to the average farm size in Saskatchewan.  The average 
transportation basis from the farmgate to export position (Transcost) is estimated at 
$48.28.  The conventional HRSW price for #1, 13.5% protein, basis Thunder Bay 
(Thunder), is approximately $222.39 per tonne.  Producers believe that price uncertainty 
(Volatileprices) is a “minor problem,” with an average response of 1.86 on a scale of one 
to five. 
While some variables are used in both the price regression and the cost regression 
(indicated by “*”), other variables are specific to the cost regression.  The cost variables 
(TotalATC, CoreTC, Negotcost, Searchcost) are characterized by relatively large 
standard deviations.  Note that each cost variable uses a time value of $10 per hour and 1 
is added to all observations.   The measure of transportation distance between the 
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producer and buyer (Trans) indicates that distances are large (246.46km), which can 
lead to large driving costs if the producer travels to meet the buyer.  
Table 6.3 – Regression Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Mean Standard Deviation 
Price Regression:   
    Organic price-pool price   
    + 219.08 $289.65/t 53.58 
   
    Nonagent* 0.145 (11 out of 76 obs.) 0.354 
    POF* 0.145 (11 out of 76 obs.) 0.354 
    Processor* 0.105 (8 out of 76 obs.) 0.309 
    Exper* 6 years 4.99 
    Q* 76.31 tonnes 117.07 
    Numberbuyers 7.65 buyers 8.74 
    Transcost $48.28/t 9.50 
    Thunder $222.39/t 24.13 
    Protein 13.8 1.17 
    Grade 1.2 0.53 
    Volatileprices* 1.86 0.98 
   
Cost Regression:   
    TotalATC $23.08/t 72.30 
    CoreTC $4.41/t 8.62 
    Negotcost $2.83/t 3.72 
    Searchcost $2.58/t 6.97 
   
    FarmSize 1220 acres 943 
    Trans 246 km 246 
* = variable used in price and cost regressions 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
6.4 Regression Results 
The results of the price and cost regressions are reviewed in this section.  Several 
regressions were performed on price and different combinations of transaction costs.  
The transaction cost regressions were performed using a common time value of $10 per 
hour across all observations, since using producer-chosen time values did not improve 
the explanatory power of the regression. 
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The reported regression results consist of one price regression and four transaction 
cost regressions.  Regressions using the dependent variables of crop year and quality-
adjusted farmgate price (Price), total average transaction costs (TotalATC), core 
transaction costs (CoreTC), search costs only (Search) and negotiation costs only 
(Negot) are given in Table 6.4.  It is assumed that the error term is distributed 
independently of the independent variables (i.e. no endogeneity exists). 
6.4.1 Price Regression 
The price regression (Equation 5.1) regressed farmgate organic HRSW prices on 
several variables that were hypothesized to explain prices.  A linear specification was 
used because it yielded a normally distributed error term (Prob(Jarque-Bera 
statistic)=0.292) and the coefficients are easy to interpret.  The R-squared was 
reasonable (R2 = 0.495), but approximately half of variations in price remain 
unexplained by the independent variables.  The coefficient of the constant has no 
meaningful interpretation, other than to say that it represents the organic HRSW price 
when all other explanatory variables equal zero.  The governance structure dummy 
variables (Nonagent, POF, Processor) are all positive, but POF was the only statistically 
significant governance structure variable.  The coefficients indicate that the POF prices 
are $59/tonne higher than the base CWB agent governance structure, non-agent prices 
are $17/tonne higher, and processor prices are $15/tonne higher. 
Experience does not have a significant effect on price, but a one tonne increase in 
the quantity of the sale results in a statistically significant $0.077 increase in price.  The 
number of buyers contacted before the sale (Numberbuyers) has the expected positive 
sign but is not significant.  The transportation basis (Transcost) has the expected 
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negative effect on price and is statistically significant.  The Transcost coefficient 
indicates that a one dollar increase in conventional transportation cost results in a 
statistically significant $0.80/tonne reduction in farmgate price.  The results thus suggest 
a clear transportation basis incorporated into the prices that buyers offer. 
The conventional price (Thunder) has a positive but insignificant (p=0.102) effect 
on organic HRSW price within a crop year.  The Thunder coefficient suggests that a one 
dollar increase in conventional price leads to a $0.34 increase in organic farmgate price.  
Since all producers should receive the CWB price plus an organic premium, and 
assuming that all transactions in the sample performed the PDS, the results suggest that a 
one dollar increase in conventional price leads to a $0.34 increase in the organic 
premium over and above the CWB price.  If one assumes that cheating did occur, and 
some transactions were made without performing the PDS with the CWB, then the 
coefficient may be overestimated due to the prices reported without deducting the PDS. 
The protein level (Protein) had an expected positive sign, indicating that organic 
price is more sensitive to protein than conventional prices, but this effect was not 
significant.  The grade of the HRSW (Grade) variable is found to have a negative but 
insignificant effect on price (p=0.128).  It was expected that protein would have a 
significantly greater effect on price, since it is generally understood that wheat buyers 
pay premiums for protein above those received for conventional HRSW.  The quality 
variables indicate that protein levels and grade in organic HRSW do not have effects on 
price that are significantly different than those found in conventional HRSW.  The 
variable that aims to measure the effect of risk averseness (Volatileprices) is not 
significant, indicating that risk aversion does not affect price. 
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Table 6.4 – Regression Results 
 Equation Number 
 5.1 5.2a 5.2b 5.2c 5.2d 
Dependent 
Variable 
Price Log(Total 
ATC) 
Log(CoreTC) Log(Search) Log(Negot) 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Constant 293.17*** 
(73.39) 
0.333 
(0.489) 
0.183 
(0.293) 
0.174 
(0.239) 
-.0085 
(0.236) 
Nonagent 16.69 
(15.71) 
0.412 
(0.530) 
0.276 
(0.415) 
-0.268 
(0.360) 
0.0487 
(0.243) 
POF 58.74*** 
(17.50) 
0.223 
(0.370) 
-0.186 
(0.206) 
-0.318*** 
(0.0741) 
-0.0237 
(0.204) 
Processor 14.59 
(11.99) 
0.308 
(0.383) 
0.718** 
(0.348) 
0.498* 
(0.270) 
0.559 
(0.353) 
Exper -1.46 
(0.975) 
0.0105 
(0.0369) 
0.001 
(0.0224) 
-0.0114 
(0.0165) 
0.0149 
(0.0180) 
Q 0.077* 
(0.0387) 
-3.55E-3*** 
(0.00114) 
-1.46E-3** 
(7.26E-4) 
-1.51E-3** 
(6.38E-4) 
-5.34E-4 
(4.71E-4) 
Numberbuyers 0.677 
(0.689) 
    
Transcost -0.800* 
(0.463) 
    
Trans  6.10E-4 
(7.77E-4) 
1.22E-4 
(2.00E-4) 
8.36E-5 
(1.35E-4) 
3.52E-5 
(1.74E-4) 
Thunder 0.344 
(0.207) 
    
Protein 1.84 
(4.89) 
    
Grade -12.39 
(8.03) 
    
Volatileprices 1.36 
(6.79) 
0.417** 
(0.161) 
0.317** 
(0.120) 
0.0564*** 
(0.0739) 
0.334*** 
(0.108) 
Europe 124.34* 
(73.89) 
    
US 28.81* 
(20.01) 
    
Farmsize  5.07E-4** 
(2.05E-4) 
4.56E-5 
(1.30E-4) 
1.96E-4** 
(9.38E-5) 
-7.90E-5*** 
(1.15E-4) 
N 76 76 76 76 76 
Adjusted R2 0.495 0.23 0.19 0.14 0.20 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000015 0.0011 0.0045 0.02 0.003 
*** = p<0.01, ***= p<0.05, *= p<0.10   
Source: Author’s calculations   
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Finally, the effect of selling overseas has a positive effect on prices.  Selling to 
Europe (Europe) results in a statistically significant $124/tonne increase in price.  
Selling to the United States (US) results in a statistically insignificant $29/tonne increase 
in price.  The results suggest that prices in Europe and the US are higher than prices in 
other regions and thus the “law of one price” does not hold in the international organic 
wheat market.  As noted in Table 6.1, there is a slightly higher cost associated with 
marketing to the U.S. and Europe, but the higher prices outweigh the higher cost. 
It is important to note that even after accounting for several effects on price 
(quantity, searching, transportation costs, conventional price effects, quality, risk 
aversion, and country), the governance structure dummy variables are still positive and 
the POF variable is statistically significant.  The result means that the POF is the only 
governance structure with producer prices that are significantly different from the base 
governance structure.  The price regression results reject the hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference in prices between governance structures for organic HRSW. 
6.4.2 Transaction Cost Regressions 
The transaction cost regressions (Equations 5.2a, 5.2b, 5.2c, 5.2d) regressed four 
forms of producer transaction cost on several variables that explain those costs.  Each 
regression was performed using the log form of the dependent variable.  The log-linear 
specification was used in order to create a more normally distributed error term and to 
improve the explanatory power of the regression.  The log-linear specification of the 
regressions provides semi-elasticity coefficients.  These coefficients are interpreted as a 
percentage change in the dependent variable caused by a one-unit change in the 
independent variable. 
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The transaction cost regressions had a relatively poor fit, with adjusted R-squared 
values between 0.14 and 0.23.  Nonetheless, the F-statistics were all statistically 
significant.  The transaction cost dependent variables were characterized by relatively 
large standard errors, which resulted in lower explanatory power in the regressions. 
The governance structure dummy variables were positive and insignificant in the 
regression using TotalATC as the dependent variable (equation 5.2a).  While the 
coefficients suggested that using the alternative governance structures caused total 
average transaction costs to rise between 22-41%, the standard errors of these 
coefficients were too great to yield statistical significance.   
The CoreTC regression (equation 5.2b) yielded significant results for one 
governance structure variable, with Processor having a positive significant effect on 
core transaction costs.  The results suggest that as far as the core transaction costs of 
searching and negotiating are concerned, selling to processors is the only governance 
structure that results in significantly higher costs for producers, with 72% higher core 
transaction costs than selling to CWB agents.  Higher costs of searching for processor 
reputations and processor prices and higher costs of quality testing are the main reasons 
for the cost difference.  The higher costs associated with processor transactions are 
offset by higher prices in the same transactions. 
The regression using Search (equation 5.2c) as the dependent variable yielded 
significant results for two of the three governance structures.  The regression indicated 
that selling through a POF resulted in a statistically significant decrease in search costs, 
while selling to a processor significantly increased search costs.  The coefficients 
suggests that selling through a POF results in search costs that are 32% lower than 
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selling through CWB agents.  On the other hand, producers selling through a processor 
have search costs that are 50% higher.  These results are consistent with the theoretical 
framework, as POF members allow their marketing agent to search on their behalf, while 
producers that sell to processors typically spend more time searching for reputation and 
prices.  The Negot regression (equation 5.2d) exhibited small and insignificant 
governance structure coefficients. 
The experience of the producer at the time the transaction is made (Exper) was 
found to have an ambiguous effect on transaction costs for all of the cost regressions.  
This result is somewhat surprising, as the expectation was that greater experience would 
lead to lower transaction costs. 
The quantity of the transaction (Q) had the expected negative effect on costs and 
was statistically significant in all regressions except for the Negot regression.  A one 
tonne increase in transaction quantity resulted in average cost decreases ranging from 
0.36% to 0.14%, which suggests that there are economies of scale in HRSW 
transactions.  Distance from the farmgate to buyer (Trans) had the expected positive 
effect on costs in all cost regressions, but was not statistically significant.  The effect of 
risk aversion on transaction costs (Volatileprices) is positive and significant in all cost 
regressions, with an increase in the producers’ risk aversion by one point on the five-
point scale increasing total average transaction costs by 42%, core transaction costs by 
32%, search costs by 3% and negotiation costs by 33%.  A producer’s risk aversion, as 
measured by the proxy variable, thus appears to have a large effect on their transaction 
costs. 
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The size of the producer’s farm in the transaction (Farmsize) had inconclusive 
effects on transaction costs.  While farm size had a positive significant effect on total 
average transaction costs and search costs, it had a negative significant effect on 
negotiation costs.  The theory of the thesis does not explain this result. 
Overall, the cost regressions suffered from poorer fit and significance compared to 
the price regression.  Despite the poorer results, the significance of governance structure 
variables in the regressions of core transaction costs and search costs rejects the 
hypothesis that there are no significant differences in transaction costs between 
governance structures. 
6.5 Comparison of Governance Structures 
The results from comparing the price and cost of each governance structure are 
described in this section.  Price and transaction cost under each governance structure is 
first predicted using the regression results, then the remaining transaction and 
transformation costs are added to the prediction in order to arrive at an average cost 
value and price value for each governance structure.  These values are then illustrated 
using the Dorward model and the optimal governance structures from all perspectives is 
discussed. 
6.5.1 Prediction Results 
A summary of the predictions of price and transaction costs are outlined in Table 
6.5.  The predictions are organized in the table by the regression (as defined by the 
dependent variable), then by the prediction for each governance structure.  The 
predictions are made using average values for the other variables in the regression 
equation.  The bold font indicates statistical significance from the price and cost 
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regressions from which the predictions were made.  It should be noted that these 
predictions are based on the regressions, which had relatively low measures of goodness 
of fit.  The mean absolute percent error for forecasts from the price regression was 
10.2%, while the mean absolute percent error for forecasts from the cost regressions 
ranged from 29.0% to 64.0%.  Predictions from the price regression thus appear more 
accurate than predictions from the cost regressions. 
Table 6.5 – Predicted Price and Transaction Costs 
90% Confidence Interval 
($/tonne) Regression Governance Structure 
Prediction 
($/tonne) Lower CI Upper CI 
     
Price Nonagent 290.49 266.83 314.14 
 POF 332.54 305.76 359.32 
 Processor 288.38 270.50 306.27 
 CWB agent 273.80 262.78 284.82 
     
TotalATC Nonagent 12.19 9.14 51.14 
 POF 9.92 10.11 31.63 
 Processor 10.89 10.77 35.49 
 CWB agent 7.74 10.26 19.60 
     
CoreTC Nonagent 3.35 1.28 7.28 
 POF 1.74 1.07 2.62 
 Processor 5.76 3.00 10.42 
 CWB agent 2.30 1.72 3.00 
     
Search Nonagent 2.11 0.74 4.55 
 POF 0.38 0.62 0.84 
 Processor 2.13 1.55 5.00 
 CWB agent 0.90 1.12 1.67 
     
Negot Nonagent 1.58 0.83 2.64 
 POF 1.40 0.80 2.19 
 Processor 3.30 1.52 6.34 
 CWB agent 1.46 1.05 1.95 
Bold indicates significant difference between governance structures from regressions 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
After accounting for all other factors that affect price, the POF price prediction is 
$332.54 when the CWB agent price is $273.80.  This corresponds with the significant 
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POF coefficient in the price regression.  On average, accounting for all other factors that 
affect core transaction costs, core transaction costs when transacting with processors 
were $3.46/t higher compared with CWB agent transactions.  Search costs in POF 
transactions are significantly lower compared to CWB agent transactions.  On average, 
accounting for all other factors that affect core search costs, search costs when 
transacting with POFs were $0.38/t compared to $0.90/t through CWB agent 
transactions.  Non-agents showed no significant differences in price or transaction costs 
compared to grain companies that are CWB agents, but this is to be expected since the 
CWB agent and non-agent transactions use similar vertical coordination. 
6.5.2 Average Cost Calculation Results 
The calculation of average cost is given in Table 6.6.  Core transaction costs are 
small compared to non-core transaction costs and transformation costs.  After all of the 
average costs are summed, the difference between CWB agent and Processor transaction 
costs, the lowest and highest cost groups respectively, is only $3.46/tonne. 
6.5.3 Governance Structure Comparison 
The graphical comparison of governance structures is given in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.6.  
While costs are similar across all governance structures, prices differ to a greater extent, 
which results in different net prices across governance structures.  It is not possible to 
collect data on downstream prices that marketers obtain, except for the POF marketer 
involved in this study, which takes a commission on sales.  It is thus assumed that 
downstream prices are equal across all governance structures.  Assuming a 4% 
commission by the POF (which does not include transformation costs), the downstream 
price is equal to 104% of the predicted POF price, or $345.84/tonne.  As the downstream 
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price is assumed to be identical across all four governance structures, a higher price to 
the farmer results in a smaller margin for the marketer.  The POF governance structure 
thus results in the lowest marketing margin, at $13.30/tonne.  The marketing margin for 
the other three governance structures is significantly larger than the POF case.  CWB 
agents, non-agents and processors are estimated to have a margin of $72/tonne, 
$55/tonne and $57/tonne respectively.   
Table 6.6 – Cost, Price and Profit Summary 
Average Cost, Price, Profit Governance Structure 
 CWB agent Non-agent POF Processor 
Producer     
A.      Core Transaction Cost 2.30 3.34 1.74 5.76 
B.      Non-Core Transaction  
          Cost  18.67 18.67 18.67 18.67 
C.      POF Member Cost   0.46  
D.      Certification Cost 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
E. Average Transaction Cost 
     (A+B+C+D) 21.73 22.77 21.63 25.19 
     
F. Average Transformation  
    Cost 124.55 124.55 124.55 124.55 
     
G. PRODUCER AVERAGE  
    COST (E+F) $146.28 $147.32 $146.18 $149.74 
     
H. PRODUCER PRICE $273.80 $290.49 $332.54 $288.38 
     
I. PRODUCER PROFIT 
     (H-G) $127.52 $143.16 $186.36 $138.65 
     
Marketer     
J.   Marketer Price $345.84 $345.84 $345.84 $345.84 
     
K.  Marketing Margin $72.04 $55.36 $13.30 $57.46 
     
L.    Marketer Average Cost  
       (excluding transformation  
        cost) 
$13.30 $13.30 $13.30 $13.30 
     
M.    Marketer Profit (K-L) $58.74 $42.05 $0 $44.16 
     
Source: Author’s calculations     
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Figure 6.1 Dorward Model of Cost, Price and Marketing Margin 
 
Given the estimates of producer and marketer profit for each governance structure, 
one can evaluate the optimal governance structure from the perspective of producers, 
marketers, and from a multi-level perspective.  This evaluation is presented in Table 6.7.  
The POF governance structure is the optimal choice for the producers, since it provides 
the greatest profit per tonne.  The other three governance structures provide much lower 
profits per tonne.  The CWB agent governance structure, however, is the optimal choice 
for marketers, at least on a per-tonne basis.  The results thus illustrate that producers and 
marketers should have different governance structure preferences based on the metric of 
 CWB agent  Non-agent       POF      Processor 
Governance Structure 
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individual profit per tonne.  Producers should prefer the POF governance structure, 
while marketers appear to profit most as CWB agents. 
The optimal governance structure for producers and marketers from the combined 
producer and marketer perspective is the governance structure that provides the greatest 
combined profits per tonne.  All four governance structures have similar levels of 
combined profits, since they differ as a result of cost differences in the supply chain, 
which were found to be minimal.  The POF and CWB agent governance structures had 
the highest combined profits per tonne, and the processor governance structure had the 
lowest combined profits per tonne.   
Overall, the results thus suggest that the least attractive marketing option for 
producers (selling through a CWB agent) is the best option for marketers and for these 
two levels of the supply chain as a whole.  This empirical comparison corresponds with 
the predictions of the Mahoney framework, which predicted that producers should prefer 
a vertically coordinated governance structure such as relational contracting while the 
marketer should prefer the spot market.  The POF examined in this analysis shares many 
characteristics of a relational contract, making the Mahoney prediction very close to the 
resulting optimal outcome for producers. 
Table 6.7 – Profit per Tonne Comparison 
Profit per tonne Governance Structure 
 CWB agent Non-agent POF Processor 
     
Producer $127.52 $143.16 $186.36 $138.65 
  
Marketer  $58.74 $42.05 $0 $44.16 
     
TOTAL $186.26 $185.22 $186.36 $182.80 
     
Source: Author’s calculations     
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6.6 Limitations of the Analysis 
There are several limitations of the approach used to compare profit from 
alternative governance structures.  Firstly, the approach ignores differences in risk 
sharing among the governance structure alternatives.  Specifically, CWB agents 
typically purchase HRSW earlier in the year than the other marketers, often without a 
buyer to sell to, and these firms must discount their prices to control for the risk that 
prices may fall.  The lower price paid by CWB agent grain companies is the reward for 
speculating in the market.  Marketing firms that make back-to-back sales do not 
speculate in the market and do not require compensation for speculation risk.  Secondly, 
producers may discount having to hold onto wheat until later in the crop year because 
they need cash flow after harvest.  The principle that prices may be discounted into the 
future is not considered by the methodology.  Thirdly, this analysis implicitly assumes 
that a POF already exists, so the costs associated with creating a POF are not included.   
It may be possible to account for lower prices given by CWB agents due to their 
greater risk-bearing by comparing non-agent price with CWB agent price.  The 
difference between the CWB agent price and the non-agent price may represent the 
effect of increased risk-bearing on price, since these two types of firms are similar in 
most other respects. 
The price regression may also suffer from bias due to respondents that have 
reported a price that has not incorporated the PDS.  Producers may be avoiding the PDS 
when conventional cash price is above the CWB pool price (i.e. cheating), since this 
necessitates a large payment to the CWB for the difference.  The price regression may 
overestimate other coefficients that are correlated with cheating, which limits the 
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methodology’s ability to differentiate the effect of cheating from other factors.  For 
example, if many producers using a particular governance structure did not perform the 
PDS, this would translate into a greater coefficient for that governance structure and a 
higher price prediction.  The legitimate price would be less than the predicted price.  
While the conventional price variable may correct for some of this overestimate of 
legitimate prices, the methodology is not able to fully correct for the effect of cheating 
on the price predictions. 
Another limitation of the price regression in testing for significant differences in 
price between governance structures is that it analyzes all crop years at once, and does 
not test for stability of price differences across different crop years.  If the price 
premium of the POF is not significant in each year, then it is doubtful that it is the POF’s 
inherent characteristics that allow it to capture higher prices.  However, if the price 
premium of the POF is statistically significant in each year, this lends support to the 
claims of the theoretical framework for explaining higher POF prices.  This issue is 
examined in Appendix C, with the result that the POF prices were strongly significant in 
one year and weakly significant in the other year. 
The most significant limitation of the cost regression results is that the predictions 
made from the cost regression have a large degree of error.  Using the predictions of 
core transaction cost had very little effect on the results, as the magnitude of the 
differences in predicted values were small in comparison to differences and price and to 
the total average cost values. 
The assumption that all governance structures sell for the same price to 
downstream customers is not realistic.  Different governance structures may fetch 
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different prices due to differences in their marketing strategy or customer base.  The 
assumption that all governance structures have the same average transaction costs is also 
unrealistic, as it ignores cost differences that could result from differences in economies 
of size.  The calculated marketing margins and profit margins of the marketer under each 
governance structure are subject to criticism due to the assumptions on marketer price 
and marketer transaction costs. 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
The results of testing the hypothesis of the thesis were described in this chapter.  
The descriptive statistics for the characteristics of producers in different governance 
structures were first given.  Interesting differences in characteristics across governance 
structures were found.  The descriptive statistics of the transaction costs were also 
presented.  Producer transaction costs were found to be a small compared to producer 
transformation costs.  The results of the regression on organic HRSW price and four 
types of transaction costs associated with the HRSW sales were then reported.  
Significant differences in price, core transaction costs and search costs were found in the 
regression.  Based on the regression results it was possible to reject the hypothesis that 
there are no significant differences between governance structures in price and cost.  In 
order to illustrate the differences in price and cost and their effect on producer profits, 
predictions of prices and core transaction costs under the four governance structures 
were made using their respective regressions.  The predicted core transaction costs were 
summed with all other relevant costs and plotted to illustrate producer profit per tonne.  
Marketer profit per tonne was also estimated through two assumptions.  Comparing the 
profits from the alternative governance structures indicated that the optimal governance 
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structure for the producer, given the assumptions made by the study, is not the optimal 
governance structure for the marketer. 
The next two chapters complement the results of this chapter.  A methodology is 
provided to detect the presence of a price distribution in the organic wheat market in 
Chapter 7, and the results are reported.  Testimonial evidence that organic producers 
suffer from price information asymmetry is presented in Chapter 8
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7 Chapter 7: Price Distribution Detection Methodology 
and Results 
 
7.0 Introduction 
The theoretical framework of the thesis proposes that there is not only one price 
for a given quality of organic wheat, but rather a dispersion of bidding prices.  
Furthermore, the theory posited that price dispersion decreased for producers who could 
more effectively search for prices by transacting with POFs and processors.  This 
chapter complements the main results by providing empirical evidence that price 
dispersion exists in the sample of transactions collected through the producer survey and 
discusses whether or not price dispersion differs across different governance structures 
used to transact organic HRSW between producers and buyers. 
7.1 The Approach to Residual Analysis 
Figure 7.1 shows the conventional HRSW14 and the organic farmgate HRSW 
prices over time and is derived from data collected from the producer survey.  The figure 
illustrates that producers obtain a wide variety of prices for the organic HRSW that they 
grow.  The organic HRSW prices shown in Figure 7.1 include transactions of 
heterogeneous quality, location, and other factors, and are not a good measure of a price 
distribution because they include heterogeneous characteristics of the product.
                                                 
14 The conventional price is the #1, 13.5% protein domestic human consumption price, basis Thunder Bay. 
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Figure 7.1 – Farmgate Organic HRSW Price, Unadjusted for Product 
Heterogeneity 
 
Other studies (Lach 2002) have detected selling price distributions for goods by 
surveying the same stores in weekly intervals over several weeks.  Lach used a 
regression to control for product heterogeneity, then analyzed the residuals from the 
regression.  While the available survey data for organic HRSW does not have panel-
style data on transaction prices, it does include detailed information about each sale, 
such as the price, the date of setting the price, the location, quality and other attributes.  
The dispersion of organic HRSW prices is analyzed using the residual values from the 
price regression performed in Chapter 6.  This section begins by proposing a 
methodology for examining the residuals from the price regression, then reporting the 
results of the residual analysis. 
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7.2 Residual Analysis Methodology 
The residuals from the price regression are the difference between the price 
predicted by the regression and the actual price received by the producer.  A negative 
residual value for an observation indicates that the actual price was below the predicted 
price.  A positive residual value for an observation indicates that the actual price was 
above the predicted price.  Given the theory that transactions within more vertically 
coordinated governance structures may have lower price dispersion due to lower search 
costs, one would expect that more vertically coordinated governance structures with low 
price search costs would have smaller residuals.  A formal method of comparing the 
dispersion across governance structures is to calculate the standard deviation of the error 
terms belonging to each governance structure.  One can also visually examine a ranking 
of the regression residuals in order to detect whether or not POF and processor 
transactions result in less dispersion.  These methods, used by Lach (2002), provide a 
conservative estimate of price dispersion, since the price regression used in this thesis 
controls for far more than product heterogeneity. 
The residuals are analyzed by three methods.  First, the residuals of the original 
price regression are compared with the non-dummy explanatory variables to detect if 
there are any correlations.  Second, the standard error is calculated for the residuals 
under each governance structure.  Third, the residuals are plotted in order of value, and 
the plotted observations are distinguished based on governance structure. 
It is expected that CWB agent transactions will have the lowest standard deviation 
of error terms, since these buyers typically offer to buy HRSW earlier in the year, take a 
long position in the market, and thus shoulder more risk.  Non-agent, POF and Processor 
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transactions are expected to have higher standard deviations than CWB agents, because 
they cannot afford to speculate in the market and shoulder risk of price changes. 
7.3 Residual Analysis Results 
The residuals of the price regression were plotted against each of the non-dummy 
explanatory variables to detect if any relationships exist.  None of these explanatory 
variables exhibited a relationship with the residuals.  These results suggest that price 
dispersion is not a function of location, quality, or the other attributes. 
The standard deviation of the residuals under each governance structure is given in 
Table 7.1.  Processor transactions have the lowest error standard deviation, while POF 
transactions have the highest standard deviation.  Grain company transactions have a 
standard deviation between the two extremes.  This result indicates that the degree of 
price dispersion is most pronounced in POF transactions.  The POF result does not 
correspond with expectations based on the idea that lower search costs through a POF 
lead to less price dispersion, but differences in risk shouldering between governance 
structures may provide a suitable explanation.  POF marketers transmit all price risk 
back to the producer members, while grain companies appear to transmit less price risk 
back to producers.  The speculative nature of CWB agent grain companies may explain 
why they transmit the least price risk, as they offer prices to producers before they have 
found a buyer, and therefore cannot transmit the ups and downs of price back to 
producers.  Following this explanation, processors may be willing to absorb the ups and 
downs of price in order to receive a consistent product.   
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Table 7.1 – Price Regression Residual Dispersion 
Measurement Governance Structure 
 CWB agent Non-agent POF Processor 
     
Standard Deviation 36.34 36.45 39.49 32.64 
     
Source: Author’s calculations     
 
The residuals from the price regression, ranked separately for each governance 
structure, are plotted in order of value in Figure 7.2.  It is apparent that the residuals 
from CWB agent transactions have residuals that are more concentrated at the zero 
compared to the other governance structures.  Although the abundance of observations 
for the CWB agent transactions makes it difficult to directly compare the rankings across 
governance structures, the residuals of the other three governance structures are not 
concentrated at the mean and thus are much more evenly dispersed.  On the other hand, 
it is evident that the processor transactions have a much lower range of residual values, 
which explains their lack of dispersion. 
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Figure 7.2 – HRSW Price Regression Residual Rankings, by Governance Structure   
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7.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
A methodology for detecting the presence of price dispersion in organic HRSW 
and the results of the residual analysis were provided in this chapter.  Limitations in the 
nature of the price data prohibit the use of more sophisticated residual price analyses, but 
a methodology to work with the given data is provided.  Differences in the error 
standard deviation across governance structures suggest that price dispersion is not a 
function of vertical coordination, but rather a function of the buyer’s risk-shouldering.  
While the POF transactions had the largest dispersion, the processor transactions had the 
least dispersion.  The ranking of the residuals indicates that the distribution of prices 
does not exhibit a peak near the mean. 
The results of this chapter and Chapter 6 suggest that the vertically-coordinated 
POF governance structure provides higher prices, but more volatile prices.  On the other 
hand, the processor governance structure provides prices similar to CWB agent prices, 
but offers less price volatility than other governance structures. 
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8 Chapter 8: Information Asymmetry: Producer 
Perceptions 
 
8.0 Introduction 
The producer survey collected data on organic producers’ opinions regarding the 
prevalence of information asymmetry in their markets.  While chapters 6 and 7 measure 
the effect of information asymmetry on average price levels and price dispersion, this 
chapter complements those results by providing testimonial evidence that information 
asymmetry is a problem for producers.  The sample of organic producers is first 
described, then the surveying techniques are described and the results of the survey are 
reported. 
8.1 Sample Description 
The original sample of organic producers, which was used in the organic HRSW 
analysis of chapters 6 and 7, yielded 57 surveys that answered the questions relating to 
information asymmetry.  The sample was not completely random, as six extra 
observations from POF members were added to the random sample. 
8.2 Information Asymmetry Problems 
Section 6.2 of the questionnaire was titled “Marketing Problems,” which contained 
a list of potential marketing problems and asked producers to indicate the extent to 
which each was a problem to them when selling organic grains.  These marketing 
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problems represent producers’ perceptions of transaction costs.  The managerial 
perceptions of transaction costs are very important, as they direct future actions by 
managers (Buckley and Chapman 1997).The responses were reported on a scale of 1 to 
5, where 1 indicated that there was “not a problem” and 5 indicated that there was a 
“major problem”.  The complete survey is given in Appendix A. 
The list of producer marketing problems and the average producer response is 
reported in Table 8.1.  Problems 1 and 2 measures producers’ perceptions of grain 
companies and processors opportunistic behaviour with respect to quality upon delivery, 
which translate into reputation search costs.  Problem 3 measures producers’ perceptions 
of quantity uncertainty, which translates into negotiation costs for the producer and 
buyer.  Problems 4 and 5 measure producers’ perceptions of the general uncertainty 
regarding buyers fulfilling contractual obligations, which translates into reputation 
search costs.  Problem 6 measures producers’ perceptions of price uncertainty, while 
problems 7 and 8 measure producers perceptions of price information asymmetry.  
Perceptions of price uncertainty and information asymmetry translate into price search 
costs.  Problem 9 measures producers’ perceptions of transaction barriers, which 
translate into negotiation costs.  Problems 10 and 11 measure producers’ perceptions of 
information asymmetry regarding downstream market conditions, which translates into 
search costs.  Problem 12 measures producers’ perception of the increase in uncertainty 
that may come with processor transactions, which translates into increased search and 
negotiation costs in processor transactions. 
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Table 8.1 – Producer Marketing Problems 
Problem Average Response* 
  
1) Processors dispute quality upon delivery 1.16 
2) Grain companies dispute quality upon delivery 1.18 
3) Difficult to provide enough high quality grain to meet 
requirements 
1.77 
4) Buyers do not honour contracts 1.24 
5) Buyers do not pay on time 1.59 
6) Prices are volatile 1.95 
7) Buyers have much better information on prices than I do 2.44 
8) I do not get the best price possible when I sell 1.98 
9) Not being able to find a buyer when I want to sell 2.05 
10) I have a poor understanding of the final market for the products 
resulting from my crops 
1.74 
11) I have a poor understanding of my buyers’ business situation and 
problems 
1.77 
12) Having problems/disputes with buyers when I try to market “on 
my own.” 
1.32 
  
* a higher rating indicates that the problem is greater  
Source: Producer questionnaire  
 
Problems 7 and 8, which measured producers’ perceptions of price information 
asymmetry, ranked highest and second highest respectively as potential marketing 
problems.  Problem 6, which measured producers’ perception of price uncertainty, 
ranked third highest.  This result suggests that price information asymmetry is “a 
problem” for producers.  The ratings were not very high for any of the questions, 
indicating that producers do not perceive any of these as a “major problem”.  Overall, 
the results reveal that producers are somewhat aware of their lack of information. 
8.3 Marketing Information Sources 
Question 2.2.4c in the survey asked producers to estimate the amount of money 
they pay per year for marketing publications, etc.  Question 2.2.4d asked producers to 
describe the type of marketing information that they purchase.  These questions were 
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asked in order to find out how much marketing and specifically price information that 
producers are able to access for a fee.   
Producers bought an average $26.23 of marketing information per year.  Several 
producers responded that they did not spend any money on marketing information, while 
the highest response was $300 per year.  The marketing information that was described 
by the producers included farm papers, newsletters and books.  However, organic 
producers do not appear to have access to organic price information.  The author of this 
study is not aware of any price information for organic grains that is available for 
purchase or free of charge, other than the Organic Agriculture Centre of Canada 
(OACC) that reports wheat flour prices weekly on their website, and provides historical 
grain prices.  The results suggest that there is almost no public or private price 
information available to organic grain producers. 
8.4 Producer Interest in Price Information 
Part 4 of the survey asked producers for their thoughts on hypothetical price 
information.  The survey asked producers to rate the value of different types of price 
information and their willingness to pay for that price information, as well as the amount 
of time that price information would save them.  Producers were asked to rate four 
hypothetical types of price information, including: 1) monthly prices that other farmers 
have received, plus their inventories, 2) monthly market outlook and future price 
forecasts, 3) daily price quotes from organic grain buyers, and 4) weekly price quotes 
from organic grain buyers.  The rating of each option was given on a scale of 1 to 5 
where, 1 represented a poor rating and 5 represented a very good rating.  The willingness 
to pay question was provided as the amount that the respondent would be willing to pay 
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per year for the information.  The time saving question asked producers to provide an 
estimate of the time that the information would save them per sale.  These questions 
were asked in order to find out the kinds of information that organic producers would be 
interested in receiving. 
The results of the price information questions are given in Table 8.2.  The ratings 
on a 1-5 scale were all within a range between 2 and 3, indicating small differences in 
preferences among the information options.  Producers rated weekly price offers from 
organic grain buyers the highest, and also perceived this option to result in the highest 
time saved per week and were willing to pay the highest annual fee for this service.  
Monthly market outlook and future forecasts and monthly prices received plus 
inventories ranked second on the rating scale.  Daily price offers from organic grain 
buyers were rated the lowest.  The results suggest that weekly price offers is the price 
information service that these organic producers would value the most. 
Table 8.2 – Price Information Ratings 
Information service that is provided Average Response 
 Rate 1-5* $ you 
would 
pay** 
Time 
Saved 
(hrs)*** 
1) Monthly prices that farmers have recently 
received plus their inventories 
2.42 21.45 0.84 
2) Monthly market outlook and future price 
forecasts 
2.51 18.54 1.03 
3) Daily price offers from organic grain buyers 2.18 17.30 1.01 
4) Weekly price offers form organic grain buyers 2.84 23.57 1.34 
    
* a higher rating indicates that the problem is greater 
** $ paid per year for the information service    
*** time saved per sale    
Source: Producer questionnaire    
 158
8.5 Synthesis of the Results 
The results from the producer marketing problem data suggest that producers are 
somewhat aware that price variability exists and that they have very little information on 
prices compared to those who buy their grain.  Furthermore, producer responses in the 
survey indicate that almost no public or private price information exists for organic 
producers.  This situation is very different from conventional HRSW producers who 
have access to a large amount of public and private information.  Given this situation of 
asymmetric information, the survey indicates that producers are interested in having 
more price information and they perceive substantial time savings if they had such 
information.  One can conclude from the results that there may be a role for public or 
private price information organizations in the organic wheat sector.  However, the 
apparent lack of willingness to pay for price information suggests that the role of private 
firms to provide price information may be limited at the present time.  A publicly funded 
price information service may be the most viable method of transmitting price 
information to firms in the organic wheat sector. 
8.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter the survey data that related to producers’ perceptions of information 
asymmetry, their current price information resources, and their perceptions of 
hypothetical price information services was summarized.  The results highlighted the 
fact that price information asymmetry is a problem for organic producers and that they 
desire more price information. 
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This chapter ends the presentation of the results of this thesis.  The next chapter 
concludes the thesis by briefly synthesizing all of the results and discussing the 
limitations and recommendations for further study. 
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9 Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
9.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the conclusions that can be drawn based 
on the results and analyses.  First, a summary of the conclusions of the study are 
provided, followed by a discussion of the limitations of the study.  The chapter 
concludes by making recommendations for further research. 
9.1 Summary of Conclusions 
9.1.1 Test of Hypothesis 
The primary conclusion of this thesis is drawn from testing the hypothesis.  The 
null hypothesis was that there were no significant differences in price or transaction 
costs between governance structures used to transact organic HRSW between producers 
and buyers.  This hypothesis was rejected for prices, core transaction costs and search 
costs. 
Predictions made from the price regression indicated that POF transactions 
obtained significantly higher prices compared with the base CWB agent governance 
structure.  Predictions made from the transaction cost regression using core transaction 
costs as the dependent variable indicated that processor transactions incurred 
significantly higher core transaction costs compared to the base CWB agent governance 
structure and the POF governance structure.  Predictions made from the transaction cost 
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regression using search costs as the dependent variable indicated that POF transactions 
incurred significantly lower search costs compared to the base CWB agent and processor 
governance structures.  While both POF and processor governance structures are both 
characterized by greater vertical coordination, they exhibit significantly different 
transaction costs for producers. 
 While statistical significance was found for both price and average core 
transaction costs, price differences between governance structures were far greater in 
magnitude than core transaction cost differences.  The difference between the highest 
and lowest price prediction was $76/tonne, while the difference between the highest and 
lowest average core transaction cost prediction was only $4/tonne. 
9.1.2 Producer Profit Comparison 
The producer profit calculation indicated that POF transactions resulted in the 
highest profit per tonne, mainly due to the effect of higher prices.  CWB agent 
transactions resulted in the lowest profit per tonne, mainly due to the effect of lower 
prices.  Processor transactions resulted in profits per tonne that were only slightly higher 
compared with CWB agents.  The lacklustre performance of the processor governance 
structure conflicts with the belief that producers should “eliminate the middleman” in 
order to gain higher prices.  The results suggest that processor transactions in the organic 
HRSW market require much more effort for very little reward.   
Overall, the POF governance structure appears to be the optimal choice for the 
producer, while the results suggest that this governance structure is the least appealing 
for the marketer on a profit per tonne basis.  Given the assumptions on downstream 
prices and marketer costs, marketers derive the most profits per tonne from the CWB 
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agent governance structure.  These results suggest that producers and marketers should 
prefer different governance structures.  This result corresponds with the prediction using 
the Mahoney (1992) framework that marketers should use the spot market governance 
structure while producers should prefer a more vertically coordinated governance 
structure.  The results suggest that the push for POF marketers must come from 
producers. 
9.1.3 Explaining the Performance of the POF 
The POF governance structure clearly emerged from this study as the optimal 
marketer for organic HRSW producers.  The theoretical framework suggested that a 
POF governance structure would result in lower search costs for producers and more 
effective searching on their behalf through the marketing agent.  The more effective 
searching via a POF was posited to result in those producers obtaining prices that were 
higher in the distribution of available prices.  The results suggest that this is true, since 
POF search costs were significantly lower and POF prices were found to be significantly 
higher.   
The POF governance structure is fundamentally different from the others because 
a marketing agent is working on the producers’ behalf.  With a commission 
arrangement, the marketing agent has the incentive to find the highest price possible, and 
is required to pass that price upstream to the producer.  The CWB agent and non-agent 
governance structures do not share this important characteristic, and prices and price 
dispersion reflect this.  Producers using the processor governance structure also receive 
the full downstream price, but they do not have the search cost efficiencies that benefit 
the POF and they suffer from relatively lower prices.  On the other hand, the POF’s full 
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pass-through of downstream price back to the producer also transmits more price 
volatility, as indicated by the residual analysis in Chapter 7.   
Although it is impossible to know the strategies of most grain buyers, the results of 
the study support the idea that grain companies and processors know that producers have 
less price information and this allows them to offer lower prices.  Producers that are less 
aware of market prices may transact at these lower prices, while more aware producers 
may not.  Marketing through a POF that has as much price information as the other 
buyers eliminates the effect of ignorance on offer prices.  Producers are somewhat aware 
of their lack of information, and they want to have more tools available to them in order 
to have more market knowledge.  This thesis does not make any inferences about the 
optimal governance choice of governance structure for producers that already have more 
market knowledge. 
9.2 Limitations of the Study 
There are several limitations of this study.  One major limitation is that it only uses 
costs and prices to measure the performance of governance structures.  The theoretical 
framework and methodology ignores differences in risk sharing among the governance 
structure alternatives.   Differences in risk sharing may explain some of the differences 
in producer farmgate prices.  The residual analysis revealed differences in price 
volatility between governance structures, which may be attributed to differences in 
marketer risk shouldering, but this analysis was not directly involved in the test of 
hypothesis. 
Another major limitation of the theoretical framework and methodology is that it 
does not incorporate the effect of governance structure on quantity.  While quantities 
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sold by producers may not vary across governance structures, the quantities transacted 
by marketers vary considerably depending on the governance structures used.  This 
limitation may bias the determination of the optimum marketer governance structure, but 
it should not bias the determination of the optimum producer governance structure.  The 
incorporation of quantity into the analysis would allow for traditional measures of profit 
and surplus. 
Although the POF governance structure is optimal for producers, other governance 
structures are used by producers in the organic HRSW market.  There must obviously be 
a reason why governance structures that deliver lower prices are used by producers.  The 
utility gained from other governance structures or the effect of non-maximizing 
behaviour by producers presumably must counter the lower prices that the producers 
receive.  This study does not analyze the factors that affect governance structure choice, 
which may reveal some non-profit utilities that result from choosing less profitable 
governance structures.  Some non-profit reasons for choosing a governance structure 
may include the timing of sales during the year, the proximity of the buyer and the 
degree of trust between the producer and the buyer.  Another reason for not choosing a 
POF governance structure is the cost and feasibility of setting up a POF.  The fixed costs 
associated with POF setup are not incorporated into this analysis. 
The small sample size of this analysis may be another limitation on the inferences 
that can be made from the thesis.  The sample may also have been affected by non-
response bias, where producers that did not want to participate would have provided 
different answers than those that chose to participate. 
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This thesis did not include an examination of industry structure, which may have 
been useful in understanding the behaviour of firms in the organic wheat supply chain.  
There may be issues of oligopoly, price leadership, dominance of a single firm or 
restriction of entry in the organic wheat supply chain that were ignored by this thesis. 
9.3 Recommendations for Further Research 
There are many opportunities for further research in the area of organic supply 
chain economics.  A study similar to this thesis could be performed on other types of 
organic grains.  The organic producer survey collected data on flax, oats and lentil 
prices, which may lend itself to an analysis similar to the one performed in this study.  
Further research could also be performed that incorporate the limitations of this study.  
The effect of governance structure on quantity and risk sharing would allow for more 
rigorous conclusions to be made.  A complementary study on the factors that affect 
governance structure choice, such as transacting through grain companies, processors or 
POFs would also be useful in understanding producers’ transaction behaviour.  Mirror-
image questions from the organic producer survey could also be studied in order to 
determine if producer and buyers priorities are in accordance. 
Industrial organization theory could also be used to understand the pricing and 
buying behaviour of organic grain buyers.  An industrial organization approach to 
organic grain markets may yield interesting analysis, looking at characteristics such as 
concentration and pricing behaviour. 
Finally, the involvement of the CWB in the organic wheat industry could be 
examined more fully, including issues such as the viability of the CWB marketing of 
organic grains or examining the options for less CWB involvement with organic wheat.
 166
Bibliography 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. 2002. Manitoba Organic Report 2002. Market 
and Industry Services Branch, Manitoba Regional Office. Website: http://atn- 
riae.agr.ca/region/manitoba/e3327 .htm#2.2 Distribution Channels. Accessed March 17, 
2003. 
 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC). 2004. Organic Statistics 2003 – Canada. 
from “Certified Organic” The Status of the Canadian Organic Market in 2003.  Prepared 
for Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada by Anne Macey, March 2004. 
 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC). 2004. Organic Statistics 2003 – 
Saskatchewan. from “Certified Organic” The Status of the Canadian Organic Market in 
2003.  Prepared for Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada by Anne Macey, March 2004. 
 
Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development (AAFRD). 2004. Western 
Canadian Rail Rates and CWB Deductions. Website: http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca 
/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/econ1523?opendocument. Accessed March 25, 2004. 
 
Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development (AAFRD). 2001. Organic Grain 
and Oilseed Enterprise. AG-Ventures Agdex 100/830-1. 
 
Bamberg, G. and K. Spremann. 1987. Prologue. in Agency Theory, Information and 
Incentives. G. Bamberg and K. Spremann (Eds.). Springer Verlag. Berlin.  
 
Boger, S. 2001. Quality and contractual choice: a transaction cost approach to the Polish 
hog market. European Review of Agricultural Economics. 28(3):241-61. 
 
Buckley, P.J. and M. Chapman. 1997. The perception and measurement of transaction 
costs. Cambridge Journal of Economics 21:127-145. 
 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB). Various years. Canadian Wheat Board Payments.  
www.cwb.ca. Accessed June 9, 2004 
 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB). 2004. About us. Website: http://www.cwb.ca 
/en/about/index.jsp. Accessed October 17, 2004. 
 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB). 2004. Handling Agents. Website: http://www.cwb.ca 
/en/movement/handling_agents/index.jsp. Accessed October 17, 2004. 
 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB). 2004. Domestic Human Consumption price, #1, 
13.5%, basis Thunder Bay.  Received March 17, 2004. 
 
 167
Coase, R.H. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4(16):386-405. 
 
Dorward, A. 2001. The Effects of Transaction Costs, Power and Risk on Contractual 
Arrangements: A Conceptual Framework for Quantitative Analysis. Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 52(2):59-73. 
 
Farmer Direct Cooperative Ltd. 2004. Website: http://www.farmerdirect.ca/ 
index.html. Accessed October 17, 2004. 
 
Fowke, V.C. 1957. The National Policy and the Wheat Economy. University of Toronto 
Press. Toronto. 
 
Hobbs, J.E. 1996. A transaction cost approach to supply chain management. Supply 
Chain Management 1(2):15-27. 
 
Hobbs, J.E. 1997. Measuring the Importance of Transaction Costs in Cattle Marketing. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79 (November 1997): 1083-95. 
 
Hobbs, J.E. and L.M Young. 2000. Closer vertical coordination in agri-food supply 
chains: a conceptual framework and some preliminary evidence. Supply Chain 
Management. 5(3):131-42. 
 
Hodgson, G.M. 1998. Competence and contract in the theory of the firm. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 35(2):179-201. 
 
Kennett, J, M. Fulton, P. Molder and H. Brooks. 1998. Supply chain management: 
the case of a UK baker preserving the identity of Canadian milling wheat. Supply Chain 
Management 3(3):157-66. 
 
Kinnucan, H.W. and Robert G. Nelson. 1993. Vertical Control and the Farm-Retail 
Price Spread for Eggs. Review of Agricultural Economics 15(3):473-81. 
 
Klein, B., R. Crawford, and A. Alchain. 1978. Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law and Economics 21(2): 
233-261.  
 
Kmenta. J. 1997. Elements of Econometrics. 2nd Ed. University of Michigan Press. Ann 
Arbor. 
 
Lach, S. 2002. Existence and Persistence of Price Price Dispersion: an Empirical 
Analysis. The Review of Economics and Statistics 84(3): 433-44. 
 
Lentz, T.D. and J.T. Akridge. 1997. Economic Evaluation of Alternative Supply 
Chains For Soybean Peroxidase. Journal of Food Distribution Research 28(3):28-41. 
 
Mahoney, J.T. 1992. The Choice of Organizational Form: Vertical Financial Ownership 
versus other Methods of Vertical Integration. Strategic Management Journal 13:559-84. 
 168
 
Martinez, S.W., K.E. Smith, and K.D. Zering. 1998. Analysis of Changing Methods 
of Vertical Coordination in the Pork Industry. Journal of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics 30(2):301-11. 
 
McCluskey, J.J. 2000. A Game Theoretic Approach to Organic Foods: An Analysis of 
Asymmetric Information and Policy. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
29(1):1-9. 
 
Mighell, R.L. and Jones, L.A. 1963. Vertical Coordination in Agriculture. USDA-ERS. 
Agricultural Economics Report No. 19. February. 
 
Muth, R.F. 1964. The Derived Demand Curve for a Productive Factor and the Industry 
Supply Curve. Oxford Economics Papers 16:221-34. 
 
Nolan, J.F. 2004. Personal communication with grain transportation expert. March 25, 
2004 
 
North, D.C. 1989. Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction. 
World Development 17(9):1319-32. 
 
Organic Agriculture Centre of Canada (OACC). 2004. Prices for Organic and 
Conventional Food in Canada. 
www.organicagcentre.ca/MarketReports/market_info_prices.html Accessed June 8, 
2004. 
 
Pro-Cert Organic Systems. 2004. Personal communication with employee. July 29, 
2004. 
 
Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization (SAFRR). 2004. Farm 
Machinery Custom and Rental Rate Guide. Crop Development Branch. Regina, SK. 
 
Stigler, G.J. 1961. The Economics of Information. The Journal of Political Economy 
69(3):213-25. 
 
Sykuta, M. and M.L. Cook. 2001. A New Institutional Economics Approach to 
Contracts and Cooperatives. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 83(5) 1273-9. 
 
Williamson, O.E. 1971. The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure 
Considerations. American Economic Review 61(2):112-23. 
 
Williamson, O.E. 1979. Transaction Cost Economics: the governance of contractual 
relations. Journal of Law and Economics 22:233-62. 
 
Williamson, O.E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free Press. New 
York. 
 
 169
Wilson, W.W. and B.L. Dahl. 1999. “Quality Uncertainty in International Grain 
Markets: Analytical and Competitive Issues.” Review of Agricultural Economics. 
21(1):209-2. 
 
Woolridge, J. M. 2003. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Second 
Edition. Thomson South-Western. Mason, OH. 
 170
10 Appendix A: Organic Producer Survey 
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UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN    Code # _________ 
 
CONFIDENTIAL 
 
Organic Producer Survey 
 
Shon Ferguson (306-966-4043 or 306-652-3059) 
Gary Storey      (306-966-4020 or 306-374-1693) 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this survey.  All information will be treated in the 
strictest of confidence. 
 
Part 1   Production Information for Organic Commodities Produced. 
 
1.1 When was your first transition year for organic production? __________ 
 
1.2 When was your first certification year for organic production? ____________ 
 
1.3 Please tell us the total cultivated area of your farm for the previous three years. 
 
Cultivated 
Area: 
Certified Organic 
(acres) 
Transition 
(acres) 
Non-Certified  
(acres) 
Total 
land 
(acres) 
2003     
2002     
2001     
 
Part 2   Marketing Organic Crops 
 
We are particularly interested in all aspects of crop marketing, including who buys your 
crops, your marketing practices, the particular problems you have, and suggestions for 
improvement.   
 
2.1   Marketing of Hard Red Spring Wheat (HRSW), oats, lentils and flaxseed  
 
2.1.1) We are interested in the prices that you receive for the different market outlets that 
you use to sell your organic crops.  Please fill in the information for HRSW, oats, brown 
flax and laird lentil sales that you have made in the calendar years of 2001 and 2002. 
 
If you do not have the exact information in your records, please make an approximation.  
In the case where dates are asked and you do not know the exact date, please 
approximate to the part of the month (ex: early March) 
NOTE: If you are uncomfortable including the name of your buyer, please describe the 
type of buyer it is (ex: large grain company, small grain company, local farmer, miller, 
broker working on commission, Marysburg group, Farmer Direct, etc.) 
The buyer’s location can be described by their country, state or province. 
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Sale #1 Buyer name (or buyer type) and location: ___________________ 
a) Crop and Variety _____________________ 
b) Quantity _______ 
c) Farm Price __________ 
d) Marketer name (if different from buyer)____________ Marketing tariff ($ or %)_____ 
e) Who did the Producer Direct Sale? (HRSW sales only) ________ 
f) What was the Producer Direct Sale fee? (HRSW sales only)  _________$/tonne 
g) Did you pay for cleaning?  Yes ____ No _____ 
h) Did you pay for bagging?  Yes ____ No ______ 
i) Grade  ________ 
j) Protein content (HRSW only)________ 
k) Date that contract was made  ___________ 
l) Date that the price was set ___________ 
m) Delivery date ___________ 
n) Did the buyer pay for trucking from the farm?  Yes____ No____   
o) Where did the truck take your grain? _____________   unsure ___ 
p)Date that you were paid ____________ 
q) How was sample delivered?  Personally ____   Mail ____   Bus ____  No sample___ 
r) First time selling to this buyer?   Yes____  No____ 
s) Was the buyer bonded?   Yes____ No_____ Unsure ______ 
t) Were there any problems? Yes _____ No _____ 
u) What tests did you provide the buyer? (tick) 
v) Protein___  Falling #___  Test weight___  Other (describe)__________________ 
w) U.S. sales only: v)   Did you fax documents to the U.S. border?  Yes___  No___ 
x)  Did you pay the customs agent fee?  Yes___   No___ 
 
Sale #2 Buyer’s Name (or buyer type) and Location ___________________________ 
a) Crop and Variety _____________________ 
b) Quantity _______ 
c) Price __________ 
d) Marketer name (if different from buyer)____________ Marketing tariff ($ or %) __ 
e) Who did the Producer Direct Sale? (HRSW only) ________ 
f) What was the Producer Direct Sale fee? (HRSW only)  _________$/tonne 
g) Sold cleaned?  Yes ____ No _____ 
h) Sold bagged?  Yes ____ No ______ 
i) Grade  ________ 
j) Protein content (HRSW only)________ 
k) Date that contract was made  ___________ 
l) Date that the price was set ___________ 
m) Delivery date ___________ 
n) Did the buyer pay for trucking from the farm?  Yes____ No____ 
o) Where did the truck take your grain? _____________   I don’t know ___ 
p) Date that you were paid ____________ 
q) How was sample delivered?  Personally ____   Mail ____   Bus ____  No sample___ 
r) First time selling to this buyer?   Yes____  No____ 
s) Was the buyer bonded?   Yes____ No_____ Unsure ______ 
t) Were there any problems? Yes _____ No _____ 
u) What tests did you provide the buyer?   
v) Protein___  Falling #___  Test weight___  Other (describe)_______________________ 
w) U.S. sales only: v)   Did you fax documents to the U.S. border?  Yes___  No___ 
x)   Did you pay the customs agent fee?  Yes___   No___ 
173 
2.2   Costs and Time Spent on Marketing Organic Crops 
 
2.2.1) How far away are the cleaning plants that you use to clean your grains before you 
sell? (This question may not be applicable if you never clean your grain before selling it) 
 
Grain Distance (km, one-way) 
HRSW  
Oats  
Flax  
Lentils  
 
2.2.2) Please describe any trips that you made in 2001 and 2002 that were related to 
marketing your crops.  This can include grower meetings, personal meetings, discussing 
samples in person, certification meetings, group marketing meetings, etc.  Please write 
in the sale numbers from part 2.1 
 
Special 
Trip 
Which 
sales were 
involved? 
What was the purpose of the trip? Total time 
spent (incl. 
driving) 
Km 
(one-
way) 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
7     
8     
 
Please answer the following questions using a typical year as your point of reference.  
That is, do not use as your point of reference a year in which you had little crop to 
market due to drought, hail, or other reasons. 
 
Questions 2.2.3 through 2.2.12 ask you about the rest of the time that you spent 
marketing, not including the special trips and meetings that you mentioned above. 
 
2.2.3 a) Not including special trips or meetings, how much time do you devote per sale 
to determine the reputation of a new buyer? (such as trustworthyness, paying promptly, 
bonded, etc.)   
write in the time you spend for each crop: 
 
b) Please explain your specific activities to determine their reputation: 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 HRSW Oats Flax Lentils 
Time per sale     
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2.2.4 a) Not including special trips or meetings, how much time do you spend per sale, 
to get information on HRSW, oats, flax and lentil prices?   Consider time taken to call 
other producers or buyers, time spent reading information, etc.   
 
write in the time you spend for each crop 
 
b) Please explain your specific activities: 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
c) How much do you pay for marketing publications, information, etc. per year? ____ 
 What type of info do you buy? ______________________________________ 
 
2.2.5 a) Not including special trips or meetings or getting price information, how much 
time do you spend communicating with your buyer to coordinate a sale, on average?  
(talking on the phone and exchanging information, negotiating the details, preparing the 
transaction certificate, loading the truck or rail car, etc.) 
 
write in the time you spend for each crop 
 
b) Please explain your specific activities: 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.2.6) Producer Direct Sale (PDS) 
 
a) If you made HRSW sales where another company performed the Producer Direct 
Sale: 
 
i. How much of your time does it take to perform a PDS, in hours?  
ii. What activities does this include? (driving, etc) 
 Please explain your activities when another company performs the PDS: 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________Total km driven:  
 
b) If you made HRSW sales where you performed the buy-back yourself: 
 
 i. How much of your time does it take to perform a PDS, in hours?  
ii. What activities does this include? (driving, etc) 
 Please explain your specific activities to perform the PDS yourself: 
_______________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________Total km driven: 
 HRSW Oats Flax Lentils 
Time per sale     
 HRSW Oats Flax Lentils 
Time per sale     
 
 
 
 
175 
2.2.7) When looking for a buyer, how many buyers do you contact, and how many 
buyers do you send samples to per sale, on average? 
 
write in the number for each crop 
 
2.2.9 a) How much time does it take to prepare and send one sample to a buyer?  
 
b) Please describe the sample preparation and sample sending process: 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.2.10) How much extra time per sale does it take to sell to the U.S.? (ex: time spent 
faxing papers to the U.S. border and/or dealing with the customs broker) (If applicable) 
 (hours) 
 
2.2.11) How much extra time per sale does it take to sell to other foreign countries? (if 
applicable) (hours) 
 
2.2.12 a) How much time do you spend to have a test done of your grain per sale when 
each of the following tests is needed? 
 
Crop Test Amount of your time 
taken per test 
(preparing sample) 
(hours) 
Km driven 
to 
send/deliver 
sample(s) 
Number of samples 
that you would 
likely send at a time
Wheat     
     
Oats     
     
Flax     
     
     
Lentils     
     
     
 
c) Any other costs to perform these tests?  Please describe: 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 HRSW Oats Flax Lent
ils 
Number of buyers that I contact when I want to sell     
Number of buyers that I send samples to per sale     
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2.3   Challenges Associated with Marketing and Payments 
 
2.3.1 a)From the time you began to produce organic crops(consider all organic crops) 
have you ever not been paid for a sale of organic grain?    Yes ________ No ________ 
Proceed to question 2.3.2 if you answered “No” 
 
b) If you answered “Yes” please give the following details about each non-payment 
situation, including the extra time and money spent dealing with the problem: 
 
Sale 
number 
(or year) 
Crop Company 
type 
CWB 
agent? 
(yes/no) 
Extra time 
spent 
(hours) 
Extra 
money 
spent 
Value 
of sale 
lost 
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
Please provide other details about the problems: 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.3.2 a) From the time you began to produce organic crops, have you ever been paid 
late? 
Yes ________ No __________ 
Proceed to question 2.3.3 if you answered “No” 
 
If you answered “Yes” please give the following details about each late payment 
situation, including the extra time and money spent dealing with the problem: 
Sale 
number 
(or year) 
Crop Company 
type 
CWB 
agent? 
(yes/no)
Days after 
deadline 
Extra time 
spent 
(hours) 
Extra 
money 
spent 
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
Please provide other details about the problems: 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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a) From the time you began to produce organic crops, has the buyer ever said that your 
grain quality was lower than what the contract/agreement had stipulated? (This can 
include quality problems relating to dockage, splits, visual quality, etc.)  
Yes ________ No __________ 
 
(if you answered “No”, then skip the rest of this question and proceed to section 2.4) 
 
b) If you answered “Yes” please give the following details about each quality problem 
situation. 
 
Please provide the relevant details for each instance: 
Trans. 
number 
(or year) 
Crop Company 
type 
CWB 
agent? 
(yes/no) 
Type of 
quality 
problem 
Discoun
t per 
tonne (if 
any) 
Extra 
time 
spent 
(hours) 
Extra 
money 
spent 
        
        
        
 
Please provide other details about the problems related to the quality rejection: 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2.4 Member of a Farmer-controlled marketing agency 
 
Were you a member of a farmer-controlled marketing agency in 2001 and/or 2002? (ex: 
Marysburg Organic Producers, etc.) Yes _____ No _____ 
 
If you answered “no”, please skip this section and proceed to section 2.5 
  
2.4.2 How many hours per year did you spend in the last two years in your capacity as 
a member?  This can include any meetings that you attended, time spent finding out 
about how the company is doing, preparing for the meetings, driving time, etc, plus the 
km driven to get to the meetings. 
 
 2001 activities:___________________________________________________ 
________________________________________    time ____ km ____ 
 2002 activities:___________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________ time ____ km ____ 
 
2.4.3 Do you have any official capacity within the organization?    Yes ___   No ___ 
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If you answered yes to 2.4.3, please explain your involvement 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Were you a preferred member in 2001 or 2002? Yes_____   No______ 
 
If you answered yes, please explain what extra benefits this gave you 
_______________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2.5  Direct Marketing Questions 
 
Skip this section and proceed to 2.6 if you do not process any of your crops yourself or 
you do not have someone else process on your behalf. 
 
2.5.1 a) If you processed some of your crops in 2001 and/or 2002, or if you had 
processing of your crops done for you, please explain what processing you carry out. 
 
This includes breads or other final food products, using any of your organic grains. 
 
2002 
Product Price/unit Value of  
Sales 
Type(s) of 
grain used 
Amount of 
own grain 
used 
Average cost 
per unit to 
process or 
package 
      
      
      
 
2002 
Product Price/unit Value of  
Sales 
Type(s) of 
grain used 
Amount of 
own grain 
used 
Average cost 
per unit to 
process or 
package 
      
      
      
 
2) Please explain what markets you sell into, and explain how you established the 
markets for your processed products. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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2.6   Forward Contracting Questions 
 
2.6.1) Your Satisfaction with Forward Contracts 
 
Please think about the different contracts that you have had in the past. 
 
Rate your satisfaction with the contracts that you have signed when forward contracting 
between 1 and 5, where 1 = very unsatisfied and 5 = very satisfied 
 
Were there any features of those contracts that you did not like? 
If so, please name the features and explain what was bad about it (ex: too constrictive) 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.6.2) Contracting Strategy 
 
Explain how you find buyers to contract with and establish a price: 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Part 3    Organic – Conventional Cost Comparison 
 
We would like you to provide an estimate of what you think the difference in production 
and marketing costs are between organic and conventional grain. 
Ex: if you think production for organic is 10% higher than conventional, write “+10%” 
 
Please write the percentage difference in cost per tonne for each function, for organic 
compared to conventional: 
Function HRSW Oats Flax Lentils 
Production     
Farm Storage     
Grain Cleaning (if applicable)     
Record-Keeping     
Marketing (making sales etc.)     
Transportation from farm (if applicable)     
 
Comparing organic and conventional costs, what areas of your costs do you think are too 
high?  How could you decrease these costs? ___________________________________ 
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Part 4    Your thoughts on the creation of a price information agency 
 
4.1) Please rate each of the following hypothetical information sources in terms of its 
value to you on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is very low value and 5 is very high value. 
 
Also please write a dollar amount that you would be willing to pay per year in order to 
receive that information. 
Lastly, please guess how much time that this information would save you, in hours per 
sale. 
Information service that is provided Rate  
1-5 
$ you 
would 
pay 
Time 
 saved  
(hrs) 
1) Monthly prices that farmers have received plus their 
inventories (via mail) 
   
2) Monthly market outlook and future price forecasts (via 
mail) 
   
3) Daily price offers from organic grain buyers (via e-mail)    
4) Weekly price offers from organic grain buyers (via e-mail    
 
Part 5   Your thoughts on CWB Involvement in Organic Wheat 
 
Think about what it would be like if you sold all of your wheat through the Canadian 
Wheat Board (CWB).  Marketing organic wheat would be exactly the same as marketing 
conventional wheat. 
 
5.1) Do you think that the CWB should begin to market organic wheat and create an 
organic wheat pool account?  Yes ____ No ____ 
5.2) Please state your reason for choosing yes or no: 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Part 6   Relationships with buyers. 
6.1 What buyers want from organic producers   
 
For each grain below, please rank the concerns of your buyers as you see them, listed on 
the left, in terms of their importance from 1 to 5, with 1 being the most important, 2 for 
the next most important, and so on, o 5, the least important. 
Your Buyers’ Concerns: HRSW Oats Flax Lent 
ils 
Quality of producer’s commodity     
Quantity that the producer promised     
Timeliness of producer’s delivery to the buyer     
To buy at a cheap price from the producer     
The farmer’s audit trail is complete     
Other (specify) _________________     
Other (specify) _________________     
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6.2  Marketing problems 
 
Please indicate the extent to which each of the following is a problem to you when 
selling organic grains. 
1 = Not a problem  4 = Relatively significant problem 
 2 = Minor problem  5 = Major problem 
3 = A problem 
Problems HRSW Oats Flax Lent 
ils 
Processors dispute quality upon delivery     
Grain companies dispute quality upon delivery     
Difficult to provide enough high quality grain to meet 
commitments 
    
Buyers do not honour contracts     
Buyers do not pay on time     
Prices are volatile     
Buyers have an “unfair” advantage at knowing what 
my grain is worth 
    
I do not get the best price possible when I sell.     
Not being able to find a buyer when I want to sell     
I have a poor understanding of the final market for the 
products resulting from my crops 
    
I have a poor understanding of my buyers’ business 
situation and problems 
    
Having problems/disputes with buyers when I try to 
market “on my own.” 
    
Other:_________________________________     
Other:_________________________________     
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6.3 Marketer Functions/Services 
 
Please indicate if your primary marketer provides these services, and if so, rate their 
performance.  Also please indicate how important each function/service is to you. 
 
Company name (or describe type) referred to in this question: ____________________ 
 
Tick for YES or NO to indicate if they provide each service, then rate on a scale of 1 to 
5, where 1 is low performance or importance, and 5 is high performance or importance. 
Provided? Functions: 
YES NO
Rate  
Perfor
m 
ance 
Rate  
Impor
t 
ance 
Providing marketing opportunities for me 
throughout the year 
    
Providing marketing opportunities shortly after 
harvest, when I need cash flow 
    
Providing me the option to contract for sale     
Provides high prices, given the realities of the 
market 
    
“Fair” marketer fees     
Provides information on marketing costs, cleaning, 
transportation, etc. 
    
Arranging for trucking from your farm     
Providing assurance of payment to you     
Provides prompt payment after delivery     
Provide information on future prices and market 
potential for my crops 
    
Advising on market and price prospects     
Providing “target pricing” opportunities     
Provides advice on “when to sell” to achieve 
highest price 
    
Provides advice on “what to plant” in new crop 
year 
    
Provides advice on “market prospects” based on the 
quality and quantity that I have grown 
    
Providing me with agronomic info.     
Other:_______________________________     
Other:_______________________________     
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Please describe, in your own words, the marketing problems that the organic industry 
has.  For each problem that you mention, please try to provide a possible solution to the 
problem. 
 
___ Problem _______________________________________________________ 
Solution _______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
___ Problem _______________________________________________________ 
Solution _______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
___ Problem _______________________________________________________ 
Solution _______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
___ Problem _______________________________________________________ 
Solution _______________________________________________________ 
 
In the spaces provided on the left in question 6.3.1 above, please rank the importance of 
each problem that you mentioned. 
 
Part 7  Certification questions 
 
7.1) Please indicate how effective your certification body is at each of the following 
functions.  (Please evaluate their effectiveness in these areas without considering 
whether it is right or wrong that they perform these functions.)   
Also please indicate how important each function is to you. 
 
Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not effective or not important, and 5 is very 
effective or very important. 
Function Rate 
Effectiveness 
Rate 
 
Import 
ance 
Providing efficient and timely certification   
Providing objective certification   
Providing affordable certification   
Providing access to the markets that I wish to sell to   
Helping myself and buyers to connect with each other   
Providing other marketing information (discussion at 
meetings, pamphlets, etc.) 
  
Providing production/agronomic information   
Performing research in agronomy and marketing   
Distributing research knowledge to members   
Participating in the creation of a mandatory national standard   
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7.2) Are you satisfied with the services you are getting from your certifying body? 
Please check one of the following: 
 
 Not   Moderately Neutral  Moderately  Fully 
 Satisfied Satisfied   Satisfied Satisfied 
 _______ ________ _______ ________ _______ 
 
Please explain why you selected the answer in 7.2: ______________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.3) Please indicate how strongly you feel that certification bodies should undertake 
each of the following functions: 
 
1 = Strongly disagree  4 = Somewhat agree 
 2 = Somewhat disagree 5 = Strongly agree 
3 = neutral 
Function 
 
Rate Opinion 
Helping myself and buyers to connect with each other  
Providing other marketing information (discussion at meetings, 
pamphlets, etc.) 
 
Providing production/agronomic information  
Performing research in agronomy and marketing  
Distributing research knowledge to members  
Participating in the creation of a mandatory national standard  
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Part 8 Organic Regulation in Canada 
 
We are interested in your opinion on the way that organic foods are regulated in Canada. 
 
What do you think are the main marketing challenges for the organic grain industry? 
 
Please rank the options in terms of their importance, with 1 being the most important: 
Developing a national organic standard _______ 
Educating consumers about organic food _______ 
Promoting organic food to consumers _______ 
 
Please indicate your opinion regarding organic regulation in Canada. 
 
1 = Strongly disagree  4 = Somewhat agree 
 2 = Somewhat disagree 5 = Strongly agree 
3 = neutral 
 
Statement Rate
Canada currently has a voluntary national organic standard.  
The organic regulatory system in Canada is effective  
Canada should implement a government regulated mandatory national standard  
Canada should implement an industry regulated mandatory national standard.  
Having a mandatory national organic standard in Canada would facilitate 
market access to the United States. 
 
Having a mandatory national organic standard in Canada would facilitate 
market access to Europe. 
 
Having a mandatory national organic standard in Canada would protect 
domestic consumers against fraud (i.e. it would decrease the ability to sell non-
organic commodities as organic). 
 
Having a mandatory national organic standard in Canada would increase the 
profitability of my operation. 
 
I am aware of initiatives that are being undertaken to regulate Canada’s organic 
industry.  
 
Canada has a permanent advisory board made up of industry representatives that 
provide guidance to the government for making revisions to our national 
organic standard and for other policy decisions. 
 
Canada needs a permanent advisory board made up of industry representatives 
that provide guidance to the government for making revisions to our national 
organic standard and for other policy decisions. 
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Part 10   Personal Information 
 
10.1) Age of farm operator   Please check one of the following categories 
 
<20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 >71 
______ ______ ______ _______ ______ _____ 
 
10.2) Highest education achieved by farm operator.  Please check one of the following: 
 
High School Technical  University  University  Other 
  College Bachelors Graduate (Please 
  Or Equivalent  Studies Specify) 
_______ _______ _______ _______   _______ 
 
10.3) Net Farm Income  
 
Please select a category that represents your net income from farming operations. (i.e. 
gross farm income less all costs related to the farm operation) for a typical year. 
 
$-10,000 to $0 _______ 
$0 to $10,000 _______ 
$10,001 to 20,000 _______ 
$20,001 to $30,000  _______ 
$30,001 to $50,000  _______ 
$50,001 to $75,000  _______ 
$75,001 to $100,000  _______ 
>$100,000 _______ 
 
10.4)  a)Would you like to become a member of a farmer-owned or farmer-controlled 
marketer? (If you aren’t a member of one already) 
    Yes ______ No ______ 
 
10.5) If you were to give yourself an hourly wage (i.e. value your time per hour), what 
would that value be, in dollars per hour? _______  
 
10.6) Do you use the internet to market your organic grains? Yes_____ No_____ 
 
10.7) If you answered “yes’ to 10.6, would you have the internet if you weren’t using it   
for organic marketing? Yes_____   No_____ 
 
10.8) What percentage of your computer usage is devoted to selling organic grain? ___ 
 
10.9) What percentage of your fax machine usage is devoted to selling organic grain? __
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Appendix B: Organic Wheat Production Costs 
1999 Organic Dryland Wheat Costs and Returns 
  Total $ $/Acre $/Bushel
A  Yield per acre 35.25bu/ac  
     Expected market price per bushel $7.12  
     Crop Sales  17074.00 250.83 
     Crop Insurance receipts  146.35 2.15 
     Miscellaneous receipts  771.23 11.33 
Gross Returns  17991.58 264.31 7.50
   
B 1) Seed and seed cleaning  832.96 12.24 
    2) Fertilizer 14P  333.39 4.90 
    3) Chemicals  0.00 0.00 
    4) Hail/Crop insurance  90.94 1.34 
    5) Trucking and Marketing  86.43 1.27 
    6) Fuel  720.00 10.58 
    7) Irrigation fuel and electricity  0.00 0.00 
    8) Repairs – machine  819.09 12.03 
    9) Repairs – buildings  586.80 8.62 
   10) Utilities and misc. expenses  583.63 8.57 
   11) Custom work and specialized labour  43.86 0.64 
   12) Operating interest paid  31.59 0.46 
   13) Paid labour and benefits (19 hours)  182.55 2.68 
   14) Unpaid labour (112 hours)  1117.27 16.41 
Total Variable Costs  5428.71 79.75 2.26
   
C 1) Cash/share rent and land lease  91.08 1.34 
    2)Taxes, water rates, licenses and            
        insurance 
 324.29 4.76 
    3) Equipment and building    
                                       (a) depreciation 
 1829.86 26.88 
                                       (b) lease payments  0.00 0.00 
     4) Paid capital interest  474.55 6.97 
Total Capital Costs  2719.78 39.96 1.13
   
D  Cash costs                       (B+C-B14-C3)  5201.36 76.41 2.17
E  Total Production Costs    (B+C)  8148.49 119.71 3.40
   
F  Gross Margin                    (A-D)  12790.22 187.90 5.33
     Return to Unpaid Labour (A-E +B14)  10960.36 161.02 4.57
     Return to Investment        (A-E+C14) 3.2% 10317.64 151.57 4.30
     Return to Equity               (A-E)  9843.09 144.60 4.10
   
Source: Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development (2001) 
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1999 Organic Dryland Wheat Costs and Returns Continued 
  Total $ $/Acre $/Bushel
Investment   
Land  55.564.29 816.28 
Buildings  7518.41 110.45 
Machinery  16369.65 240.48 
Irrigation equipment  0.00 0.00 
Total  79452.35 1167.22 
   
Source: Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development (2001) 
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Appendix C: Test of Significant Difference in POF Price 
Within Crop Years 
The result that producers selling through the POF firm attained much higher prices 
than producers selling through a CWB agent grain company is a significant finding, and 
merits extra investigation to ensure that this result is robust.  This section tests for the 
stability of the POF premium prices over the multiple years of the sample.  If the POF 
prices are significantly higher than the CWB agent grain company prices in each crop 
year in the sample, this result would lend support to the claim that the POF delivers 
higher prices to producers because of its inherent POF characteristics of producer 
control, incentives and information sharing as detailed in the theoretical framework.  If, 
however, the POF firm only provides higher prices in some years or just one of the years 
from which the sample data is taken, this would suggest that the POF may not have 
provided higher prices because of these reasons.  Instead, the POF’s superior 
performance in the overall sample may have been due to circumstances that were present 
in some years and absent in others. 
The price regression similar to Equation 5.1, performed for each crop year, would 
be the best method of testing for significant difference in prices within crop years.  This 
method, however, is not feasible because the regression would not have enough degrees 
of freedom.  A simpler method of testing is thus needed.  A measurement of the 
significance of POF prices is performed by using a two-sample test (Kmenta 1997).  The 
test is performed given two populations with means m1 and m2, estimated variances e1 
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and e2, and total elements n1 and n2.  The test statistic follows a t distribution with (n1 + 
n2 – 2) degrees of freedom, where  
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Significance of the test statistic in each year of the sample would offer support to the 
claim that the characteristics of the POF allow it to attain higher prices for the producer. 
 There are several ways to measure price.  First, the organic prices of the POF and 
CWB agent governance structures are tested or significant difference in each year.  This 
tests whether or not the POF is fetching prices that are significantly higher than the 
alternative CWB agent grain company route.  However, this measurement does not 
account for the fact that the POF may simply be selling at times of the year when the 
price is highest.  A second test is performed that compares the corresponding 
conventional wheat prices that existed at the time of sales for the POF firm versus CWB 
agent grain company sales.  This test allows for the measurement of the POF selling 
when the “general” price of wheat is significantly higher or lower.   
In order to account for the “time of year” effect that is present when comparing 
organic prices within a crop year, the comparison is performed again by finding the 
“organic premium” (organic price minus conventional price) for each observation and 
testing for significant difference between prices of the POF and the CWB agent grain 
company governance structures.  While the first and second approaches provide insight 
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into the prices of the POF, the third approach of using the organic premium is the most 
appropriate method of measuring the price differences of the POF within individual crop 
years.  This method is most appropriate because it measures the ability of the POF to 
find higher organic premiums on a given day. 
The results the tests are given in Table A.3.1.  While observations were plentiful 
for the CWB agent governance structures in each year of the analysis, the POF 
observations were limited.  There were four POF observations in the 2000-01 crop year, 
six observations in the 2001-02 crop year and 1 POF observation in the 2002-03 crop 
year.  The test was thus possible only for the 2000-01 and 2001-02 crop years. 
Table A.3.1 – Test of Significant Difference in Price in 2000-01 and 2001-02 Crop 
Years 
Measure Year Governance 
Structure 
Mean Var. N t-
Statistic 
Organic Price 2000-01      
  POF 309.35 3100.55 4 
  CWB Agent 270.19 3912.16 9 1.07 
       
 2001-02      
  POF 371.94 6419.99 6 
  CWB Agent 281.86 1530.03 21 3.89*** 
       
Conv. Price 2000-01      
  POF 207.19 11.49 4 
  CWB Agent 212.39 122.37 9 -0.90 
       
 2001-02      
  POF 205.36 38.23 6 
  CWB Agent 208.81 110.11 21 -0.76 
       
Price Premium 2000-01      
  POF 102.16 3001.14 4 
  CWB Agent 57.80 2947.87 9 1.36 
       
 2001-02      
  POF 166.58 5959.39 6 
  CWB Agent 73.05 1309.85 21 4.27*** 
       
*** = p<0.01, ***= p<0.05, *= p<0.10   
Source: Author’s calculations   
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In the test of significant difference between POF and CWB agent organic prices, in 
the 2000-01 crop year, the POF prices were higher but not statistically significant.  
However, in the 2001-02 crop year the test finds that the POF prices were higher and 
significant at the 1% level.  This result illustrates that the POF did not provide 
significantly higher prices in all years of the sample, even though POF prices were about 
$40/tonne higher than CWB agent prices in 2000-01.  The variance of the price samples 
was too great to allow for statistical significance in the 2000-01 crop year. 
In the test of significant difference between POF and CWB agent corresponding 
conventional prices, in the 2000-01 crop year, the conventional prices for POF 
transactions were $5/tonne lower compared to when CWB agents sold organic wheat, 
but were but not statistically significant.  A similar result was found in the 2001-02 crop 
year, where the conventional price difference was only $3/tonne.  This result suggests 
that the POF sells at times when the price of conventional wheat is lower compared to 
the sales timing of CWB agents.  Given the assumption that the organic wheat price 
follows the conventional wheat price to some degree, this result suggests that the POF is 
not necessarily selling at time of high prices within each crop year. 
In the test of significance between POF and CWB agent organic premiums, in the 
2000-01 crop year, the POF prices were higher but only significant at the 20% level.  
However, in the 2001-02 crop year, the test finds that the POF prices were higher and 
significant at the 1% level.  The prices provided by the POF were thus weakly 
significant in one year and strongly significant in another year.  This result illustrates 
that the POF did not provide higher prices to the same degree of significance in all years 
of the sample, even though POF prices were about $45/tonne higher than CWB agent 
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prices in 2000-01.  Similar to the first test using organic prices alone, the variance of the 
price samples is too great to allow for strong statistical significance in the 2000-01 crop 
year.  This result lends weak support to the idea that the POF provides producers with 
higher prices due to its inherent characteristics as a POF.   
To conclude, the objective of this analysis is to test whether or not the POF’s 
statistically significant prices from the original price regression hold within crop years.  
A simple two-sample test was employed in order to test this hypothesis.  The results 
indicated that the 2001-02 crop year allowed the POF to provide significantly higher 
prices to its producer members compared to CWB agent transactions, while the prices 
provided by the POF in the 2000-01 crop year were higher but not highly significant.  
The higher prices of the POF cannot be attributed to selling at times when the general 
market prices are higher, as measured by the conventional wheat prices corresponding to 
the dates when POF and CWB agent sales were made.  The POF did not provide 
significantly higher prices than the CWB agent governance structure, but the 
performance of the POF was more consistent when measuring its ability to capture 
higher organic price premiums over conventional prices on a given day, as measured in 
the organic premium test. 
